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by Jordi Ribes Gonza´lez
The cloud computing paradigm provides users with remote access to scalable and pow-
erful infrastructures at a very low cost. While the adoption of cloud computing yields a
wide array of benefits, the act of migrating to the cloud usually requires a high level of
trust in the cloud service provider and introduces several security and privacy concerns.
This thesis aims at designing user-centered techniques to secure an outsourced data set
in the cloud computing context. The studied problems and their treatment stem from
the European Commission H2020 project CLARUS: User-Centered Privacy and Security
in the Cloud. The explored techniques and problems are searching over outsourced data,
outsourcing Kriging interpolation computations, secret sharing and data splitting.
Our first work on the subject of searching over outsourced data concerns symmetric
searchable encryption (SSE) schemes, and develops techniques that enable secure and
efficient two-dimensional range queries in SSE. Our second work tackles this problem
through public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) schemes, and builds efficient
PEKS schemes achieving conjunctive and subset queries.
Our next aim is to securely outsource Kriging computations. Kriging is a spatial inter-
polation algorithm designed for geo-statistical applications. We present a method for
the private outsourcing of Kriging interpolation based on homomorphic encryption.
Secret sharing is a fundamental primitive in cryptography, used in many cloud-oriented
techniques. One of the most important efficiency measures in secret sharing is the
optimal information ratio. Since computing the optimal information ratio of an access
structure is generally hard, we find properties that facilitate its description.
Our final contribution concerns the privacy-preserving data splitting technique, which
aims at protecting data privacy by storing different fragments of data at different lo-
cations. We analyze the data splitting problem from a combinatorial point of view,
bounding the number of fragments and proposing various algorithms to split the data.
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RAM Random Access Machine
ROM Random Oracle Model
RP Results Pattern
SE Searchable Encryption
SEAL Simple Encrypted Arithmetic Library
SHE Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption
SP Size Pattern
SSE Searchable Symmetric-key Encryption
WFS Web Feature Service Interface Standard
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Outline of the Thesis
This thesis is organized in six chapters.
Chapter 1 states the thesis aims and objectives and frames it in the CLARUS project.
It also outlines the directions taken in our research, and introduces the results contained
in the remainder of the thesis.
Chapter 2 introduces some basic cryptographic preliminaries required throughout the re-
maining material. It briefly explains symmetric-key and public-key encryption schemes,
provable security, hash and pseudorandom functions, and introduces homomorphic en-
cryption schemes, searchable encryption schemes and secret sharing schemes.
Our results in the field of searchable encryption are presented in Chapter 3. This chapter
is divided in two sections. Section 3.1 describes our approach to enable two-dimensional
range queries over encrypted data, aimed at dealing with geo-referenced data sets. Sec-
tion 3.2 describes two proposed PEKS schemes, which achieve conjunctive and subset
queries with great efficiency.
Chapter 4 states our contributions to secure outsourced computation. We focus in
outsourcing Kriging interpolation computations to the cloud, which applies to a practical
use case where sensitive16 measurements are taken at certain geographic locations. We
protect measurement data as well as interpolation results, and we additionally support
architectures with multiple writers and a single reader.
Our contributions to the field of secret sharing are stated in Chapter 5. Our main
contribution in this chapter states that close access structures admit secret sharing
schemes with similar information ratio. We show that this property is also true for
other families of secret sharing schemes and models of computation such as linear secret
sharing schemes, span programs and Boolean formulas and circuits.
Chapter 6 presents our results in data splitting. We give a new combinatorial formulation
to the data splitting problem, which consists in splitting sensitive data into several
fragments. Through this formulation, we take two different approaches to solve the data
splitting problem. The first one exploits algebraic techniques to compute all possible
optimal decompositions. The second one sacrifices the solution optimality to achieve
polynomial running time.
xvii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter we motivate the directions taken in our research, and we briefly intro-
duce each of the contributions in this thesis. This chapter is divided in five sections.
In Section 1.1 we give a general account of cryptography. In Section 1.2 we expose
the security and privacy concerns in cloud computing that motivate our research. We
also present the CLARUS project, whose use cases and requirements guide all of our
research. Next, in Section 1.3 we lay out the research directions taken in this thesis,
explaining the topics we deal with and listing some of the applicable existing techniques.
In Section 1.4 we give a general description of each of the contributions of this thesis.
Finally, Section 1.5 lists the publications emanating from this thesis.
1.1 Cryptography
In recent years, the adoption of information technologies has seen a global and ceaseless
growth, which in turn has boosted the relevance of IT security in society. Nowadays,
securing information and digital systems is a priority for governments, businesses and
users alike. We see cryptographic techniques as one of the strongest and most critical
backbones in many of the technical measures taken to provide digital security in this
context.
Cryptography is a discipline that studies techniques to transform information in order
to achieve certain information security goals. Cryptography was originally born as the
study of encryption schemes, which are algorithmic constructions whose main aim is to
provide secure communication between two parties in the presence of an eavesdropper.
Using encryption schemes, a user can protect a plaintext message at the source and send
the resulting ciphertext over an insecure channel, preventing eavesdropping third parties
to read the message in transit and preserving data confidentiality.
While encryption schemes are ubiquitous in all sorts of information systems, there exist
other real-world security needs that can be addressed by cryptographic means. As a field,
cryptography has evolved to consider a wide range of information security objectives,
user architectures and functionalities. Real-world scenarios may require security objec-
tives beyond data confidentiality, for example data integrity, message authentication and
non-repudiation of signatures. Also, in practice users can take part in complex architec-
tures, as in the case where messages are broadcasted to a wide audience and should only
1
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reach authorized recipients. Finally, one may wish to carry out functionalities richer
than simple communication, such as computing over encrypted data. Alternative fac-
tors, such as the exponential increases in computational power that quantum computing
promises, have also driven the expansion of cryptographic research.
One of the main strengths of modern cryptography lies in its methodical treatment of
security. In the cryptographic design process, real-world adversaries are modelled as
abstract algorithms, and security goals are described through rigorous security defini-
tions. Security definitions consist of two components: a threat model and a security
guarantee. The threat model shapes the potential adversaries, specifying computational
and functional restrictions to match the abilities of the adversaries in the actual sce-
nario where attacks may take place. The security guarantee establishes the necessary
conditions to assert that any given adversary breaks the security of the scheme. In this
context, cryptographic constructions are often proven secure against security definitions.
This approach allows to build very robust constructions that are secure according to the
considered security guarantee, and that resist all adversaries that fit the threat model.
We note that adversaries are allowed to take arbitrary strategies within the threat model
constraints.
All this said, we must remind that cryptography is not the only security ingredient of
information systems. In practice, cryptographic designs are implemented in software
products and in hardware technologies, which in turn are connected to networks and
embedded in complex societal systems involving users, companies, infrastructures, eco-
nomics and laws. The security of all components in play must be taken into account
in order to fulfill the guarantees that cryptography promises. Cryptography by itself,
even when properly designed and implemented, does not suffice to provide security in
practice.
This thesis is directed at studying cryptographic techniques to address data security and
privacy issues raised in cloud computing. We seek for techniques set in the client-server
model. The client-server model takes place between a client and a server, and the client
starts the communication by requesting access to the resources of the server, who in turn
provides a service to the client. In the setting we consider, the client uploads a protected
data set to a cloud server and then wants to remotely execute some functionality over
the outsourced data. The obtained solutions must be user-centered, meaning both the
data protection and the storage of keying material must be carried out at the client
trusted zone. They must also provide end-to-end security, meaning that the data must
stay in a protected form whenever it leaves the client trusted zone. Finally, the sought
techniques must efficiently support functionalities arising in cloud computing, as can be
searching over the outsourced data, computing on the outsourced data or controlling
access to the outsourced data.
A natural approach to enhance security in the client-server model is to encrypt the
whole data set in a straightforward way, using traditional encryption schemes, prior to
outsourcing it. However, this approach diminishes the benefits of cloud computing, since
it forces users to retrieve the whole encrypted data set and locally decrypt it in case
they want to make use of the data. To solve this issue, recent cryptographic research
focuses on developing special encryption techniques that enable the secure delegation of
particular functionalities over encrypted data to the cloud. Some of these functionalities
are searching for data items which contain certain keywords, ordering data, computing
statistics or restricting data access to particular users.
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In this thesis we seek techniques to efficiently delegate useful functionalities to the cloud
while keeping the outsourced data set private. We approach three cryptographic tech-
niques that fit this description: Searchable Encryption, Homomorphic Encryption and
Attribute-Based Encryption. These techniques aim at delegating three of the main func-
tionalities that are difficult to execute remotely in an efficient way when using traditional
encryption schemes, namely searching, computing and controlling data access. Some of
the obtained solutions, particularly for searchable and homomorphic encryption, have
been implemented as privacy-preserving mechanisms in a cloud security toolkit [1].
Searchable encryption schemes are cryptographic schemes that enable searching over
encrypted data. By using searchable encryption schemes, users can encrypt a data set in
a specific way and upload it to the cloud, and still preserve remote searching capabilities.
After the outsourcing phase, users can retrieve the segment of records in the outsourced
data set that satisfy certain query conditions by sending an encrypted query to the cloud.
All this process is carried out efficiently and in such a way that information leakage is
reduced and data confidentiality is ensured. Since remote searching capabilities take
a central role in the business logic of many commercial and industrial applications,
searchable encryption schemes can provide huge security benefits in many applications.
Next, we approach homomorphic encryption schemes. An encryption scheme is homo-
morphic if it allows to encrypt data in a way that enables computing on the resulting
ciphertexts. Given two ciphertexts generated with an homomorphic encryption scheme,
it is possible to operate on them to produce a third ciphertext. This is done so that
the performed operations translate to operations in the underlying plaintexts, thus al-
lowing to effectively perform computations over encrypted data. Remotely performing
computations is a major feature of cloud computing, and outsourcing computations on
encrypted data can be very convenient for a wide range of applications.
Attribute-based encryption schemes are cryptographic encryption schemes that enable
fine-grained access control to the encrypted data. Attribute-based encryption schemes
are used concurrently by a set of users, and they typically rely on a central authority. In
a setup stage, the central authority creates keying material and distributes secret keys
to each user individually. Then, users are able to encrypt messages while designating a
set of authorized recipients, without requiring any interaction with the central authority
in the process. As a result, only authorized users are able to decrypt the resulting
ciphertext, thus providing access control over the original message.
Additionally, in this thesis we explore data splitting, which is a non-cryptographic data
anonymization tool. Data splitting is a privacy-preserving technique that consists in
dividing sensitive tabular data into fragments, in such a way that individual fragments
do not disclose any confidential information. Data privacy is enforced by allocating data
fragments at different non-communicating servers. This approach is particularly suitable
for multi-cloud architectures, where a single client operates with several independent
cloud service providers.
1.2 Cloud Computing
The cloud computing paradigm enables the outsourcing of data storage and data com-
putation to external servers, relieving storage and computational burden off of users. By
using cloud computing services, users can benefit of top-of-the-line IT infrastructures
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while saving on operational and maintenance costs. All this is achieved by providing
users with remote access to a shared pool of computing systems, whose resources are
managed to simultaneously meet all issued requests. The use of cloud technologies has
seen tremendous growth over the past few years. Cloud computing brings economic and
practical benefits such as ubiquitous access, scalable infrastructures and reduced costs.
Over time, cloud adoption has led to a wide dissemination of computing capabilities and
services, benefiting society at large.
Nowadays, many popular distributed applications take advantage of the cloud computing
paradigm. Cloud infrastructures allow organizations to provide multiple users with
remote access to services at an affordable price, sometimes even to a universal audience
and at no cost to the end user. Some of the most frequently outsourced services are e-
mail, conferencing, web mapping, file sharing, storage and computing solutions, and the
deployment of other services in the cloud is expected to grow in the future. Leading cloud
benefits reported by organizations mainly relate to a faster and cheaper access to high-
end platforms, since cloud computing increases performance and lowers operational costs
with respect to in-house computing infrastructures. Reported benefits also include data
ubiquity and data availability, since cloud service providers often use data redundancy
to achieve fault-tolerance and to prevent data loss.
Whereas migrating to the cloud can indeed bring great benefits to data owners and
users, it also introduces several security and privacy concerns related to the fact that
the cloud service provider has full access to the outsourced data. These concerns are
considered to be the main barrier to the implementation of cloud strategies. Outsourcing
sensitive data and computations to the cloud requires a high amount of trust in the cloud
service provider and in the security measures it applies. By agreeing to the terms of
service of cloud services, users frequently give up the ownership of their data and accept
the usage of insufficient security measures. Still nowadays, many cloud services store
data at rest in an unencrypted form, leaving it open to all kinds of attacks. Many
recent data breach cases have been caused by poor implementation practices or by the
adoption of inappropriate security measures. Furthermore, outsourced data is often sold
to data brokers unknowingly to users, increasing the attack surface and exposing the
likely sensitive data to potentially malicious actors.
This state of affairs is aggravated by the tremendous growth of cloud adoption. Indeed,
recent data breaches [2, 3] include half a billion records leaked only in 2016, many
of them containing personal details, credit card information, e-mail passwords, health
records and full bank account details. Poor security measures and plain public release
are among the main reported causes of data leakage. For a recent survey on the current
state of privacy and security issues in cloud computing, see [4, 5].
Due to the current data breach outbreak, cloud technologies are often regarded as in-
secure by users with serious data privacy needs or with a privacy-aware mindset. The
main perceived threats to data confidentiality in the outsourcing process are that the
security mechanisms offered by cloud service providers are usually exclusively located
within the cloud platform, and that the cloud service provider has full access to the
possibly sensitive data. If users want to implement a cloud strategy, this situation com-
pels them to either completely trust cloud service providers, agreeing with their privacy
policies and relying on the security measures they may implement, or to take action
and seek additional legal regulations and technical measures in order to guarantee the
privacy of their data.
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On the legal side, and in an effort to mitigate this situation, several regulations have
been put in place with the aim of giving control over data back to users and of enforcing
the implementation of appropriate technical safeguards. Some examples of such policies
are the recently approved E.U. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which
regulates the processing and movement of personal data of EU citizens, the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which regulates the use and
disclosure of Protected Health Information in the U.S., and the E.C. INSPIRE directive,
which defines a framework to enable the sharing of environmental spatial information
among public sector organizations.
On the technical side, a reasonable approach to address security and privacy concerns
in this setting is to apply additional privacy-preserving measures in the client side.
Therefore, over the last few years there have been massive research efforts in order
to design user-centered solutions that provide appropriate security guarantees to cloud
users without trumping the performance and cost-saving benefits of cloud architectures.
Data encryption techniques are among the candidate solutions to address privacy issues
in this context. The application of these techniques would benefit both end users and
cloud service providers, as enhancing trust in cloud storage would clearly foster the
migration to cloud architectures.
1.2.1 CLARUS
This thesis is carried out in the frame of the European Commission project CLARUS:
User-Centered Privacy and Security in the Cloud, funded under the EU Framework Pro-
gramme for Research and Innovation Horizon 2020. The CLARUS project was launched
on January 1st 2015, and ended in December 31st 2017. The CLARUS consortium was
integrated by leading players in security development and research, including the Univer-
sitat Rovira i Virgili, the Royal Holloway University of London, Eurecom, the Katholieke
Universiteit Leuven, Thales Services, AKKA Technologies, Trust-it, Montimage, Offis
EV and the Fundacio´ Cl´ınic per a la Recerca Biome`dica. All solutions proposed in
this thesis emanate from use cases, requirements and specifications suggested during the
course of the project (see [1]).
The main aim of CLARUS is to develop a framework to assure secure storage and
processing of data outsourced to the cloud, in the face of a not fully trusted cloud service
provider. The CLARUS project seeks to develop a proxy that is able to interoperate
with cloud servers through standard communication interfaces, and which provides cloud
users with adequate security measures in this context. The proxy is assumed to be
deployed on a local environment trusted by the cloud user, and the cloud user is thought
to interact with the cloud through this proxy. The proxy protects confidential and
sensitive data towards the cloud service provider, and it must operate transparently for
the cloud user. The implemented privacy and security techniques must allow end users
to securely store, exploit, monitor, audit and control their outsourced data while still
gaining all the practical and cost-saving benefits that cloud services bring. Our objective
in this thesis is to contribute to the pool of privacy-enhancing techniques suitable for
CLARUS. Some of the techniques proposed in this thesis have been implemented in the
CLARUS suite [1].
The CLARUS proxy is divided in four inter-communicating modules: the CLARUS
access module, the access policy and key management module, the data operations
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module and the monitoring and administration module. The CLARUS access module
provides users with access to the CLARUS proxy deployed in their local premises. The
access policy and key management module manages all the keying materials and data
access policies. The data operations module implements the data protection techniques
and applies them to input data. All the previous modules follow a plug-in approach,
where supported protocols and techniques can be conveniently installed, uninstalled and
configured. Finally, the monitoring and administration module implements intrusion-
tolerant measures and is used to configure all other modules. The CLARUS solution
has been implemented as an extensible application in the Java 8 platform, and code
dependencies have been managed with Maven.
There exist a wealth of service suites alternative to CLARUS that share part of its ob-
jectives. The most well-recognized system is CryptDB [6], which aims at providing data
confidentiality in SQL databases. Another similar project is MONOMI [7], which aims
to improve CryptDB to allow more complex queries. Other similar tools implementing
data encryption techniques for cloud environments are CipherCloud [8, 9], SecureCloud
[10], PerspecSys [11], BoxCryptor [12] and CloudFogger [13]. There also exist several
FP7 and H2020 projects aimed at data protection in the cloud, such as CloudSpaces
[14], TRESSCA [15], ESCUDO-CLOUD [16] and MUSA [17]. One of the main differ-
ences between CLARUS and other existing projects lies in the considered techniques,
since both cryptographic and data anonymization techniques have been implemented.
Another key difference is the user-centered approach, because the proxy is considered to
be deployed in a trusted zone owned by the user.
The threat model followed in CLARUS considers the cloud service providers as the
adversaries, and defines both honest-but-curious and malicious adversaries. Honest-but-
curious cloud service providers may passively eavesdrop on all the data made available
to them while following the prescribed protocols, and malicious cloud service providers
can both eavesdrop and perform active attacks by deviating from the protocols.
The architectural frames considered in CLARUS include multi-user and multi-cloud set-
tings, i.e., they admit one or many users communicating with one or many cloud servers
through a single dedicated proxy. In this setting, end users are classified according to
their roles into three classes: security managers, data providers and data consumers.
Security managers are in charge of configuring access control and technical aspects of
the CLARUS proxy, managing security policies and selecting access protocols and secu-
rity techniques according to user needs. Data providers may use the CLARUS proxy to
securely store data in the cloud. Data consumers may want to interact with the cloud
infrastructure to access the data or to perform some action on it, having previously
received authorization from the corresponding data providers.
One of the functionalities to be supported by CLARUS is the ability to create and
store data securely. Data retrieval must also be implemented, and enabled queries must
include searching by id and searching according to other identified complex queries.
Support for dynamic data sets is a requisite as well, and thus updating data items by
id and by other attributes is required. Finally, performing some identified computations
over the outsourced data is also a requirement. In summary, the considered use cases
demand two main functionalities to be delegated to the cloud: searching over outsourced
data and computing on outsourced data.
Two business application cases of interest have been contemplated in the CLARUS
project, one dealing with e-health data sets and the other dealing with geo-referenced
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data sets. The user and technical requirements for the CLARUS solution have been
motivated by these use cases.
In the e-health scenario, we study the outsourcing of electronic health records (EHRs),
which for instance can consist of result reports, clinical notes, diagnostics (ICD-10) and
lab results (LOINC). The typical volume of medical data sets and the need for data
ubiquity and availability make the cloud infrastructure an appealing tool for hospital
information systems. However, the sensitive and highly personal nature of medical data
makes outsourcing a high-risk operation if no proper security guarantees are taken. In
this respect, several legislative measures stipulate that medical data must be adequately
protected.
In the cloud computing setting, data consumers may want to access patient data in order
to retrieve a segment of the medical data according to a set of attributes, such as the id
of a certain patient or the ICD-10 number corresponding to a certain disease. Medical
data consumers may need to update or remove data as well. In turn, data owners may
want to control which data consumers are allowed to access any given document, for
instance to restrict access to patient history to the authorized personnel. Performing
statistical computations on the outsourced data, such as means, standard deviations
and frequencies, may also be of interest. We seek to apply suitable cryptographic tech-
niques that adequately protect the outsourced medical data while enabling the required
functionalities to be carried out over the protected data.
The requirements considered in this domain stem from the use cases proposed by the bio-
medical research-oriented CLARUS partner Fundacio´ Cl´ınic per a la Recerca Biome`dica.
The requirements here mainly focus in single user architectures, where a single actor both
owns and manages the outsourced sensitive information. This actor can be thought of as
the medical institution in charge of the EHRs of the patients. Functionalities to support
include creating, updating and removing medical histories from a single patient (i.e., by
id), and retrieving the history of a single patient. Shared access to the EHRs according
to access policies specified by the data providers is also desirable.
In the geo-referenced data case, we study the outsourcing of confidential data containing
locations and measurements of critical natural earth resources as water boreholes, min-
erals or rare earth materials. Geo-referenced data may be judged sensitive, for instance
because of its high business potential or its private nature.
In the cloud storage setting, data consumers may want to access the data in order to
retrieve a segment of it. In this case the issued queries can take specially complex
forms, for instance when they refer to particular geographic areas. Data consumers
may also want to remotely perform geo-statistical computations on dynamic data sets.
Among such computations we highlight the Kriging interpolation algorithm [18–21],
which is of particular relevance in this context. We seek for cryptographic techniques
that protect the outsourced data while enabling meaningful geographic queries and the
private evaluation of geo-statistical computations.
The considered requirements have their source in industrial users dealing with ground-
water borehole data in France (maintained by the BRGM [22]) and borehole data from
the oil industry in Denmark and Greendland (maintained by GEUS [23]), and fall into
the themes and topics specified in the INSPIRE directive. In order to comply with this
directive, we must take into account data provided by multiple users and distributed
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among multiple cloud servers. Main functionalities to support in this setting are creat-
ing, updating and removing outsourced spatial data, retrieving data that lies in some
specified geographical location and remotely performing specific computations over the
outsourced data. In the spirit of the INSPIRE directive, shared access to spatial data
according to access policies specified by the data providers is also desirable.
1.3 Research Directions
In this section we survey the different research themes explored during the course of the
thesis. The taken research directions are clearly motivated by the CLARUS use cases
stated above, and can be broadly divided into four topics: searching over outsourced
data, computing over outsourced data, the efficiency of secret sharing schemes and
privacy-preserving allocation of data.
Searching over outsourced data refers to the act of retrieving the segment of records
of an outsourced data set that satisfy certain query conditions. It can be argued that
searching is one of the most basic operations that can be carried out on outsourced
data. Since remote searching capabilities take a central role in the business logic of many
commercial and industrial applications, solutions to search securely over outsourced data
can provide huge security benefits. Achieving secure search over encrypted data may
help in solving security issues related to storage and database servers, enhance security
in e-mail routing, or even aid in overcoming legal difficulties due to data extradition
treaties.
Computing over outsourced data is also a central functionality to cloud computing.
Due to the major performance advantage and the data ubiquity and availability fea-
tures provided by cloud infrastructures, remotely performing computations can be very
convenient for a wide range of applications. Such applications include for instance com-
puting statistical indicators, accounting and financial applications, e-voting or machine
learning.
Secret sharing is a fundamental cryptographic primitive that allows the distribution
of a secret amongst parties, in such a way that the distributed shares do not hold
any information on the secret. By combining together some of the shares, parties are
able to reconstruct the secret. Secret sharing has found applications in many cloud-
oriented cryptographic techniques, the most relevant to our setting being attribute-based
encryption. Attribute-based encryption schemes [24] can be built by embedding secret
sharing into public-key constructions. The efficiency of secret sharing as a primitive has
a considerable impact on the storage and computational cost of the resulting attribute-
based encryption schemes, and thus we seek for properties that help in analyzing and
quantifying this efficiency.
Privacy-preserving allocation of data refers to storing fragments of a data set at different
locations to enhance privacy. In order to guarantee data availability and integrity,
cloud users often adopt a multi-cloud approach in their cloud strategy. Data splitting
techniques are implemented in multi-cloud architectures, and they are supported in a
variety of database management systems (such as SQL or MongoDB) in the form of
database shards and partitions, where they provide flexibility and data redundancy.
Data splitting can also be adopted to mitigate data privacy concerns, and we explore
the efficiency and the feasibility of this privacy-preserving method.
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This section is divided into four parts, corresponding to each of the four different topics
laid out in the preceding paragraphs. After briefly introducing each topic and the
security concerns behind it, we give an overview of existing solutions that tackle the
exposed security and privacy issues, and we briefly comment on the particular direction
taken in our research.
1.3.1 Searching over Outsourced Data
Retrieving outsourced data selectively is a basic functionality of cloud storage servers.
Searching over outsourced data is a fundamental feature required in a wealth of appli-
cations, such as file storage systems, outsourced backup services, accounting systems
or e-mail servers. Such applications benefit greatly from the economic and operational
advantages that cloud computing brings. However, entrusting cloud service providers
with the data set, with the query and with the search execution encompasses many pri-
vacy threats, since it compels users to completely trust cloud service providers on their
privacy policy and on the security measures they may implement.
To address the aforementioned issues we consider user-centered security measures, in
which information is protected at the user’s trusted zone prior to outsourcing it. In
this respect, the security techniques to be considered in the context of searching over
outsourced data may vary mainly according to two factors: the security aims and the
architectural setting.
As for the security aims to be considered, we can classify potentially sensitive information
in this context into three classes: outsourced data, query data and search information.
Outsourced data refers to information enclosed in the data set owned by the user, such
as the data content or the number of data items. In case users delegate data of sensitive
nature, as in the use cases posed in CLARUS, data items may need to be protected.
Query data refers to data enclosed in queries. Queries themselves can be of a sensitive
nature, for instance if they contain personal information details, which may reveal infor-
mation on the outsourced data. Among the query data, we highlight the search pattern.
The search pattern is the information of whether any two given queries are identical or
not. Finally, search information fits all the data generated in the searching process, such
as the number of data items that match a given query. Among the search information,
we highlight the access pattern, which is the knowledge of which outsourced data items
match any given query.
The architectural frame where the searching process takes place involves three distinct
types of actors: writers, readers and the cloud service provider. Writers are cloud users
in charge of outsourcing the data (i.e., data providers), and readers hold the ability
to remotely search over the outsourced data (i.e., data consumers). The architectural
setting can be single or multi-cloud depending on the number of involved cloud service
providers. Likewise, we depict four possible architectures according to cloud users:
• Single user: This is the simplest context, where a single user outsources a data
set and wants to query over it remotely. An example application could be a file
storage service without sharing capabilities.
• Single reader, multiple writers: In this setting, multiple users push searchable data
to the cloud so that a single user is able to search over the outsourced data. This
may be the case in e-mail or sensor network applications.
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• Multiple readers, single writer: In this context, a single user pushes data to the
cloud so that a set of user-defined readers can search over the outsourced data.
As an example, some single-writer electronic message boards or file storage servers
can fit this setting.
• Multiple readers and writers: This is the most complex setting, where each of a
set of users is able create searchable content for a chosen set of users. This could
be the case in a file storage service with sharing capabilities.
Other considerations can also apply, such as computational limitations, whether the
data set is to remain static throughout the whole searching process, or if dynamic data
sets are allowed.
In this thesis we analyze the cryptographic approach to solve the data confidentiality
issues related to searching over outsourced data. The principal techniques considered to
this aim are Searchable Encryption (SE), Oblivious RAM (ORAM) and Private Informa-
tion Retrieval (PIR). In this thesis we provide solutions based on SE, which is arguably
the most practical technique for secure delegated search. Although not as relevant to
the searching case, other techniques such as Order-Preserving Encryption (OPE) and
Public-Key Encryption with Equality Test are also useful in some applications involving
secure search.
Searchable Encryption was first instantiated by Song, Wagner and Perrig [25] in 2000.
SE schemes aim at encrypting the data contents while enabling secure search over the
outsourced data. Typically, SE schemes leak the search and access patterns in order to
achieve greater efficiency, and protect the remaining query and search data. While this
security and efficiency trade-off has been shown to induce leakage-abuse attacks [26–32]
in various cases, SE is the only cryptographic solution known to date that allows clients to
remotely perform queries on an outsourced encrypted data set with near-optimal search
efficiency. Moreover, most SE schemes require very low to no interactivity, constant
client computational complexity and linear to sublinear search time.
Oblivious RAM was first formulated by Goldreich in 1987 [33]. ORAM achieves the high-
est security features and protects all data contents and the search and access patterns.
However, the practical applicability of ORAM techniques is restricted due to technical
reasons, and most instances require a great amount of interactivity and client computa-
tions. For example, it has been shown in [34] that, if n documents are to be stored and
if server space is O(n), then ORAM imposes an Ω(n) communication overhead.
Private Information Retrieval was introduced by Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz and Sudan
in 1995 [35]. PIR aims at protecting the access pattern, and does not protect the
outsourced data. Most PIR schemes force at least linear computational complexity
Ω(n) onto the search operation (with notable exceptions, such as [36]). This efficiency
obstacle often makes PIR unusable when large data sets are involved.
Recently, intensive research efforts in the field of SE have provided schemes that support
all the architectures proposed above. Much like traditional encryption schemes, search-
able encryption schemes come in two very different types: symmetric-key and public-key.
These correspond to the schemes in the single-user setting and to schemes in the single
reader, multiple writer setting.
The symmetric-key type of SE, namely Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE), was
principally developed by Curtmola, Garay, Kamara and Ostrovsky in 2006. In [37],
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they introduce efficient constructions and rigorous security definitions for searchable
encryption. Since their foundational work, the field has expanded in many directions,
by enhancing the security and efficiency of the schemes, by improving expressiveness of
the queries, by dealing with multi-user settings and by supporting various functionalities.
The public-key type, named Public-Key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS), was
firstly proposed by Boneh, Di Crescenzo, Ostrovsky and Persiano [38] in 2004. Since their
pioneering work, there have appeared several PEKS schemes in the literature, improving
the scheme in [38] in terms of efficiency, security or functionality. Recent improvements
achieve sublinear search [39], reduction of communication and storage costs [40, 41],
extension to multi-user systems [42] or various security improvements [43–48].
1.3.2 Computing on Outsourced Data
Computing over outsourced data is a central functionality to cloud computing. The
wide range of advantages provided by cloud infrastructures, such as computational per-
formance, data ubiquity and data availability, make data outsourcing an attractive solu-
tion for applications involving computational tasks. Examples of such applications are
accounting and financial systems, applications involving the computation of statistical
indicators, decision support systems, e-voting systems or machine learning applications.
Some of these applications may require to perform computationally expensive operations
and to potentially deal with complex architectures and dynamic data sets.
However, outsourcing data and computations in the face of an untrusted cloud ser-
vice provider poses many privacy concerns. In this context, we can classify potentially
sensitive information into three classes: outsourced data, outsourced computation and
computation outcome. Outsourced data refers to information enclosed in the data set
owned by the user, just as in the case of searching over outsourced data posed in the
previous section. Outsourced computation refers to information about the particular
operations to carry out. For example, whether the outsourced computational task is to
compute the mean of the outsourced data set, or to perform a linear regression. Com-
putation outcome refers to information about the computation results, which can reveal
information both about the outsourced data and about the outsourced computation.
The architectural frame where computing over outsourced data takes place involves three
distinct types of actors. The first is the cloud service provider. Regarding cloud users,
we make a distinction between writers (or data providers) and readers. Writers provide
the data to be outsourced, and readers specify the computation to be outsourced and
receive the computation outcome. Regarding writers and readers, we contemplate the
same four possible architectures as in the context of searching over outsourced data,
depending on whether there is a single or multiple readers and writers. Moreover, the
architectural setting can be single or multi-cloud depending on the number of cloud
service providers involved.
In order to address data privacy and confidentiality concerns when computing over
outsourced data, the data privacy literature has developed numerous solutions. Here,
we outline the cryptographic techniques aimed at solving these issues. There exist two
main areas of cryptography that deal with data confidentiality issues in outsourced
computation: one based on Homomorphic Encryption (HE) and one based on Secure
Multi-Party Computation (MPC).
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Homomorphic encryption schemes are cryptographic schemes that enable computing
over encrypted data, and in this thesis we use public-key encryption schemes with ho-
momorphic properties to this end. Homomorphic encryption schemes are set in the
single-reader architecture, and they enable users to encrypt their data in such a way
that operations carried out with the generated ciphertexts translate to operations on
the underlying plaintexts. By outsourcing the data in an encrypted form, users can
request computations to be performed on the protected data and then receive an en-
crypted outcome. Therefore, this usage of HE schemes protects both the outsourced
data contents and the computation outcome.
We can classify homomorphic encryption schemes according to the operations that they
support over encrypted data. The cryptographic literature usually distinguishes three
classes:
• Partially homomorphic encryption (PHE): PHE schemes support a single operation
on ciphertext, either multiplication or addition.
• Somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE): SHE schemes support both addition
and multiplication of ciphertexts, but they support a limited number of operations.
• Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE): FHE schemes support an unlimited number
of additions and multiplications on ciphertexts, thus enabling arbitrary computa-
tions over encrypted data.
While FHE schemes are very convenient from the functionality side, the solutions known
up to date are computationally expensive when evaluating functions with a high mul-
tiplicative depth. This, paired up with the current technological status, restricts the
applicability of FHE in practice. Therefore, in our research we turn to PHE to tackle
some of the concerns posed in the CLARUS use cases. In particular, in Chapter 4 we
propose a construction to outsource data processing to the cloud by combining PHE
with a tailored modification of the computations.
Secure multi-party computation [49] deals with the general setting of multiple writers
and readers, and aims to protect only the individual inputs from users. MPC allows
multiple users to jointly evaluate a function on their private inputs. By agreeing on
a particular function and by engaging in an elaborate protocol, MPC allows users to
learn the joint function evaluated on the inputs of all users, while they learn nothing
else about the other user’s inputs in the process.
1.3.3 Efficiency of Secret Sharing Schemes
Secret sharing is a fundamental primitive in cryptography, and it is an essential building
block for many other cryptographic applications. Some of these applications are of
interest in the cloud computing setting posed in CLARUS, and most notable examples
are attribute-based encryption [24], secure multi-party computation [49], e-voting and
joint signatures.
Secret sharing schemes aim at protecting a secret piece of information by dividing it into
shares. This is done so that it is possible to reconstruct the secret value from certain
specified combinations of shares. The use of secret sharing schemes guarantees that it
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is hard to recover the secret from individual shares, and that shares must be combined
in order to recover the secret. In information-theoretically (also called unconditionally)
secure schemes, security does not rely on any computational assumption, and the result-
ing individual shares do not hold any information on the secret value when considered
in isolation.
Typically, secret sharing schemes are used in distribution schemes, where they unfold
in a frame involving various participants. In this frame, secret sharing prevents both
the disclosure and the loss of secrets. A special participant, called the dealer, initially
holds a secret value. Using secret sharing, the dealer can divide the secret into shares
and distribute them to other participants, in such a way that only specific subsets of
participants can recover the secret by pooling their shares together. In this context,
the main proposed application of secret sharing schemes consists in protecting both
the integrity and the confidentiality of important information, such as numbered bank
accounts or encryption keys, by letting multiple participants safeguard it. Nevertheless,
as a cryptographic primitive, secret sharing has found many other uses.
Subsets of participants are authorized if they are able to recover the secret, and forbidden
if their shares hold no information on the secret. The family of authorized subsets of
participants is called the access structure of the scheme. If every subset of participants
is either authorized or forbidden, we say that the scheme is perfect. In a perfect scheme,
the size of each share is at least the size of the secret, and a scheme is called ideal if
every share is exactly as large as the secret. In our research we only consider perfect
and information-theoretically secure secret sharing schemes.
The first secret sharing schemes were proposed by Shamir [50] and Blakley [51] in 1979.
By using polynomial interpolation techniques, they achieve perfect and ideal schemes
that support any threshold access structure, meaning that the only authorized sets of
participants are those larger than a certain threshold. In subsequent works, Ito, Saito
and Nishizeki [52] and Benaloh and Leichter [53] presented perfect schemes supporting
any monotone increasing access structure. Nevertheless, for almost all access structures
their schemes are not ideal, and the size of the shares increases exponentially in the
number of participants. The size of the shares is an important property of secret sharing
schemes, and many applications require small-sized shares.
The main measure of the efficiency of a secret sharing scheme is the information ratio.
The information ratio of a secret sharing scheme is defined as the ratio of the maximum
length in bits of a share generated with the scheme to the bit-length of the secret
value. While this efficiency measure is generally easy to compute and very useful for
evaluating the efficiency of explicit secret sharing schemes, in practice a secret sharing
scheme is instantiated from a given access structure of interest. Therefore, we may be
more interested in measuring the well-conditioning of an access structure, and to do so
we turn to the optimal information ratio. The optimal information ratio of an access
structure is defined as the infimum of the information ratios of all the perfect secret
sharing schemes realizing the access structure. Thus, it indicates the size of the shares
required to realize a given access structure, giving a tight lower bound on the information
ratio of schemes realizing a particular access structure.
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1.3.4 Privacy-Preserving Allocation of Data
Due to the rising use of relational databases, nowadays many applications handle data
in a tabular format. Tabular data consists of records structured according to a set
of attributes, where each record typically holds up to one value per attribute. In this
context, outsourcing services that handle tabular data to the cloud may bring many
operational and economic advantages in a wealth of applications. However, in the case of
outsourcing tabular data, some combinations of attributes in the data set may constitute
sensitive information. For instance, in a medical data set case, a couple of attributes
holding the passport number and disease diagnostic information can be jointly regarded
as personally identifiable and sensitive information. Still, other attribute combinations,
such as blood pressure metrics and disease diagnostic information, may not violate
privacy.
Privacy-preserving allocation of data refers to storing fragments of the data at different
locations to enhance data privacy. In a cloud computing setting, one can take advantage
of multi-cloud architectures to provide data privacy. The term multi-cloud expresses the
concurrent use of multiple cloud services in a single organization or application. Multi-
cloud architectures are widely adopted in practice, despite the inevitable increase in
economic cost they entail. A suitable strategy to enhance data privacy in the data
outsourcing context is to leverage multi-cloud architectures, and to store fragments of
the data at different cloud servers.
There exist a variety of tools aimed at enhancing data privacy in the described setting.
While we have already briefly surveyed some of the tools on the cryptographic side, some
of them are non-cryptographic, and include for instance data sanitization, k-anonymity,
file splitting, data obfuscation, data merging and data splitting. In this thesis we deal
with privacy-preserving data splitting.
Privacy-preserving data splitting was first introduced by Aggarwal et al. [54] in 2005.
Several subsequent works have improved on their construction in various directions [55–
58]. Privacy-preserving data splitting deals with the problem of sensitive attribute com-
binations by realizing privacy-preserving allocation of data. The objective of privacy-
preserving data splitting is to find a decomposition into fragments of a given tabular
data set and to distribute the fragments among several servers, so that no one server
holds simultaneous information on any sensitive attribute combination. In this way,
assuming that servers do not communicate with each other, data splitting attempts to
minimize the leakage of information that can be extracted by each individual server.
In addition to the privacy constraints determined by the sensitive attribute combinations
that must not be stored together in any fragment, the data splitting literature also
considers processing constraints. These constraints specify combinations of attributes
that must be jointly stored in some server, be it because they must be queried on more
efficiently or because complex computations are to be remotely performed on them.
1.4 Research Contributions
In this section we briefly describe each of the contributions of this thesis. In the order of
appearance in the remainder of the text, the research contributions are: Range Queries
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in SSE, Conjunctive and Subset PEKS, Outsourcing Kriging Interpolation, the Optimal
Information Ratio of Secret Sharing Schemes and Privacy-Preserving Data Splitting.
1.4.1 Range Queries in SSE
The CLARUS geo-referenced data use case poses the problem of searching over a sensi-
tive spatial geo-referenced data set outsourced to the cloud. We contribute to solve this
problem by designing a SSE scheme that handles data sets whose items are referenced
by two-dimensional coordinates. This can be the case of data containing information
about civil constructions and infrastructures, or about the location and measurements
of critical natural earth resources such as water boreholes, minerals and rare earth ma-
terials.
Since the outsourced information can be valuable and confidential, users may want to
protect it against the cloud server and any external attackers. At the same time, users
may wish to securely search over the protected outsourced data, preserving the ability
to retrieve the data items that are located at a certain chosen region.
In our work we take a cryptographic approach to this problem. The existing cryp-
tographic literature tackles the problem of efficiently executing range queries over en-
crypted data by applying Deterministic Encryption [6, 59–62], Order-Preserving En-
cryption [6, 63, 64] and Searchable Encryption [64–72] schemes. Since solutions that
apply SSE provide the best overall trade-off in efficiency and security among all the
options available up-to-date, we aim at applying SSE to protect the outsourced data.
Our contribution to SSE is to study how to remotely perform queries on an encrypted
two-dimensional data set. We focus on the two-dimensional case, in which data items
can be seen as points in a planar region. In this case, range queries match all features
in the data set which intersect a chosen rectangle in the planar region. Some of our
approaches can be applied to multi-dimensional range queries as well.
Searchable Symmetric Encryption [37] schemes have been extended in recent works to
achieve secure and efficient range queries [64, 67–69, 71, 72]. These works typically
exploit a special indexation of documents, expanding both query and data coordinates
and making black-box use of a searchable encryption scheme on the modified coordinates.
We improve on the approach of [68], which expands coordinates according to a binary
tree structure in order to enable efficient two-dimensional range queries over encrypted
data. Due to the considered use case requirements, we set our solutions in the single-user
architecture.
Achieving two-dimensional range queries in the fashion described in [68] has an impact
on data leakage when issuing queries, and also on computational and communication
costs. In our work we take a step forward in addressing both concerns by introducing
quadtrees and by applying over-covers.
It is worth noting that the cryptanalysis of SE schemes has been recently studied in
various works [26–32], which develop attacks on SE schemes by exploiting the security
models and the leakage associated to various SE schemes. Among these, we highlight
some very recent attacks oriented to range searchable symmetric encryption [30]. These
attacks work under the assumptions that the data set is dense enough and that a suffi-
cient amount of uniformly distributed queries are issued, and they exploit the knowledge
of the access pattern (and possibly some rank information) to expose all the queried and
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database values to an external attacker. To the best of our knowledge, up to date no
SE schemes that avoid this and similar attacks have been proposed, and the solutions
proposed in Chapter 3.1 are also vulnerable if the premises stated in [30] hold.
The use of over-covers was introduced by Faber et al. [68], in the setting of one-
dimensional range searchable encryption. Using over-covers, the user queries for ranges
that can be larger than the desired ones, thus potentially inducing false positives in the
search results. However, the ranges are chosen in such a way that information leakage
and communication costs are reduced.
We analyze the use of over-covers, generalizing the constructions by Faber et al. [68]
to two-dimensional range queries. We also extend the result in [68] to reduce the
false-positive rate by providing larger-sized over-covers. In this way, it is possible to
substantially rise accuracy while increasing the communication costs.
We also propose the use of quadtrees, introducing a new indexing technique for two-
dimensional range queries in searchable encryption that reduces information leakage.
Quadtrees induce a decomposition of the two-dimensional grid into quadrants. This
allows to improve security by reducing leakage with respect to alternative construc-
tions [66, 68] for two-dimensional data. This technique can be extended to multi-
dimensional range queries as well.
Since using quadtrees increases the computational and communication costs, we mitigate
this downside by proposing the mixed use of quadtrees and over-covers. For all the
proposed techniques, we analyze the trade-off between efficiency, security and accuracy.
1.4.2 Conjunctive and Subset PEKS
Supporting secure searching capabilities in multi-user architectures is a key requirement
in many cloud computing applications, including, for instance, audit logs, e-mail gate-
ways, distributed sensor networks or cloud storage with sharing capabilities. Public Key
Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) schemes are searchable encryption schemes
set up in the single reader, multiple writer architecture. Our main contribution to the
field of PEKS is the design of two PEKS schemes with extended functionalities, which
achieve high efficiency marks and support conjunctive and subset queries respectively.
To support an asymmetric architecture, PEKS schemes generate two kinds of keys:
public keys and secret keys. Data providers hold the public key, and a single reader
client holds the secret key. By using the public key, data providers are able to generate
searchable encrypted data, while only the client is able to generate queries for this
encrypted data by using the secret key. In the case of PEKS, searching over an encrypted
data set usually takes linear time in the number of data items in the data set (except
in the case of [39], where it takes linear time in the number of data providers). Hence,
supporting this asymmetric architecture comes at the cost of sequential search.
The earliest PEKS scheme was presented by Boneh et al. [38] in 2004. Since their
pioneering work there have appeared several other PEKS schemes in the literature,
improving [38] in terms of efficiency, security and expressiveness. In our research we
follow this trail by exploring expressiveness and efficiency enhancements of PEKS, and
we accordingly describe conjunctive and subset PEKS schemes.
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Conjunctive PEKS schemes [42, 65, 73, 74], which enable conjunctive field keyword
queries, are one of the most common enhancements of PEKS. The first conjunctive
PEKS scheme was presented by Park et al. [74] in 2004. Typically, in conjunctive PEKS
data providers use the public key of the client to send to the cloud server a ciphertext
encrypting a tuple of keywords (w1, . . . , wm). The client can then use its secret key to
query the cloud server with a tuple of keywords (w′1, . . . , w′l), along with a set of positions
{j1, . . . , jl} ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}. When receiving this query, the cloud server is able to learn if
the predicate
∧l
i=1(wji = w
′
i) holds, and nothing else is disclosed about the ciphertext.
Subset PEKS [65] is another enhancement of PEKS which enables subset queries. In
subset PEKS, data providers use the public key of the client to encrypt a tuple of
keywords (w1, . . . , wm). The client can then produce a query associated to m arbitrary
sets of keywords (A1, . . . , Am). When receiving this query, the storage server can check
whether the conjunctive subset query predicate
∧m
i=1(wi ∈ Ai) holds or not, without
learning anything else from the ciphertext.
As in all previous works, our schemes are pairing-based constructions. Our first proposed
scheme supports conjunctive queries. The proposed scheme can be seen as an analog to
Boneh et al.’s scheme [38] by replacing the underlying hardness assumption by a stronger
one. This modification allows one to take advantage of the bilinearity of pairings and
build a conjunctive PEKS scheme with very small ciphertexts, with an efficient search
process and with very small queries, which consist of a single group element. Our
second proposed scheme supports subset queries and some more general predicates. We
show that it improves previous related schemes in terms of efficiency and expressiveness.
Moreover, unlike previous related schemes [65], our subset PEKS scheme admits an
arbitrary keyword space.
1.4.3 Outsourcing Kriging Interpolation
In this thesis, we present a method for the private outsourcing of Kriging interpolation
using a tailored modification of the Kriging algorithm in combination with homomorphic
encryption. Our solution allows the client to outsource Kriging computations while
hiding crucial information from the cloud service provider.
The CLARUS geo-referenced data use case poses the problem of privately outsourcing
Kriging computations. Kriging has been identified as a good candidate process to be
outsourced, based on the practical and legislative requirements of industrial users (for
instance, [1, 75]). In this thesis we present a practical, efficient and secure solution to
privately outsource Kriging interpolation.
Kriging interpolation [18–21] is a well-recognized form of linear interpolation technique
designed with geo-statistical applications in mind, used to analyze all kinds of spatially
dependent phenomena. The Kriging algorithm is used to predict the value of a previ-
ously sampled phenomena at an unobserved location in a two-dimensional region. In
this case, Kriging builds a prediction as a weighted sum of prior measurements, where
measurements taken close to the unobserved location are given a greater weight than
those far away.
Consider a client that owns a Kriging data set (i.e. a set of measurements taken at
various locations), and suppose that it wishes to outsource this data set to an honest-but-
curious cloud service provider to take advantage of the various cloud benefits. Further,
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other data generating nodes may be authorized by the client to add and remove data
from the outsourced data set. The client would like to make use of both the storage and
computational power of the server to make a Kriging service on its data set available
to multiple users. Since the outsourced data set may contain sensitive information, the
client may need to protect the Kriging data set prior to outsourcing it.
Our solution to this problem uses additive homomorphic encryption to outsource Kriging
interpolation efficiently. We show that the Kriging process can be adapted so that
all sensitive information can be either encrypted or factored out of the computation.
In this way, the Kriging computation may be performed on encrypted measurement
values, by using an additively homomorphic encryption scheme. We make a trade-off
by protecting only the information relating to measurement values in the data set, and
we do not hide locations of prior measurements and of queries. This choice is justified
in cases where measurement locations are externally observable (e.g. if measurements
come from previous mining operations).
Cryptographically-secured Kriging was previously studied in a different setting, where
a server owns a data set and clients may query the data set at a previously unsampled
location [76]. Two solutions are proposed in [76] which support only one variogram model
and which require high communication complexity, interactivity and local computation.
In [77] collaborative private Kriging was investigated, where users combine their data
sets to gain more accurate Kriging predictions.
1.4.4 The Optimal Information Ratio of Secret Sharing Schemes
Secret sharing is a fundamental primitive in cryptography, and it has been previously ap-
plied to build other cryptographic schemes. The most compelling case to the CLARUS
project is that of attribute-based encryption schemes. In key-policy attribute-based
schemes [24], a central authority distributes keys to a set of users, and keys are attached
to a policy instantiated by an access structure. Users can encrypt messages while at-
taching them to attributes, and the resulting ciphertexts can only be decrypted by users
holding keys with a matching policy.
In [24] Goyal et al. show how to use perfect linear secret sharing schemes to build
attribute-based encryption schemes, and this strategy has been adopted in several other
works. Yet, the key length resulting from their strategy is directly proportional to
the information ratio of the employed secret sharing scheme, and thus the efficiency
of the underlying secret sharing scheme has a direct impact on the computational and
communication complexity of the resulting attribute-based encryption scheme. For many
access structures, schemes built using known general methods [52, 53, 78] have been
shown to have exponential information ratio. Therefore, this raises the question of
which access structures admit an efficient secret sharing scheme.
In this sense, the optimal information ratio gives an idea of the well-conditioning of the
access structure. The optimal information ratio of an access structure is the infimum
of the information ratio of all the perfect secret sharing schemes realizing the access
structure. In our research, we approach the problem of finding properties that facilitate
the description of the optimal information ratio. More concretely, we show that any two
access structures that are close (i.e., whose symmetric difference is small) admit secret
sharing schemes with similar information ratios. Therefore, if we modify the access
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structure of an efficient secret sharing scheme by adding or removing a small amount
of authorized sets, we will still be able to find an efficient scheme realizing the modified
access structure.
Computing the optimal information ratio is generally a difficult task, and concrete values
are known only for certain families of access structures. For instance, since threshold
access structures admit ideal access structures [50] their optimal information ratio is
1. Other examples of access structures with known optimal information ratio include
particular families of multipartite access structures [79–81], access structures with a small
number of participants [82] and access structures with small minimal sets [83]. However,
it is not currently known how to compute the optimal information ratio of general access
structures. Our research is a step forward in addressing this problem, since we provide
theoretical bounds for the optimal information ratio. Our results effectively expand the
number of cases in which efficient secret sharing schemes are known to exist.
By taking advantage of the combinatorial nature of our main result, we also extend our
results to other models of computation such as the formula leafsize and the monotone
span program size for monotone Boolean functions.
1.4.5 Privacy-Preserving Data Splitting
The privacy-preserving data splitting technique aims at preserving the privacy of a
sensitive data set by decomposing it into fragments. In a cloud computing setting, data
splitting techniques are usually deployed in multi-cloud architectures. Assuming that
the cloud service providers are not aware of each other, data splitting can be used to
enforce data privacy by distributing the data fragments among different cloud servers.
In this thesis, we formulate the splitting problem in combinatorial terms. Using this
formulation, we describe three general algorithms for data splitting, and we provide
theoretical bounds on the required number of fragments.
The existing data splitting literature [54–58] divides the data into a small number of
fragments, frequently into two or three. Since this small number of fragments does not
usually suffice to ensure privacy, existing solutions couple cryptographic techniques with
data splitting, and they use encryption on part of the data fragments. In contrast,
we engage with the data splitting problem without relying on other privacy-preserving
techniques. This approach allows to keep all fragments in plaintext form, which can be
useful in terms of efficiency and functionality.
In our contribution to data splitting we take two sets of constraints into account: privacy
constraints and processing constraints. Privacy constraints determine the sensitive at-
tribute combinations, which no single cloud server must simultaneously hold. Processing
constraints impose some sets of data attributes to be stored together in some fragment,
to reduce query workloads.
Firstly, we present a reformulation of the stated problem in combinatorial terms, by
introducing the notion of (A,B)-coverings. Using this reformulation, we start by consid-
ering the problem of finding the optimal number of fragments required to satisfy privacy
and processing constraints. We show that it can be solved using purely algebraic tech-
niques, and we exhibit an algorithm to compute optimally-sized data decompositions by
using Gro¨bner bases.
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Since finding an optimal covering is an NP-hard problem, obtaining optimal solutions
through our first algorithm is often unfeasible in practice. We hence present greedy algo-
rithm that sacrifices the solution optimality to obtain efficient running times, achieving
polynomial running time in the size of the considered problem. We further present an
heuristic improvement of this greedy algorithm that provides smaller decompositions
when the family of constraints is sparse enough. Our greedy algorithms require millisec-
onds to find a solution in the studied cases, whereas computing an optimal solution may
require hours depending on the problem at hand. Theoretical upper and lower bounds
on the number of fragments are also provided in the process.
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Chapter 2
Background Theory
In this chapter we lay out the fundamental cryptographic theory needed in the rest of
this thesis. This chapter is divided in six sections. In the first section, we introduce
some basic mathematical notation and definitions. In the second section we present
symmetric-key encryption schemes and the fundamentals behind computational provable
security. Next, in the third section we introduce hash functions and pseudorandom
functions. The remaining three sections deal with the foundational theory behind three
of the cryptographic schemes explored in this thesis: public-key encryption schemes
(with a special mention of homomorphic encryption), searchable encryption and secret
sharing. Most of the material in the first four sections is taken from [88, 89].
2.1 Basic Definitions
Given a function f : N → R≥0, we say that f(λ) is negligible in λ if for every positive
polynomial p in one variable there exists a λ0 such that for all integers λ > λ0 we have
that f(λ) < 1/p(λ). This statement is equivalent to f(λ) = o(1/λc) for all c ∈ N. Thus,
f is negligible in λ if it decreases faster than any polynomial in λ for all sufficiently large
values of λ.
We denote by {0, 1}∗ the set of strings of finite length with characters 0 and 1.
An algorithm is a well-defined computational procedure A that takes a variable x as
input and outputs a function y of this input. We often denote this by y ← A(x) or by
y = A(x). An algorithm is probabilistic if it takes auxiliary random bits as input.
We say an algorithm A runs in polynomial time (or equivalently that it is efficient) if,
for every input x ∈ {0, 1}∗ of bit length |x|, the computation of A(x) takes O(|x|c) time
for some constant c. A probabilistic polynomial time (PPT ) algorithm is one that is
probabilistic and runs in polynomial time. Given a function f , if an algorithm A has
black-box access to the function f we denote it by Af(·).
21
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2.2 Symmetric-Key Encryption Schemes
In the next definition we introduce symmetric-key encryption schemes. Symmetric-key
encryption schemes typically deal with the problem of secret communication between two
parties, assuming that a secret key has been previously shared between them. By using
symmetric-key encryption schemes to encrypt and decrypt messages, two parties can
privately exchange information through an insecure channel. In this way, the exchanged
messages remain protected even in the presence of an eavesdropper who has access to
all information exchanged through this channel.
Definition 2.1. An (M, C,K) − symmetric-key encryption scheme S consists of three
polynomial-time algorithms:
S.Gen(λ):
Probabilistic algorithm that, given a security parameter λ, returns a secret (also
called symmetric) key k ∈ K and the public parameters params of the scheme.
S.Enck(m):
Probabilistic algorithm taking as input a message m ∈ M, a key k ∈ K and the
public parameters params of the scheme. It returns a ciphertext c = Enck(m) ∈ C.
S.Deck(c):
Deterministic algorithm taking a ciphertext c ∈ C and the public parameters
params of the scheme as input. It returns a plaintext m = Deck(c) ∈M.
We say S is correct if, for every m ∈M, S.Deck(S.Enck(m)) = m with all but negligible
probability, where probabilities are taken over the choice of key k generated with the
probabilistic algorithm S.Gen and over the random bits of S.Enc.
Frequently used symmetric-key encryption schemes include, for example, the AES [90],
3DES [91] and Blowfish [92] encryption schemes.
As we see above, encryption schemes define three spaces: the message space M, the
ciphertext space C and the key space K. From now on, we will drop all reference to
these spaces whenever their choice is implicit or irrelevant. Also, in practice, all key-
generating functions S.Gen typically just choose the key k uniformly at random from
the key space K. This will be the case in all of our schemes.
2.2.1 Provable Security
Traditional cryptography revolves around a break-then-fix paradigm where proposed
schemes are deemed secure as long as no successful attacks breaking their claimed se-
curity are devised. Due to this approach all traditional encryption schemes have been
broken, and are deemed unsuitable for cryptographic purposes at this point. This illus-
trates the important lesson that designing secure encryption schemes is hard. Although
very often the first steps of cryptographic design still starts with this break-and-fix
approach, modern cryptography relies in a more deep treatment of security.
In this subsection we give an account of this treatment in the setting of symmetric-key
encryption schemes. We do it in three stages. We initially discuss security definitions,
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which formalize the security properties sought in symmetric-key encryption schemes.
After a short digression to define bilinear groups, we present computational hardness
assumptions, which are necessary hypotheses to elaborate computational security proofs.
Finally, we describe security proofs, which give solid evidence on the security of crypto-
graphic constructions, according to some security definition and possibly accepting some
computational security assumption as a premise.
2.2.1.1 Security Definitions
Security definitions describe the security properties of cryptographic constructions, es-
tablishing concrete security guarantees against characterized adversaries by means of
precise mathematical statements. They are the main ingredient that enable the security
proofs of particular solutions. They allow refuting security as well, by showing that a
particular solution does not satisfy a given security definition.
For any cryptographic primitive there may be many valid ways to define security, and
therefore several valid formal security definitions may exist. A security definition may
or may not be adequate for a particular application depending on the way it is used.
Moreover, in many cases we observe a trade-off between security and efficiency. It is often
the case that weaker security definitions enable more efficient solutions than stronger
security definitions. Thus, security definitions also allow practitioners to choose between
cryptographic solutions, generally by adopting the most efficient solution among the ones
whose security definition suits the required security needs.
Generally, security definitions have two components: a security guarantee and a threat
model.
The security guarantee describes which security threats can be contained, in terms of
which information is protected from a potential attacker. Equivalently, it describes in
which situations the scheme can be considered to be broken. In the context of encryption,
most classical security definitions provide roughly the same security guarantee: that the
attacker does not learn any additional information about the underlying messages from
ciphertexts, aside from the information it already owns.
The threat model shapes the adversary, describing the information it has access to,
without restricting the particular strategy it can follow when launching attacks. The
threat model captures the fact that real world adversaries may or may not be able to
observe certain information when attacking the system. In the context of encryption,
classical security definitions describe the following threat models, in increasing order of
strength:
• Ciphertext-only attack: The adversary only has access to a challenge ciphertext,
and tries to obtain information about the underlying plaintext. Typically, it is
assumed that the adversary knows the length of the plaintext, but nothing else
about it.
• Known-plaintext attack: The adversary learns a set of plaintext/ciphertext pairs.
Then it tries to derive information about the underlying plaintext of a challenge
ciphertext.
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• Chosen-plaintext attack: The adversary is able to obtain any number ciphertexts
from plaintexts of its choice. It then tries to derive information about the under-
lying plaintext of a challenge ciphertext that it did not already receive.
• Chosen-ciphertext attack: The adversary is able to gather information by querying
for the decryption of ciphertexts of its choice. Then it tries to derive information
about the underlying plaintext of a non-queried challenge ciphertext.
The most common type of security definitions, namely game-based security definitions,
describe an adversarial setting and a set of possible attacks through a security game.
Then they state that any PPT adversary has negligible probability in executing these
attacks successfully.
We now introduce a game-based security definition for symmetric encryption schemes
used in our work, namely Indistinguishability against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (or IND-
CPA). In the following, we introduce the definition by means of a game between two
entities, a challenger and an adversary. This game captures the chosen-plaintext attack
threat model, by letting the adversary query the challenger for the encryption of chosen
plaintexts. At the challenge phase, the adversary chooses two messages and is handed
a challenge ciphertext corresponding to one of them. The aim of the adversary is then
distinguishing which message this challenge ciphertext corresponds to. The security
definition simply states that any PPT adversary has negligible success probability in
winning this game.
Let S = {S.Gen,S.Enc,S.Dec} be an encryption scheme. Given a security parameter
λ, define a security game in the following five phases:
• Setup. The challenger runs S.Gen on input λ, obtains the secret key k, and hands
over the public parameters to the adversary.
• Query Phase 1. The adversary adaptively requests the challenger for ciphertexts
S.Enck(m) for a polynomial number of messages m of its own choice.
• Challenge. The adversary outputs two challenge candidate messages m0,m1 of
the same length. The challenger throws a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1}, and outputs the
ciphertext c = S.Enck(mb) corresponding to mb.
• Query Phase 2. The adversary proceeds just as in Query Phase 1.
• Guess. The adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} for b.
Definition 2.2 (Indistinguishability against Chosen Plaintext Attacks). We say that
an encryption scheme S = {S.Gen,S.Enc,S.Dec} satisfies indistinguishability against
chosen plaintext attacks if the advantage of every PPT adversary A in distinguishing b
in the above game
AdvA(λ) =|Pr(b′ = b)− 1/2|
= |Pr(A(X) = b|X = b)− Pr(A(X) = b|X = 1− b)|
is negligible in λ.
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Another security definition used in related works [37] is Pseudo-Randomness against
Chosen-Plaintext Attacks (IND-PCPA). This security notion differs from IND-CPA
only in the challenge phase, where the adversary commits to a single message m, and
the challenger outputs either c = S.Enck(m) or a uniformly-random chosen ciphertext
depending on the outcome of the fair coin b.
It is worth noting that not all security definitions are game-based. Another common
style of security definition used in referenced works [37, 93] is the real-ideal paradigm, also
called simulator-based. Simulator-based definitions are introduced through a real world
and an ideal (or simulated) world setting. In the real world, the adversary interacts
with honest parties in a realistic setting involving the actual cryptographic solution.
In the ideal world, the adversary interacts with parties named simulators, which only
take public, non-sensitive information and randomness as input and do not generally
use any cryptography. Simulator-based security definitions state that there exists some
choice of simulators for which no polynomial-time algorithm can distinguish the view of
the adversary in these two settings. That is, there does not exist a PPT distinguisher
algorithm that is able to tell whether the interaction was simulated or not. See [94] for
an introduction to simulator-based security definitions and proofs.
One of the earliest simulator-based definitions in the literature is semantic security [95].
This security definition is equivalent to the IND-CPA definition presented above. The
adversary starts by randomly choosing a message m. In the ideal world, a simulator
algorithm receives certain information h(m) of some message m as input, while in the
real world a PPT algorithm additionally receives an encryption Enck(m) of the message
m. The scheme S is semantically secure if the probability that both algorithms output
some property f(m) of the message m is negligibly close for all efficiently computable
functions h, f . Intuitively, the ciphertext Enck(m) does not provide any extra knowledge
about f(m) not given already by h(m). Note that the distinguisher algorithm here is
embedded in the property f .
Definition 2.3 (Semantic Security [88]). We say that an encryption scheme S =
{S.Gen,S.Enc,S.Dec} is semantically secure if for every PPT algorithm A, all effi-
ciently computable functions f, h and every distribution χ on the message spaceM (all
of which depend on the security parameter λ), there exists a simulator B such that
|Pr (A(S.Enck(m), h(m)) = f(m))− Pr (B(h(m)) = f(m))|
is negligible in λ, where the probabilities are taken over the choice of m according to χ,
over the choice of key k generated with S.Gen, and over the random coins used by A,
B and by the encryption algorithm.
2.2.1.2 Digression: Bilinear Groups
Before continuing on to the next section, we make a brief digression to define symmet-
ric and asymmetric bilinear groups. In this thesis, group operations are often written
multiplicatively, even when the group is abelian.
Definition 2.4 (Bilinear Groups). Let (G1, ·), (G2, ·) be two cyclic groups of prime
order q with generators g, h respectively (usually denoted by G1 = 〈g〉, G2 = 〈h〉), and
suppose that there exists a cyclic group GT of order q and a non-degenerate bilinear
map e : G1 ×G2 → GT .
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We say that G1 is a symmetric bilinear group if there exists an efficiently computable
isomorphism between G1 and G2. Under such an isomorphism, we denote G1 and G2
by G.
Similarly, we say that G1,G2 are asymmetric bilinear groups if there exist no non-trivial
efficiently computable homomorphisms from G2 to G1.
In practice, the bilinear groups G,G1,G2 are taken to be subgroups of the group of
points of an elliptic curve, and GT is a subgroup of the multiplicative group of a finite
field [96]. The definition of symmetric and asymmetric bilinear groups corresponds to
Type 1 and Type 3 pairings in the article by Galbraith et al. [97]. The term pairing
refers to the non-degenerate bilinear map in the definition of bilinear group. We refer
the reader to their article for properties of particular instantiations, and to [98, 99] for
techniques to speed up pairing computation.
2.2.1.3 Computational Hardness Assumptions
Although in some cases security can be proved unconditionally and can take into account
computationally unlimited attackers, some cryptographic constructions do not admit
such proofs. Instead, it is possible to achieve higher efficiency and a greater variety of
cryptographic designs by falling back to computational security and by making use of
computational hardness assumptions.
Computational security consists in assuming that the adversary is computationally lim-
ited. That is, computationally secure schemes can be instantiated in such a way that
the current technologies need an impracticable (albeit finite) amount of time to break
them.
Computational security proofs ultimately rest on assumptions. Assumptions can gen-
erally be of two types: assumptions on the security of a cryptographic primitive and
computational hardness assumptions. The first type simply assumes the security of a
cryptographic primitive used as a building block in the actual scheme. In turn, compu-
tational hardness assumptions lie on a lower level and state that a given problem, which
is usually of number-theoretical nature, can not be solved in a practical amount of time.
Security proofs are developed based on these assumptions.
More precisely, computational hardness assumptions refer to the computational in-
tractability of precisely stated mathematical problems. These mathematical problems
are typically parametrized by a security parameter. Computational hardness assump-
tions state that there is no efficient general algorithm that solves a problem in polynomial
time in the security parameter for all large enough parameter choices. In other words,
they state that the success probability of any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
in solving the parametrized problem is negligible in the security parameter.
One of the hardest and most fundamental assumptions for cyclic groups in computational
security is the computational intractability of the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP).
We recall that if g is a generator of a multiplicative group G and if h ∈ G, then any
integer a that solves h = ga is called a discrete logarithm of h to the base g. The
DLP assumption holds in a multiplicative cyclic group G when discrete logarithms are
generally hard to compute.
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Definition 2.5 (Discrete Logarithm Problem). Let G = 〈g〉 be a multiplicative cyclic
group of prime size q (where q has at least λ bits) deterministically generated according
to the security parameter λ. We say the DLP assumption holds in G if for every PPT
algorithm B,
AdvB(λ) = Pr (B(g, ga) = a)
is negligible in λ, where the probability is taken over a uniformly distributed in Fq and
over the random bits of B.
At the time of writing this, for the elliptic curve groups G used in practice [100], there
are no known classical algorithms for solving the DLP in sub-exponential time in λ. We
should note here that there exists an efficient quantum algorithm, due to Peter Shor, that
efficiently breaks the DLP assumption (and several other frequently used assumptions)
over generic groups. Thus, advances in quantum computing may render this assumption
invalid, along with the security claims of a large corpus of cryptographic constructions
in the literature.
The DLP assumption has given rise to several cryptographic solutions. However, con-
sidering possibly stronger assumptions (i.e., more easily solvable problems) turns out to
enable the design of a greater diversity of constructions. One of the first relaxations of
the DLP assumption is the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption. The se-
curity of many cryptographic designs, such as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol,
rests on it. The CDH assumption holds in a multiplicative cyclic group G = 〈g〉 if it is
hard to compute gab from g, ga and gb in a vast majority of cases.
Definition 2.6 (Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption). Let G = 〈g〉 be a multi-
plicative cyclic group of prime size q (of bit-length |q| ≥ λ) deterministically generated
according to the security parameter λ. We say the CDH assumption holds in G if for
every PPT algorithm B,
AdvB(λ) = Pr
(
B(g, ga, gb) = gab
)
is negligible in λ, where the probability is taken over a, b uniformly distributed in Fq
and over the random bits of B.
The CDH assumption implies the DLP assumption. An efficient CDH solver can be
built from an efficient DLP solver, simply by letting it compute the exponent a of ga,
and raising gb to that same exponent. However, it is unknown if DLP and CDH are
equivalent. Thus, it might be the case that the CDH assumption is false and the DLP
assumption is true. Nevertheless, the best known algorithm breaking CDH is to solve
the DLP in G.
An attractive assumption even stronger than CDH is the Decisional Diffie-Hellman
(DDH) assumption, proposed by Boneh in [101]. The DDH assumption holds in a
multiplicative cyclic group G = 〈g〉 if, given the elements g, ga, gb, gr, it is generally hard
to decide whether or not r equals ab.
Definition 2.7 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption). LetG = 〈g〉 be a multiplicative
cyclic group of prime size q (of bit-length |q| ≥ λ) deterministically generated according
to the security parameter λ. We say the DDH assumption holds in G if for every PPT
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algorithm B,
AdvB(λ) =
∣∣∣Pr(B(g, ga, gb, gab) = 1)− Pr(B(g, ga, gb, gr) = 1)∣∣∣
is negligible in λ, where the probabilities are taken over a, b, r uniformly distributed in
Fq and over the random bits of B.
The DDH assumption enables the construction of a remarkably wide variety of efficient
cryptographic systems with strong security properties. Most notable examples are the
ElGamal and the Cramer-Shoup cryptographic schemes.
Now, one of our proposed schemes is proved secure under a bilinear version of the
DDH assumption, called the asymmetric Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption
(asymmetric DBDH). This assumption is proposed in the work [102] by Boneh and
Boyen as a generalization of the DBDH assumption (see [103]) to the asymmetric bilinear
setting. The DBDH assumption is easily seen to imply DDH in the target group GT .
Definition 2.8 (Asymmetric DBDH Assumption). Let G1 = 〈g〉, G2 = 〈h〉 be asym-
metric bilinear groups of prime size q (of bit-length |q| ≥ λ) deterministically generated
according to a security parameter λ. We say the asymmetric DBDH assumption holds
in G1 and G2 if for every PPT algorithm B,
AdvB(λ) =
∣∣∣Pr(B(g, ga, gb, h, ha, hc, e (g, h)abc) = 1)
−Pr
(
B(g, ga, gb, h, ha, hc, e (g, h)r) = 1
)∣∣∣
is negligible in λ, where the probabilities are taken over a, b, c, r uniformly distributed
in Fq and over the random bits of B.
Another assumption we make use of is the Bilinear Diffie Hellman Inversion Assumption
(p − BDHI). This assumption was first proposed in [102]. According to [100], the best
known algorithm breaking p− BDHI is to solve the DLP in G.
Definition 2.9 (p−BDHI Assumption). Let G = 〈g〉 denote a symmetric bilinear group
of prime size q (of bit-length |q| ≥ λ) deterministically generated according to a security
parameter λ, and let p be a positive integer. We say the p−BDHI assumption holds in
G if for every PPT algorithm B,
AdvB(λ) = Pr
(
B(g, ga, ga2 , . . . , gap) = e (g, g)1/a
)
is negligible in λ, where the probabilities are taken over uniformly distributed a ∈ Fq
and over the random bits of B.
2.2.1.4 Security Proofs
In many instances, it is possible to give strong evidence that a cryptographic design
is secure. This can be done by proving that it satisfies a security definition, possibly
under certain assumptions. Provided the proof is correctly carried out, a security proof
gives a sound guarantee that no attack captured in the security definition will succeed,
assuming that the assumptions made are all valid. Also, security definitions do not
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usually capture side-channel attacks or implementation-related attacks, and therefore
such attacks are out of scope in this treatment of security.
In order to rely in the security of a provably secure scheme in a practical setting, prac-
titioners have to verify that the security definition matches the abilities of real-world
adversaries and the existing threats. In addition, they must regard the assumptions
as true, and choose a security parameter for which the problem or the scheme in the
hardness assumption is thought to be computationally unfeasible or secure for current
technologies. The security parameter thus allows honest parties to adjust security to a
desired level, enabling them to defend against increases in classical computing power.
In computational security we model both adversaries and challengers by PPT algorithms,
so they are computationally bounded. The input size of adversaries can be assumed to
be polynomial in the security parameter, and we only consider adversaries whose running
time is also polynomial in the security parameter. Moreover, we assume that all parties
have access to a randomness source of their own, and this is indeed the case in a real
setting.
Computational security proofs state that the validity of the assumption implies the secu-
rity of the cryptographic scheme according to the security definition. This is equivalent
to saying that breaking the cryptographic scheme is at least as hard as breaking the
assumption. When comparing the relative difficulties of problems, one often resorts to
the notion of reducibility.
Definition 2.10 ([89]). Let L1 and L2 be decision problems. Then L1 is (polynomial-
time) reducible to L2 if there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that solves L1 by using
an algorithm that solves L2 as a subroutine.
Intuitively, if L1 is reducible to L2, then L2 is at least as difficult as L1. This is the
basis of security reductions, a technique frequently used to prove security according to
game-based security definitions. Typically, security reductions build an algorithm B
that breaks the hardness assumption by making black-box use of a subroutine A that is
assumed to break the scheme according to the security definition. In this mathematical
reduction, it is essential that the view of A provided by B is statistically close to the
view it has in the security definition of the scheme.
As for security proofs according to simulator-based definitions, they usually follow a
different strategy. Proofs in this setting are often carried out by considering an arbi-
trary adversary, and then explicitly describing a simulator algorithm that simulates the
behavior of the adversary well enough to satisfy the security definition. As an example,
see for instance [37].
Security proofs can be carried out in a variety of computational models. Some proofs
presented in this thesis are carried out in the Standard Model, which only imposes limits
on the computational power of all parties. On the other hand, some proofs presented
in this thesis are carried out in the Random Oracle Model (ROM, see [104]). The
random oracle model of computation builds on top of the Standard Model. The ROM
additionally assumes that there exists a random oracle, i.e., a mathematical function
that maps each possible query to a fixed random response from its output domain.
In our security proofs, we assume that some of the low-level cryptographic primitives
used in our schemes perfectly emulate a random oracle. Although we assume this fact
without any rigorous proof, this is a common assumption in cryptography that allows
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the construction of a wider variety of more efficient schemes than in the Standard Model.
Proofs in the Standard Model are nonetheless preferable to proofs in the ROM.
2.3 Hash Functions and Pseudorandom Functions
The task of building cryptographic schemes often involves making use of lower-level
cryptographic primitives. We present here some of the cryptographic primitives that
are employed throughout this thesis: pseudorandom functions and hash functions. Most
definitions in this section are taken from [88].
2.3.1 Pseudorandom Functions
A pseudorandom function (PRF) is an efficiently computable function that emulates
random oracles for all practical purposes. That is, outputs of a PRF appear as fixed
completely at random for every input.
Let Funcn denote the set of functions with domain and range {0, 1}n. Given a key
space K and a function F : K× {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, denote by Fk the function defined by
Fk(x) = F (k, x). Typically K = {0, 1}n. Suppose, in all instances, that the input length,
the output length and the key length are of polynomial size in the security parameter λ.
Pseudorandom functions efficiently realize the notion of “random-looking” functions in
Funcn, in the sense that no PPT algorithm can effectively distinguish between functions
chosen uniformly at random from Funcn and functions Fk for uniform choices of key
k ∈ K.
Definition 2.11. Let F : K × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be an efficiently computable function,
where the positive integer n is polynomial in the security parameter λ. Then, F is a
pseudorandom function if for every PPT algorithm B
AdvB(λ) =
∣∣∣Pr(BFk(·)(λ) = 1)− Pr(Bf(·)(λ) = 1)∣∣∣
is negligible in λ, where the probabilities are taken over the uniform choices of k ∈ K
and of f ∈ Funcn, and over the random bits of B.
We also introduce the notion of pseudorandom permutation (PRP). Let Permn denote
the set of permutations on the set {0, 1}n with polynomial-sized input and output.
The notion of PRP is analogous to that of PRF, with the only difference being that a
randomly chosen PRP must be indistinguishable from a uniformly chosen permutation
of Permn.
Definition 2.12. Let F : K × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be an efficiently computable function,
where the positive integer n is polynomial in the security parameter λ. Then, F is a
pseudorandom permutation if for every PPT algorithm B
AdvB(λ) =
∣∣∣Pr(BFk(·)(λ) = 1)− Pr(Bf(·)(λ) = 1)∣∣∣
is negligible in λ, where the probabilities are taken over the uniform choices of k ∈ K
and of f ∈ Permn, and over the random bits of B.
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Even though it is currently unknown whether true PRF and PRP functions exist, many
functions have been proven to satisfy the PRF and PRP definitions under some com-
putational hardness assumptions. Frequently used PRF and PRP families include, for
example, the HMAC-SHA [105] and the AES-CMAC [106] families.
2.3.2 Hash Functions
Hash functions are efficiently computable functions used to reduce the size of input
data. Therefore, their range is typically much smaller than its domain. Values mapped
by hash functions are typically called digests, or hash values, of the input data.
Definition 2.13. A hash function H = (H.Gen,H.H) consists of a pair of PPT algo-
rithms:
H.Gen(λ):
Probabilistic algorithm that, given a security parameter λ, returns a key s.
H.Hs(x):
Probabilistic algorithm taking as input a key s a string x ∈ {0, 1}∗ of polynomial
length in λ. It returns a digest Hs(x) ∈ {0, 1}∗ of smaller bit-length than x.
From now on, unless stated otherwise, we obviate the Gen algorithm and the generated
key s when using hash functions, and we simply denote hash functions Hs by H :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗. We thus implicitly assume that Gen has been run once prior to the
first call to H, and that the key s is thereby fixed.
One of the main properties we require from cryptographic hash functions in this work
is collision resistance. Given a hash function H, a collision is a pair of distinct values
x, y ∈ {0, 1}∗ for which H(x) = H(y). Since the domain of H is larger than its range, the
existence of collisions is inevitable. However, they can be hard to compute. Collision
resistance states that no PPT algorithm is able to find collisions with non-negligible
advantage.
Given a security parameter λ, define a security game in the following two phases:
• Setup. The challenger runs H.Gen on input λ and hands over the generated key s
to the adversary.
• Guess. The adversary determines two strings x, y ∈ {0, 1}∗ of the same length. It
outputs a bit b = 1 if x 6= y and H(x) = H(y). Otherwise, it outputs b = 0.
Definition 2.14 (Collision Resistance). We say that a hash function H is collision
resistant if the advantage of every PPT adversary B in breaking the above game
AdvB(λ) = Pr(b = 1)
is negligible in λ, where the probability is taken over the choice of key s generated with
the probabilistic algorithm H.Gen and over the random bits of B.
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Although it is currently unknown whether true collision-resistant functions exist, some
hash functions can be seen to satisfy the collision-resistance definition under computa-
tional hardness assumptions such as the DLP assumption (see [88]).
Of course, when proving security under the random oracle model, if we assume that a
hash function H perfectly emulates a random oracle and has a large enough range, then
it is collision resistant. Therefore, in this case collision resistance is embedded in the
ROM computational model.
2.3.2.1 Hashing onto Elliptic Curves
Many elliptic-curve based cryptographic schemes require hashing to a bilinear group
G = 〈g〉 of order p. That is, they require the existence of a hash functionH : {0, 1}∗ → G.
A direct way of hashing onto a bilinear group is to consider an additional hash function
h : {0, 1}∗ → Fp and then define H(m) = gh(m). However, this approach breaks security
proofs in the random oracle model, since the output of H clearly depends on that of h.
Note that, once h is queried at a certain input, H does no longer behave as a random
oracle for that input.
In this setting, cryptographic schemes whose proofs are carried out in the random oracle
model (such as the proofs in Section 3.2) require hashing directly onto an elliptic curve
group G. That is, they require hash functions that sample from G without computing
multiples of a generator g. In this respect, using asymmetric bilinear groups G1,G2
guarantees that we can securely and efficiently hash onto G1. See [107] for an extensive
discussion on this topic and for an explicit solution for secure hashing onto Barreto-
Naehrig elliptic curves.
2.4 Public-Key Encryption Schemes
The main difference between symmetric-key and public-key cryptography lies in the
assumed secrecy of keys. While in symmetric-key cryptography all keys are assumed to
be kept secret, in public-key cryptography some of the keys are made public, or available
to wider set of users. In public-key cryptography, public keys are typically derived from
secret keys. The knowledge of secret keys generally enables more capabilities than the
knowledge of public keys.
A first example of public-key cryptography are public-key encryption schemes. Consider
a setting with two parties, the sender and the receiver. At the setup stage of a public-key
encryption scheme, the receiver generates a pair of keys (sk,pk), where sk is the secret
key and pk is the public key. Then, the receiver keeps sk secret and sends the public
key pk over to the sender. The sender is then able to encrypt messages using pk, and
the receiver can decrypt those same messages by using sk.
Definition 2.15. An (M, C,K) − public-key encryption scheme S consists of three
polynomial-time algorithms:
S.Gen(λ):
Probabilistic algorithm that, given a security parameter λ, returns a secret key
and a public key sk,pk ∈ K.
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S.Encpk(m):
Probabilistic algorithm taking as input a message m ∈ M and the public key
pk ∈ K. It returns a ciphertext c = S.Encpk(m) ∈ C.
S.Decsk(c):
Deterministic algorithm run by the client and taking a ciphertext c ∈ C as input.
It returns a plaintext m = S.Decsk(c) ∈M.
We say that S is correct if S.Decsk(S.Encpk(m)) = m with all but negligible probability
for every m ∈M.
The security properties of public-key encryption schemes guarantee that, given the
knowledge of pk, the sender is able to generate ciphertexts that can only be decrypted
with the knowledge of sk. Therefore, if two parties know the public key of each other,
public-key encryption schemes enable them to communicate privately even if they don’t
share common secret information. In practice, public keys are either distributed to many
different senders privately or publicly disseminated through a public-key infrastructure
to prevent tampering attacks from active adversaries.
While the public key functionality describes a clear advantage with respect to symmetric-
key encryption schemes, all known efficient public-key schemes are at least two to
three orders of magnitude slower than the most efficient symmetric-key encryption
schemes [88]. Thus, their use in practice is often relegated to encrypting symmetric
keys. Unsurprisingly, we encounter the same issue when comparing all kinds of public-
key cryptographic schemes to their symmetric-key counterparts.
We now introduce a game-based security definition for public-key encryption schemes
used in our work, Indistinguishability against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (or IND-CPA).
This definition is the analog of Definition 2.2 in the public-key setting. We introduce the
definition by means of a game between two entities, a challenger and an adversary. The
game consists of three phases. In the Setup phase, the challenger generates the keying
material and hands over the public key and the public parameters to the adversary.
At the Challenge phase, the adversary chooses two messages and is handed a challenge
ciphertext corresponding to one of them. In the Guess phase, the aim of the adversary is
then to distinguish which message the challenge ciphertext corresponds to. The security
definition, which gives the security guarantees, simply states that any PPT adversary
has negligible success probability in winning this game.
Let S = {S.Gen,S.Enc,S.Dec} be a public-key encryption scheme. Given a security
parameter λ, define a security game in the following three phases:
• Setup. The challenger runs S.Gen on input λ, hands over the public parameters
and the public key pk to the adversary and keeps the secret key sk private.
• Challenge. The adversary outputs two challenge candidate messages m0,m1 of
the same length. The challenger throws a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1}, and outputs the
ciphertext c = S.Encpk(mb) corresponding to mb.
• Guess. The adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} for b.
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Definition 2.16 (Indistinguishability against Chosen Plaintext Attacks). We say that
a public-key encryption scheme S = {S.Gen,S.Enc,S.Dec} satisfies indistinguishability
against chosen plaintext attacks if the advantage of every PPT adversary A in distin-
guishing b in the above game
AdvA(λ) =|Pr(b′ = b)− 1/2|
= |Pr(A(X) = b|X = b)− Pr(A(X) = b|X = 1− b)|
is negligible in λ.
2.4.1 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption schemes are cryptographic schemes that enable computing
over encrypted data. Their homomorphic properties enable users to encrypt their data
in such a way that operations on the encrypted data translate to operations on the
underlying plaintexts. Thus, homomorphic encryption enables users to outsource their
data in encrypted form to a non-trusted party and subsequently request computations
to be performed on that data.
Homomorphic encryption schemes are classified according to their homomorphic prop-
erties. Cryptographic literature usually distinguishes three classes:
• Partially homomorphic encryption (PHE): PHE schemes are homomorphic encryp-
tion schemes that support just a single operation on ciphertexts. Depending on
the particular scheme, they allow for addition or multiplication of ciphertexts. We
respectively call them additively and multiplicatively homomorphic schemes.
• Somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE): SHE schemes support both addition
and multiplication of ciphertexts, but they support a limited number of operations.
Most SHE schemes admit a large number of additions and a small number of
products on ciphertexts. However, SHE schemes are usually more computationally
expensive than PHE schemes.
• Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE): FHE schemes support an unlimited num-
ber of additions and multiplications on ciphertexts, thus enabling arbitrary com-
putations over encrypted data. Unfortunately, their computational overhead is
currently too large for FHE to be practical for most applications. Usually, FHE
schemes are SHE schemes with an additional bootstrapping algorithm. When too
many multiplications are performed, the expensive bootstrapping algorithm is used
to process the encrypted data so that additional multiplications are allowed.
Most, though not all, traditional homomorphic encryption schemes are public-key. In
this thesis we make black-box use of a public-key additively homomorphic encryption
scheme. We now give an example of such an encryption scheme, the Paillier encryption
scheme [108], and we present it as described in [88].
Definition 2.17. The Paillier Encryption scheme S is defined by the following algo-
rithms:
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S.Gen(λ):
Choose two λ-bit prime numbers p, q such that gcd(pq, (p−1)(q−1)) = 1. Compute
n = pq, ν = (p− 1)(q − 1) and µ = ν−1 mod n. Return the secret key sk = (ν, µ)
and the public key pk = n.
S.Encpk(m):
Given the message m ∈ Fn, select a random r ∈ F∗n. Output the ciphertext
c = (n+ 1)m · rn mod n2.
S.Decsk(c):
Given the ciphertext c ∈ Fn2 , output the message m = c
ν−1
n µ mod n.
The Paillier encryption scheme satisfies the IND-CPA security definition under the de-
cisional composite residuosity assumption [108]. For a proof of correctness, see [88]. To
see additivity, let ci = Encpk(mi) for i = 1, 2 and note that
c1 · c2 = (n+ 1)m1 · rn1 · (n+ 1)m2 · rn2 = (n+ 1)m1+m2 · (r1r2)n = Encpk(m1 +m2).
2.5 Searchable Encryption
In this section we survey the field of searchable encryption. This section starts with an in-
troduction to the topic, defining the setting, architecture and some generalities required
in later material. Then, we present each of the main themes in searchable encryption on
a technical level, summarizing the state of the art and describing fundamental results
and particularities. For an introduction to searchable encryption, see [109].
Searchable encryption is a cryptographic technique that aims to solve data confidentiality
issues when searching over outsourced data in a cloud computing setting. Searchable
encryption schemes allow a client to efficiently search over outsourced encrypted data,
and they provide a clear description of which information is protected or leaked in the
process.
The simplest setting in searchable encryption consists of two parties, a client and a
server. The client first wants to upload a data set D to the server. This data set
is composed of tuples (wi, Di), where the document Di is any kind of plaintext (text,
audio, images, etc.) and wi is a keyword associated Di. Once this data set is uploaded,
the client may want to query the server for all documents associated to a particular
keyword w. Having received this query, the server processes it, selects the data items
(wi, Di) with matching keywords wi = w, and returns the corresponding documents Di
to the client. The use of searchable encryption schemes preserves the efficiency of this
whole process while guaranteeing that the server learns as little information as possible.
A searchable encryption scheme S first provides the client with a key k through the
execution of an algorithm S.Gen. Using this key, an algorithm S.Enc allows the client
to build an encryption C of the data set D. Additionally, this algorithm creates a
searchable index I in the process, which is uploaded to the server along with C.
Afterwards, the client may want to retrieve the documents associated to the keyword
w. The client then furnishes this keyword w to the algorithm S.Trapdoor to efficiently
generate a trapdoor (or search token) T encoding the given keyword. This trapdoor T is
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then sent to the server. The server is able to combine the trapdoor T and the searchable
index I by using a public algorithm S.Search. In this way it efficiently obtains the
encrypted documents associated to the keyword that T represents, and returns them
to the client. The client, in turn, decrypts the encrypted documents and retrieves the
desired search outcome.
One of the main aspects of a searchable encryption is efficiency. Indeed, alternative
cryptographic schemes such as private information retrieval [35] and oblivious RAM
schemes [33] provide much better security in certain practical contexts but are never-
theless impractical for efficiency reasons. Searchable encryption schemes are often very
efficient, and they provide a suitable solution when dealing with large data sets, fre-
quent queries and multiple clients. Of all the efficiency marks of searchable encryption
schemes, one can argue that the most critical are the ones involved in the searching
phase: the trapdoor generation time, the search time and the client decryption time.
This is so because one can expect many queries to be issued for a single data set.
There are many popular trends in the searchable encryption research that aim to im-
prove and extend the functionalities and properties of schemes. A desirable property is
achieving sublinear search, that is, search time that is sublinear in the number of docu-
ments of the outsourced data set. When sublinear search is achieved, the search process
does not necessarily touch all stored documents. Searchable encryption schemes have
also been extended to support all sorts of different queries, such as range, conjunctive
or Boolean queries. Another remarkable achievement of recent research are dynamic
schemes (as opposed to static schemes), which enable the client to insert, update and/or
delete documents from the outsourced data set. Complex architectures have been con-
sidered in the literature as well, by allowing various clients to search or insert documents
to a common outsourced data set. Also, verifiability in searchable encryption enables
the client to check the correctness of the search outcome in the face of a malicious server
that may tamper with the search results.
The security properties of searchable encryption vary among different schemes. In order
to guarantee efficiency in the encryption and in the search phases, searchable encryption
makes a trade-off between security and efficiency. That is, queries using searchable
encryption usually induce some information leakage on the information that is exchanged
or stored. For example, if the search process returns the same search outcome for two
different queries, it often reveals that the two queries are equivalent in the outsourced
database. Security definitions in searchable encryption formalize and bound this leakage.
Thus, searchable encryption provides an efficient solution suitable for applications where
the leaked information is not sensitive. Some of the standard leakage patterns found in
the literature are:
• Size pattern: The number of documents and/or trapdoors submitted by the client.
• Search pattern: Whether any two trapdoors encode the same keyword or not.
• Access pattern: Exactly which documents have been accessed when processing a
query.
• Operation pattern: In dynamic searchable encryption schemes, the operation car-
ried out (i.e., search, insert, update or delete).
• Update pattern: In dynamic searchable encryption schemes, which ones are the
accessed, inserted, replaced, updated or deleted documents.
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Much like traditional encryption schemes, searchable encryption schemes come in sym-
metric and public-key flavors. The setting explained above describes the symmetric-key
case. In the public-key setting, there are two kinds of clients, writers and readers. Read-
ers are able to generate trapdoors and search through the outsourced data, while writers
can only generate searchable indexes and push them to the server. In the following sub-
sections we describe each of both types, namely searchable symmetric encryption and
public-key encryption with keyword search.
2.5.1 Searchable Symmetric Encryption
Consider the one writer and one reader setting described above, where a single client
uploads a document collection (i.e., a data set) D to a server and then is able to query
on it. The document collection is composed of tuples (Wi, Di), where the document Di
is any kind of plaintext and Wi = (wi,1, . . . , wi,q) is a list of keywords associated to Di.
A searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) scheme S consists of five polynomial-time
algorithms, S = {S.Gen,S.Enc,S.Trapdoor,S.Search,S.Dec}. The probabilistic algo-
rithm S.Gen is first used to provide a client with a symmetric key k. Then, the client is
able to generate a searchable index I and an encryption C of the data set D by executing
S.Enc on input the symmetric key k and the data set D.
Afterwards, the client may want to retrieve the documents satisfying a particular pred-
icate f specified by a Boolean formula on a tuple of keywords. An example of such a
predicate is w1 ∧ (w2 ∨ w3), which is satisfied by documents whose associated keyword
list contains the keyword w1 and either w2 or w3. The client generates a trapdoor T by
executing the algorithm S.Trapdoor on f , and sends T to the server. The server can
then retrieve the encrypted documents satisfying f by combining the trapdoor T and
the searchable index I and by using the public algorithm S.Search.
We present below a general model for searchable symmetric encryption schemes. Note
that dynamic [110] or verifiable [111] searchable encryption schemes may include addi-
tional algorithms.
Definition 2.18. A searchable symmetric encryption scheme S is comprised of five
polynomial-time algorithms:
S.Gen(λ):
Probabilistic algorithm run by the client that, given a security parameter λ, re-
turns a secret key k and the public parameters params of the scheme, including a
symmetric-key encryption scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec).
S.Enck(D):
Probabilistic algorithm run by the client and taking as input a tuple of plaintexts
D = (Wi, Di)
N
i=1, where Wi is a tuple of keywords attached to the document Di.
It returns an encrypted index I together with a tuple of encrypted documents
C = (Ci)
N
i=1 = (Enck(Di))
N
i=1 for the algorithm Enc in params.
S.Trapdoork(f):
Algorithm run by the client that takes a predicate on keywords f as input and
returns a trapdoor T associated to f .
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S.Search(I,C, T ):
Deterministic algorithm run by the server and taking as input an encrypted index
I, a tuple of ciphertexts C and a trapdoor T . It returns a tuple of elements of C.
S.Deck(C):
Deterministic algorithm run by the client and taking an encrypted document C as
input. It returns the output of Deck(C) for the algorithm Dec in params.
We say that S is correct if for all security parameters λ, for all k output by S.Gen,
for all document collections D and for all (I,C) output by S.Enc, it holds with all but
negligible probability that
D(f) = {S.Deck(C) : C ∈ S.Search(I,C,S.Trapdoork(f))},
where D(f) are all documents in D whose attached keyword tuple satisfies f .
Searchable symmetric encryption schemes can be classified according to query expres-
siveness, i.e., to the class of predicates allowed by the S.Trapdoor algorithm. If the algo-
rithm S.Trapdoor supports only single keywords as predicates, we say that S is a single-
keyword SSE scheme. Alternatively, if S.Trapdoor supports arbitrary conjunctions of
such predicates, we say that S is a conjunctive SSE scheme. If S.Trapdoor supports
arbitrary Boolean formulas, we say that S is a Boolean SSE scheme. The searchable
encryption literature deals with several other predicates, such as range [65, 93], substring
[93] or subset [65] queries. We further comment on these in Chapter 3.
The first provably secure symmetric-key searchable encryption scheme was proposed in
2000 by Song, Wagner and Perrig [25]. In 2006, after a series of advances [112, 113], in
the foundational work [37], Curtmola, Garay, Kamara and Ostrovsky introduced several
rigorous and strong security definitions for searchable encryption, along with a scheme
satisfying them. Their definitions have become standard in the searchable encryption
literature, and their scheme is the basis for many other efficient SSE schemes.
Before describing the strongest security definition out of the two presented in [37], we
define some concepts which have been informally introduced in the previous subsection.
Definition 2.19 (History). Let D = (Wi, Di)
N
i=1 be a document collection. A q-query
history over D is a tuple H = (D,w) that includes the document collection D and a
list of q keywords w = (w1, . . . , wq).
The concept of q-query history formalizes the information outsourced, in the form of
documents and single-keyword queries, to the cloud service provider in a cloud computing
setting. As explained above, the access and search patterns respectively refer to the
information of which documents have been accessed when processing a query and to the
information of whether any two single-keyword trapdoors encode the same keyword or
not.
Definition 2.20 (Access Pattern). The access pattern induced by a q-query history H =
(D,w) is the tuple α(H) = (D(w1), . . . ,D(wq)), where D(wi) denotes all documents in
D matched by keyword wi.
Definition 2.21 (Search Pattern). The search pattern induced by a q-query history
H = (D,w) is the q × q symmetric matrix σ(H) where the (i, j)-th component σ(H)i,j
is 1 if wi = wj and is 0 otherwise.
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The notion used in the security definitions in [37] is that of the trace of a history. The
trace consists of the information about the history that searchable encryption schemes
do typically leak.
Definition 2.22 (Trace). The trace induced by a q-query history H = (D,w) is the se-
quence τ(H) = (|D1|, . . . , |DN |, α(H), σ(H)) comprised of the lengths of the documents
in D and the access and search patterns induced by H.
If w is empty, we denote τ(D,w) = τ(D).
Next, we describe the Adaptive Semantic Security definition presented in [37]. In this
definition, Curtmola et al. consider an adaptive stateful adversary, that is, an adversary
A that chooses how to interact with the server by taking into account all the previously
held information, including an internal state variable stA.
Definition 2.23 (Adaptive Semantic Security for SSE [37]). Let S = {S.Gen, S.Enc,
S.Trapdoor, S.Search, S.Dec} be a searchable symmetric encryption scheme. Let λ be
the security parameter and A = (A0, . . . ,Aq) and B = (B0, . . . ,Bq) be tuples of PPT
algorithms respectively defining the adversary and the simulator, where q is polynomial
in λ. Consider the following probabilistic experiments RealS,A(λ) and SimS,A(λ):
RealS,A(λ) :
k ← S.Gen(λ)
(D, stA)← A0(λ)
(I,C)← S.Enck(D)
(w1, stA)← A1(stA, I,C)
T1 ← S.Trapdoork(w1)
for 2 ≤ i ≤ q,
(wi, stA)← Ai(stA, I,C, T1, . . . , Ti−1)
Ti ← S.Trapdoork(wi)
let T = (T1, . . . , Tq)
output v = (I,C,T) and stA
SimS,A,B(λ) :
(D, stA)← A0(λ)
(I,C, stB)← B0(τ(D))
(w1, stA)← A1(stA, I,C)
(T1, stB)← B1(stB, τ(D, (w1)))
for 2 ≤ i ≤ q,
(wi, stA)← Ai(stA, I,C, T1, . . . , Ti−1)
(Ti, stB)← Bi(stB, τ(D, (w1, . . . , wi)))
let T = (T1, . . . , Tq)
output v = (I,C,T) and stA
We say that S is adaptively semantically secure if for all PPT adversaries A there exists
a PPT simulator B such that for every PPT distinguisher algorithm D,
|Pr (D(v, stA) = 1 : (v, stA)← RealS,A(λ))
−Pr (D(v, stA) = 1 : (v, stA)← SimS,A,B(λ))|
is negligible, where the probabilities are taken over the random coins of S.Gen, S.Enc,
A and B.
The adaptive semantic security definition for SSE states that the only information po-
tentially leaked by the scheme is the trace induced by the outsourced data set and by
the queried keywords. However, the leakage of searchable encryption schemes can vary
depending on the scheme and on the followed adversary model. More complex schemes
may need a different description of leakage. To address this problem, in [114] Chase
and Kamara introduced the notion of leakage function. Leakage functions generalize the
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notion of trace: given a history as input, leakage functions output an upper bound on
the information that the scheme leaks about the history.
We next introduce the L-Semantic Security against Adaptive Attacks definition pre-
sented by Cash et al. in [93], which is used in this thesis. This security definition is
conditioned to a predefined leakage function, and it is designed for the OXT Boolean
SSE scheme defined in [93]. This security definition is conceptually equivalent to adap-
tive semantic security for L = τ . We modify the original formulation to fit the notation
of Definitions 2.18,2.23.
Definition 2.24 (L-Semantic Security against Adaptive Attacks [93]). Let S = {S.Gen,
S.Enc, S.Trapdoor, S.Search, S.Dec} be a searchable symmetric encryption scheme.
Let λ be the security parameter and A = (A0, . . . ,Aq+1) and B = (B0, . . . ,Bq) be
tuples of PPT algorithms respectively defining the adversary and the simulator, where
q is polynomial in λ. Consider the following probabilistic experiments RealS,A(λ) and
SimS,A(λ):
RealS,A(λ) :
k ← S.Gen(λ)
(D, stA)← A0(λ)
(I,C)← S.Enck(D)
(w1, stA)← A1(stA, I,C)
T1 ← S.Trapdoork(w1)
for 2 ≤ i ≤ q,
(wi, stA)← Ai(stA, I,C, T1, . . . , Ti−1)
Ti ← S.Trapdoork(wi)
let T = (T1, . . . , Tq)
b← Aq+1(stA, I,C,T)
output b
SimS,A,B(λ) :
(D, stA)← A0(λ)
(I,C, stB)← B0(L(D))
(w1, stA)← A1(stA, I,C)
(T1, stB)← B1(stB,L(D, (w1)))
for 2 ≤ i ≤ q,
(wi, stA)← Ai(stA, I,C, T1, . . . , Ti−1)
(Ti, stB)← Bi(stB,L(D, (w1, . . . , wi)))
b← Aq+1(stA, I,C,T)
output b
We say that S is L-semantically secure against adaptive attacks if for all PPT adversaries
A there exists a PPT simulator B such that
|Pr (RealS,A(λ) = 1)− Pr (SimS,A,B(λ) = 1)|
is negligible, where the probabilities are taken over the random coins of S.Gen, S.Enc,
A and B.
To conclude this subsection, we describe the second and most secure searchable en-
cryption scheme introduced by Curtmola, Garay, Kamara and Ostrovsky in [37]. This
single-keyword static scheme, while being less efficient than the first scheme in [37], is
the first scheme to satisfy the strong notion of adaptive semantic security.
The main insight behind the schemes presented in [37] is the use of an inverted index,
which is the conceptual basis for nearly all efficient searchable symmetric encryption
solutions. The use of inverted indexes in [37] initiated a recurrent trend in searchable
encryption, where cryptographic primitives are used on top of structured data to enable
efficient searching over encrypted data.
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A forward index can be understood as a table, where every row contains a different
document D and all keywords w1, . . . , wn attached to it. An inverse index can also be
understood as a table, where every row contains a different keyword w and all documents
D(w) = {D1, . . . , Dm} it is attached to. The task of searching for all documents attached
to a particular keyword w over a forward index is sequential, and takes linear time O(|D|)
in the number of documents. In contrast, this same searching task takes O(|D(w)|) time
when using inverted indexes, by employing a technique called FKS dictionary [115].
Before stating the definition, we follow [37] and give some notation. Given an ordered
set A = (a1, . . . , an), we denote by A[i] the i-th element ai of A. Given an element b ∈ A,
assuming A has no repeated elements, we denote by addrA(b) the subindex i such that
A[i] = b. Therefore, A[addrA(b)] = b.
Definition 2.25. Let n be the total number of documents to encrypt and let MAX
be the bit size of the largest document. Let W denote the keyword space, and as-
sume that the bit size of the keywords in the document collection to encrypt ranges
between m and `, and that it includes a keyword of bit size exactly m. Set max =
min
(
max{i : ∑ij=1 2mjj < MAX}, |W |) and s = max ·n.
Define a SSE scheme S by the five following polynomial-time algorithms:
S.Gen(λ):
Choose parameters k, ` non-constant polynomial in λ. Let W be the keyword
space. Let T = (T .Gen, T .Enc, T .Dec) be an IND − PCPA-secure symmetric
encryption scheme. Instantiate a PRP pi with key space {0, 1}k
pi : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}`+log2(n+max) → {0, 1}`+log2(n+max)
Sample K1 uniformly at random from {0, 1}k and generate K2 = T .Gen(λ). Out-
put the public parameters params = {W,k, `,m,max, n, s, T , pi} and the secret key
K = (K1,K2).
S.EncK(D):
Let D = (Wi, Di)
n
i=1, where Wi is a tuple of keywords attached to the document
Di. For every document D in D, denote by id(D) a unique identifier of D. Define
δ(D) = ∪iWi as the ordered set of distinct keywords in D. For every w ∈ δ(D),
let D(w) denote the ordered set of documents attached to keyword w, in the order
induced by D.
Compute C = (C1, . . . , Cn), where Ci = T .EncK2(Di).
To prepare the index I, for every w ∈ δ(D) and for every D ∈ D(w), set
I[piK1(w||addrD(w)(D))] = id(D).
Now let s′ =
∑
w∈δ(D) |D(w)|, and let ci denote the number of entries of I that
contain id(Di). For security purposes, if s
′ < s then modify I as follows: for all
documents Di in D and for all 1 ≤ l ≤ max−ci, set I[piK1(0`‖n+ l)] = id(Di).
Output I,C.
S.TrapdoorK(w):
Output T = (t1, . . . , tn), where ti = piK1(w‖i).
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S.Search(I,C, T ):
Let X be an empty set. For all t ∈ T such that I[t] exists, add C[I[t]] to X.
Output X.
S.DecK(C):
Output D = T .DecK2(C).
This searchable encryption scheme is seen to be adaptively semantically secure in [37],
under the assumptions that pi is a pseudo-random permutation and that T is IND −
PCPA-secure.
2.5.2 Public-Key Searchable Encryption with Keyword Search
In searchable encryption there potentially exist two kinds of clients: readers and writers.
Readers are able to generate trapdoors and search over the outsourced data, and writers
can generate searchable indexes. While in searchable symmetric encryption one assumes
that a single user fills both roles, that may not always be the case, and writers may not
necessarily be authorized to search over the outsourced data. Moreover, one can consider
architectures where there may exist multiple readers or writers.
Public key searchable encryption (also named public key encryption with keyword search),
or PEKS, realizes searchable encryption in the public-key setting, where there may exist
multiple writers that send data over to a single reader. PEKS was firstly proposed by
Boneh et al. in [38]. Since their pioneering work, there have appeared several PEKS
schemes in the literature [40–43, 47, 48, 65, 74, 116–118], improving the scheme in [38]
in terms of efficiency, security or functionality.
The keyword search protocol usually considered in PEKS involves the following entities:
• a set of data suppliers, which provides and encrypts the data to be outsourced,
• a storage server (e.g. an e-mail gateway or a database), which stores the out-
sourced data, and
• a client of the storage server, who retains the ability to generate queries for the
encrypted data.
In the protocol, the client firstly sets up the scheme by generating some public parameters
and shares them with the server and the data suppliers. It generates a public and private
key pair, shares the public key with the data suppliers and keeps the private key secret.
Afterwards, the data suppliers may wish to share a collection of data items with the
client, where each of them is indexed by a set of keywords. To do so, they encrypt this
collection, and they upload the resulting ciphertexts to the storage server. Afterwards,
the client may want to receive from the storage server all the stored data items indexed
by keywords in some chosen list. To let the storage server know which encrypted data
it should forward, the client can generate a query and send it to the storage server. The
storage server is then able to use the received information to select the encrypted stored
data items satisfying the query conditions, and it can return those data items to the
client. Note that this process can be carried out without direct interaction between the
client and the data providers.
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We now give a general model for public-key searchable encryption schemes. Although
not stated, every algorithm apart from S.Gen takes the public parameters as input.
Definition 2.26. We define a PEKS scheme S as consisting of four polynomial-time
algorithms:
S.Gen(λ): Probabilistic algorithm run by the client that, given a security parameter λ,
returns the private key sk, the public key pk and the public parameters params of
the scheme.
S.Encpk(D): Probabilistic algorithm run by data providers. It takes as input a docu-
ment D, which consists of a tuple of keywords. It returns a corresponding search-
able index I.
S.Trapdoorsk(f): Algorithm run by the client that takes as input a predicate f on
keywords. It returns a corresponding trapdoor T.
S.Search(I,T): Deterministic algorithm run by the server and taking as input a search-
able index I and a trapdoor T. It returns either 1 or 0.
Note that our usage of the term document here drops the data items (e.g., files, e-mails)
and considers only the indexing keywords. This is so because PEKS works exclusively
over the indexing keywords, and data items may be protected by other cryptographic
means (as explained in the following paragraphs).
Just as in searchable symmetric encryption schemes, PEKS schemes can be classified
according to query expressiveness, i.e., according to the class of predicates allowed by
the S.Trapdoor algorithm. If the algorithm S.Trapdoor supports only single keywords
as predicates, we say that S is a single-keyword SSE scheme. If S.Trapdoor supports
arbitrary conjunctions of such predicates, we say that S is a conjunctive SSE scheme.
In most of the proposed applications for single-keyword PEKS, the exchanged ciphertexts
take the form
Encpk(D)‖I(w1)‖ · · · ‖I(wm),
where pk is the public key of the client, Enc is some public-key encryption scheme,
the data item D is indexed by keywords w1, . . . , wm, and I(wi) = S.Encpk(wi) are the
searchable indexes corresponding to each of the indexing keywords. In a cloud computing
setting, this concatenation of ciphertexts is uploaded to the cloud server by the data
suppliers. The client can recover all data items indexed with keyword w at position (or
field) i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} by sending the trapdoor T(w) and the position i to the server.
Following this last strategy, the PEKS literature usually achieves conjunctive queries
by using keyword fields. This is done by setting up the S.Trapdoor algorithm so that
it admits as input a tuple L = (w′1, . . . , w′l) of keywords and a set J = {j1, . . . , jl} of
positions. Then, a data item D = {w1, . . . , wn} satisfies such a conjunctive field keyword
query if wji = w
′
i for all i ∈ [l]. This construction is properly defined in Section 3.2.
In order to define correctness for PEKS schemes, we recur to the notions of consistency
defined by Abdalla et al. [119]. Consistency in PEKS refers to the property that a
searchable index and a trapdoor should match in the search process exactly when the
underlying document and query also match. The consistency notions defined in [119]
are, in increasing strength order, computational, statistical and perfect. In this thesis we
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use the computational consistency definition. Informally, this definition states that the
advantage of any polynomial-time adversary in finding a matching searchable index and
trapdoor coming from a non-matching document and query is negligible in the security
parameter, where the adversary has access to the public parameters and to the public
key.
We now present the Computational Consistency definition. Let S be a PEKS scheme.
Given a security parameter λ, we introduce a consistency game in the following three
phases:
• Setup. The challenger runs S.Gen on input λ, hands over the public parameters
and the public key pk to the adversary, and keeps the private key sk secret.
• Guess. The adversary outputs a document of the form D = (w1, . . . , wm) and a
predicate f on keywords.
• Output. The challenger hands over adversary the trapdoor T = S.Trapdoorsk(f),
and the adversary computes I = S.Encpk(D). If S.Search(I,T) = 1 and if pred-
icate f does not match document D, then the adversary outputs a bit b = 1.
Otherwise, it outputs b = 0.
Definition 2.27 (Computational Consistency of PEKS [119]). A PEKS scheme S is
computationally consistent if the advantage of every PPT adversary A in the above game
AdvA(λ) = Pr(b = 1)
is negligible in λ.
We next introduce the Semantic Security against Adaptive Chosen Keyword Attacks
definition presented by Boneh et al. in [38]. This security definition states that indexes
I(w) do not reveal any information about the underlying keyword w unless the trapdoor
T(w) corresponding to this keyword is available. In a cloud computing setting, this
means that that the server does not learn any information from the searchable indexes
unless it has the knowledge of a matching trapdoor.
Given a security parameter λ, define a security game in the following five phases:
• Setup. The challenger runs S.Gen on input λ and hands over the public parameters
to the adversary.
• Query Phase 1. The adversary adaptively requests the challenger for encrypted
indexes S.Enck(w) for a polynomial number of keywords w of its own choice.
• Challenge. The adversary outputs two challenge candidate keywords w0, w1. The
challenger throws a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1}, and outputs the encrypted index Ib =
S.Enck(mb) corresponding to keyword wb.
• Query Phase 2. The adversary proceeds just as in Query Phase 1.
• Guess. The adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} for b.
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Definition 2.28 (Semantic Security against Adaptive Chosen Keyword Attacks [38]).
The PEKS scheme S is semantically secure against adaptive chosen keyword attacks if
the advantage of every PPT algorithm A in breaking the above game
AdvA(λ) =
∣∣Pr(b′ = b)− 1/2∣∣
is negligible in λ.
To conclude this subsection, we describe the PEKS scheme introduced by Boneh et al. in
[38]. This scheme is a single-keyword scheme that satisfies the previous security definition
under the Bilinear Diffie Hellman computational hardness assumption [103, 120] in the
Random Oracle Model.
Definition 2.29. Define a PEKS scheme S by the four following polynomial-time al-
gorithms:
S.Gen(λ): Given a security parameter λ ∈ Z, fix a symmetric bilinear group G of prime
order q ≥ 2λ and denote the corresponding pairing by e : G × G → GT . Let g
be a random generator of G. Let H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G and H2 : GT → {0, 1}log q be
collision-resistant hash functions. Choose α ∈ F∗q uniformly at random. Output
the public parameters params = {G,GT , q, e, g,H1, H2}, the private key pk = gα
and the public key sk = α.
S.Encpk(w): Given as input a document consisting of a single keyword w, compute t =
e(H1(w),pk
r) for a random r ∈ F∗q . Return the encrypted index I(w) = (gr, H2(t)).
S.Trapdoorsk(w): Given as input a tuple of keywords consisting of a single keyword w,
return a corresponding trapdoor T(w) = H1(w)
sk.
S.Search(I,T): Given an encrypted index I = (A,B) and a trapdoor T, return 1 if
H2(e(T, A)) = B. Otherwise, return 0.
2.6 Secret Sharing
In this section we give an account of unconditionally secure secret sharing. We formally
define some of the terms mentioned in Section 1.4.4, such as access structure, distribution
scheme and secret sharing scheme, and we present the complexity measures analyzed in
this thesis. For a low-level discussion of secret sharing, see Section 1.4.4 and Chapter 5.
For an introduction to secret sharing, see for instance [121, 122].
As explained in Section 1.4.4, secret sharing schemes aim at protecting a secret piece
of information by dividing it into shares, in such a way that the secret can only be
reconstructed from some combinations of shares. The collection of combinations of
shares that allow the reconstruction of the secret form an access structure. We now
formally define this term.
Definition 2.30 (Access Structure). Let P be a set. A collection Γ ⊆ P(P ) is monotone
if B ∈ Γ and B ⊆ C ⊆ P implies C ∈ Γ. An access structure is a monotone collection
Γ ⊆ P(P ) of non-empty subsets of P . The family of minimal subsets in Γ is denoted by
min Γ.
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Secret sharing schemes can be used to distribute a secret among a set of participants,
in such a way that the secret can only be recovered when some participants pool to-
gether their shares. The distribution phase in this usage is formalized by the notion of
distribution scheme.
Definition 2.31 (Distribution Scheme). Let P = {1, . . . , n} and let K be a finite set.
A distribution scheme on P with domain of secrets K is a pair Σ = (Π, µ), where µ is
a probability distribution on a finite set R, and Π is a mapping from K ×R to a set of
n-tuples K1 ×K2 × · · · ×Kn. The set R is called the set of random strings and Kj is
called the domain of shares of j.
For a distribution scheme (Π, µ) and for any A ⊆ P , we denote by Π(s, r)A the projection
of Π(s, r) to its A-entries. We next formally define secret sharing schemes as distribution
schemes with some added reconstruction and confidentiality conditions. This definition
is taken from [121].
Definition 2.32 (Secret Sharing). Let K be a finite set of secrets with |K| ≥ 2. A
distribution scheme (Π, µ) on P with domain of secrets K is a secret-sharing scheme
realizing an access structure Γ if the following two requirements hold for every A ⊆ P :
• If A ∈ Γ, then there exists a reconstruction function ReconA : Ki1× . . .×Kir → K
such that, for every k ∈ K,
Pr ( ReconA(Π(k, r)A) = k ) = 1.
• If A /∈ Γ then, for every a, b ∈ K and for every possible vector of shares (sj)j∈A,
Pr ( Π(a, r)A = (sj)j∈A ) = Pr ( Π(b, r)A = (sj)j∈A ) .
In a secret sharing scheme, we usually consider that there is an additional player p0
not in P called the dealer. In order to distribute a secret k ∈ K according to Σ, the
dealer first samples a random string r ∈ R according to µ, it computes a vector of shares
Π(k, r) = (s1, . . . , sn), and it privately communicates each share sj to party j. The
subsets of participants in P satisfying the first condition in the last definition are called
authorized, and the ones satisfying the second condition are called forbidden. In this
work we consider only perfect secret sharing schemes, that is, schemes in which every
subset of participants is either authorized or forbidden.
Among secret sharing schemes, we highlight linear secret sharing schemes. These
schemes are of special interest, since their linearity is useful for applications in other
cryptographic solutions such as attribute-based encryption schemes [24], secure multi-
party computation schemes or joint signature schemes.
Definition 2.33 (Linear Secret Sharing Scheme). Let F be a finite field. A secret
sharing scheme Σ = (Π, µ) is (F, `)-linear if K = F`, the sets R, K1, . . ., Kn are vector
spaces over F, µ is the uniform distribution on R, and Π is a surjective linear mapping.
As stated in Section 1.4.4, we can associate various complexity measures to secret sharing
schemes and to access structures. We next define the complexity measures analyzed in
our research.
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For a secret sharing scheme Σ on P , the information ratio of Σ is defined as
σ(Σ) =
max1≤j≤n log |Kj |
log |K| ,
and the total information ratio of Σ is defined as
σT(Σ) =
∑
1≤j≤n log |Kj |
log |K| .
We say that Σ is ideal if σ(Σ) = 1. If an access structure Γ admits an ideal secret
sharing scheme, we also say that Γ is ideal.
For an access structure Γ, we define the optimal information ratio σ(Γ) as the infimum
of the information ratio of secret sharing schemes for Γ. Also, we define the optimal
total information ratio σT(Γ) as the infimum of the total information ratio of the secret
sharing schemes for Γ. Analogously, for every prime power q we define λq,`(Γ) and λ
T
q,`(Γ)
as the infimum of the information ratios and total information ratios of the (Fq, `)-linear
secret sharing schemes for Γ, respectively.
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Chapter 3
Searchable Encryption
In this chapter, we present our contributions to the field of searchable encryption. This
chapter is divided in two independent sections, each containing a separate work.
In Section 3.1, we present our work on two-dimensional range queries over encrypted
data. This work is set in the field of Symmetric Searchable Encryption (SSE), which aims
to enable efficient search over outsourced encrypted data in a single-user architecture.
In this section, we present techniques that enable secure and efficient two-dimensional
range queries in SSE.
In Section 3.2, we present our work on Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search
(PEKS). PEKS schemes are searchable encryption schemes that enable public key hold-
ers to encrypt documents, while the secret key holder is able to generate queries for the
encrypted data. In this work, we build two schemes achieving conjunctive and subset
queries respectively. We show that our schemes outperform existing ones in terms of
efficiency and expressiveness.
3.1 Two-Dimensional Range Queries Over Encrypted Data
3.1.1 Introduction
The main problem we deal with in this section is searching over encrypted data. In
particular, we consider the case in which we want to perform queries on an encrypted
two-dimensional data set. A possible motivation would be the natural issue of users
owning data sets containing spatial geo-referenced data, for instance data about geologic
resources, water supplies, critical infrastructures or civil constructions. Typically, this
information is stored and indexed locally, but lately, due to economical and practical
reasons, data is often outsourced to the cloud. Since the information may be valuable
and confidential, users may want to prevent the cloud server and any external attackers
from obtaining information about it.
A simple approach for secure storage is to encrypt all the data in a straightforward
way, using symmetric-key encryption schemes. However, very few functionalities are
preserved when using general encryption techniques, and in particular it is hard to
search or to compute on the outsourced data efficiently. Hence, we consider a solution
49
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based on searchable encryption (SE), a cryptographic primitive that allows to remotely
query on outsourced encrypted data in a secure way. Song et al. [25] presented one
of the first SE schemes in 2000. Since their pioneering work, the field has expanded in
many directions, by enhancing the security and efficiency of the schemes, by improving
expressiveness of the queries, and by dealing with multi-user settings.
We are interested in using SE schemes in a client-server architecture. In this setting, the
client first creates an index of the data according to certain indexing keywords and stores
it along with the data set in an encrypted form. Later, if the client wants to recover
the elements of the encrypted data set that are indexed by some chosen keywords, it
sends a token associated to these keywords to the server. The server is then able to
efficiently retrieve and return the corresponding encrypted documents while learning as
little information as possible. We assume that the server behaves in an honest-but-
curious manner, that is, it always runs the protocol correctly, but it collects additional
information and is able to perform computations using the data it already holds.
Recent works [64–72] present extensions of existing SE schemes that achieve secure
and efficient range queries. These solutions generally exploit a special indexation of
documents. However, in all these solutions, achieving range queries has an impact on
computational and communication costs. Our work here is dedicated to the study of
similar techniques for range queries in SE, focusing on two-dimensional range queries.
We employ two techniques: quadtrees and over-covers.
We introduce quadtrees as a new technique for SE that aims to reduce the leakage of
information and the communication and computational costs of two-dimensional range
queries. Quadtrees induce a decomposition of the two-dimensional grid into quadrants.
They allow to improve security by reducing leakage with respect to alternative construc-
tions [66] in the case of two-dimensional data. This technique can also be extended to
other multi-dimensional range queries.
In order to reduce the communication costs, Faber et al. [68] introduced the concept
of over-covers. By enlarging the queried ranges, over-covers reduce the communication
costs and information leakage associated to the scheme, but they induce false positives
in the search results. However, the ranges are chosen in such a way that the information
sent to the server is reduced. For instance, queries that use the over-covers in [68] always
result in three keyword queries, and they have a false-positive rate of at most 66%.
In this work we analyze the use of over-covers, generalizing the constructions in [68]
by providing over-covers with a greater number of intervals. Using these over-covers
the information sent to the server is still small. Moreover, the accuracy is substantially
increased when increasing the number of elements in the over-cover.
Due to restrictions of the setting, we study symmetric-key cryptographic schemes. We
provide general techniques that can be used for a broad family of schemes, the ones
supporting at least single keyword searches. Moreover, we also provide techniques that
take advantage of the properties of more advanced schemes supporting Boolean queries,
like the one by Cash et al. [93]. Recently, Faber et al. [68] presented an extension of the
scheme in [93] that supports range queries. Following [68], we provide an adaptation of
their scheme for two-dimensional range queries. In the public-key setting, there exist
schemes supporting range queries [65, 66], but these schemes do not fit our setting
because we aim at dealing with the one writer and one reader scenario.
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We note here that very recent works study the cryptanalysis of SE schemes [26–32],
exposing attacks that exploit the leakage of SE schemes. Some of these attacks, partic-
ularly [30], specialize to the case of range queries. Assuming that the data set is dense
and that enough uniformly distributed queries are issued, they allow attackers to reveal
all the queried and data set values by using only the leaked access pattern information.
To the best of our knowledge, up to date no range SE schemes that avoid this and
similar attacks have been proposed, and the solutions proposed in Chapter 3.1 are also
vulnerable if the premises stated in [30] hold. The easiest way to prevent such attacks
is to apply a PIR scheme instead of a SE scheme in our constructions. A scheme based
on binary trees such as the one by Lipmaa [123] would be most suitable to our construc-
tions. Applying PIR as in [124] would effectively achieve query privacy and prevent the
attacks described in [30], although it would have an impact both on efficiency and on
the security of the outsourced data set.
In Section 3.1.2 we give an introduction to searchable encryption, providing a general
description of the primitives involved in our constructions. In Section 3.1.3 we suggest
different representations of two-dimensional data, and we provide our two-dimensional
range searchable encryption constructions in Sections 3.1.5, 3.1.6, 3.1.7, 3.1.8. The
efficiency and the information leakage associated to the proposed constructions are de-
scribed in Sections 3.1.9 and 3.1.10. Then, some of the proofs are deferred to Sec-
tion 3.1.11. Finally, the conclusions and future work are sketched in Section 3.1.12.
3.1.2 Problem Definition
3.1.2.1 Searchable Symmetric Encryption
The two-dimensional data-oriented solutions presented in this thesis make a black-box
use of an underlying searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) scheme. Searchable sym-
metric encryption schemes are SE schemes set up in a single-client architecture, and
they were principally developed by Curtmola et al. in [37]. Such schemes allow a client
to outsource an encrypted version of a data set to a semi-trusted, honest-but-curious
server, while preserving basic searching capabilities over the encrypted data.
Consider the one writer and one reader setting, i.e. a single-client architecture. Firstly,
a single client wants to upload a data set D to a server. The data set is composed
of tuples (Wi, Di), where the document Di is any kind of plaintext (e.g. text, audio,
images) and Wi is a list of keywords associated Di.
A searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) scheme S first provides a client with a sym-
metric key k by executing an algorithm S.Gen. Using this key k, an algorithm S.Enc
allows the client to build an encryption C of the data set D. Additionally, this algorithm
creates a searchable index I in the process, which is uploaded to the server along with
the ciphertexts C.
Afterwards, the client may want to retrieve the documents satisfying a particular predi-
cate f on keywords. A predicate is specified by a Boolean formula on a tuple of keywords.
For example, the predicate w1 ∧ (w2 ∨ w3) is satisfied by documents whose associated
keyword list contains the keyword w1 and either w2 or w3. The client can then furnish
a predicate f to the algorithm S.Trapdoor to generate a trapdoor (or search token) T
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encoding the given predicate. To query for documents satisfying predicate f , the client
sends T to the server.
By combining the trapdoor T and the searchable index I and by using the public algo-
rithm S.Search, the server is able to obtain a tuple of ciphertexts which are the encrypted
documents satisfying the predicate that T represents.
Refer to Definition 2.18 for a general model for searchable symmetric encryption schemes.
For an introduction to searchable encryption, see [109] and Section 2.5.1.
From all searchable symmetric encryption schemes, we choose the OXT scheme by Cash
et al. [93] as the underlying scheme for the instantiations of our proposed schemes.
The OXT scheme is suitable for static data sets and it provides highly efficient Boolean
search while incurring moderate and quantifiable leakage to the server. Regardless of
this choice, we provide general techniques that can also be used with any searchable
encryption scheme, even if it does not support conjunctive or Boolean queries.
As of security, queries using searchable encryption induce some leakage on the infor-
mation that is exchanged or stored. Several works define different models of leakage,
depending on the scheme and on the followed adversary model. The notion of security
of some SSE schemes is conditioned to a predefined leakage function L. In [93], Cash et
al. define the concept of L-semantic security against adaptive attacks (which is stated in
Section 2.5.1), and in this work we base our security analysis on their security definition.
Further, in [93, Section 5.3], they show precise upper bounds on the allowed leakage of
the OXT scheme. This enables us to provide a clean security analysis in Section 3.1.9 by
describing upper bounds on the leakage incurred by each instantiation of our proposed
schemes.
3.1.3 Data Structure for Range Queries
In this section we present the structure for two-dimensional data considered in this work.
We use binary tree and quadtree structures in order to describe the geometrical objects
used in the proposed schemes. Next, we give the general model for 2-dimensional range
searchable symmetric encryption schemes.
3.1.3.1 Data Model
In our model, the client owns a collection of documents, each of which is attached to a
particular tuple of values. Without loss of generality, we assume that such tuples always
belong to the two-dimensional discrete grid Λn = {0, . . . , 2n+1 − 1} × {0, . . . , 2n+1 − 1}
for some fixed bit length n+ 1 > 0.
We call the tuples (a, b) ∈ Λn points. By an abuse of notation, we also denote points in
Λn by (an · · · a0, bn · · · b0), where an · · · a0, bn · · · b0 ∈ {0, 1}n+1 are the bit representations
of a and b. For instance, we can consider the point (1001, 0100) ∈ Λ3.
We restrict our model to the case where each document is attached to a single point in
Λn. Since all shapes in Λn can be represented as some set of points, the constructions
naturally extend to cases where documents are attached to lines and polygons. We
further comment this extension in Section 3.1.12.
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Let In =
{
[a, b] : 0 ≤ a ≤ b < 2n+1, a, b ∈ Z} denote the set of intervals (or ranges)
with only n+ 1-bit values. Here, [a, b] denotes the discrete interval {a, a+ 1, . . . , b}. We
call the elements in I2n = In × In rectangles. For instance, the rectangle [0100, 1011] ×
[1000, 1111] ∈ I23 is a product of two intervals of length 8.
In our setting, the client first delegates an encrypted version of its data set to a server.
Afterwards, it may want to issue a query to the server to retrieve the subset of the
outsourced data set whose associated points fall inside a two-dimensional range of values.
That is, the client may want to query the server for the set of documents whose associated
points lie inside a rectangle of its own choice.
3.1.3.2 Binary Trees and Prefixes
Binary trees have been widely applied in computer science, and applications range from
routing protocols to sorting and text searching. In the context of searchable encryption,
they have been used to achieve security and efficiency in range queries over encrypted
data in works such as [66, 70] and, more recently, in [68, 71].
Let 0 ≤ a < 2n+1 be an integer. Then a can be represented with n+ 1 bits as an · · · a0.
It is clear that every such a can be viewed as a leaf of the perfect binary tree of height
n + 1, so that the parent of a at depth i is associated to the i most significant bits of
a. In this way, we denote the parent of a at depth i ≤ n with the binary represen-
tation an · · · an−i+1∗, where the wildcard ∗ denotes an arbitrary suffix. We call such
representation a prefix of length i.
We define the parent tuple of a non-negative integer a with bit representation an · · · a0
as the tuple of prefixes given by the parents of a in increasing depth, that is,
(an∗, anan−1∗, . . . , anan−1 · · · a1∗, anan−1 · · · a1a0).
For instance, the parent tuple of 0110 is (0∗, 01∗, 011∗, 0110). We use this tuple to
generate the index element associated to a point, as in related works [66, 68].
Any prefix an · · · an−i+1∗ of length i defines a prefix range of length 2n−i+1
{an · · · an−i+1bn−i · · · b0 : bn−i · · · b0 ∈ {0, 1}n−i+1}.
We say that any given interval is a prefix range if it is expressible as a prefix. For
example, in a 4-bit field, the prefix 01∗ defines the prefix range [0100, 0111].
3.1.3.3 Quadtrees and Prefixes
As we see in Section 3.1.9 or in works such as [66, 68], the usage of binary trees in
2-dimensional range searchable encryption induces substantial data leakage. The main
reason behind this is that the plaintext documents use a binary tree for each coordinate,
so the dimensions are decoupled. In an attempt to fix this, we develop the same concepts
above by using quadtrees instead of binary trees.
We consider quadtrees to be perfect 4-ary trees. Most common uses of quadtrees involve
two-dimensional data, such as in image representation, spatial indexing or storing matrix
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information. Geometrically, they are usually interpreted as representing a recursive
subdivision of space into quadrants.
Let (a, b) be a point in Λn with binary representation (an · · · a0, bn · · · b0). Then (a, b)
can be viewed as a leaf of a quadtree of height n + 1, in such a way that the parent
of (a, b) at depth i is associated to both the i most significant bits of a and the i most
significant bits of b. In this way, we denote the parent of (a, b) at depth i ≤ n with
the binary representation (anan−1 · · · an−i+1∗, bnbn−1 · · · bn−i+1∗), where the wildcard ∗
denotes an arbitrary suffix. We call such representation a prefix of length 2i.
The parent tuple of the point (an · · · a0, bn · · · b0) is defined just as in the case of binary
trees. For instance, the parent tuple of (001, 100) is ((0∗, 1∗), (00∗, 10∗), (001, 100)).
We say that a rectangle [a, b] × [c, d] is a prefix rectangle if it is expressible as a prefix.
This happens exactly when both [a, b] and [c, d] are prefix ranges expressible as prefixes
of the same length. For example, when using 6-bit fields, the prefix (110∗, 011∗) defines
the prefix rectangle [110000, 110111]× [011000, 011111].
3.1.3.4 Prefix Decomposition
Given an arbitrary interval, consider an expression of it as a disjoint union of some set
of prefix ranges. We call the set of corresponding prefixes a prefix decomposition of the
interval. For example, the interval [0011, 1101] admits a decomposition into 4 prefixes,
namely {0011, 01∗, 10∗, 110∗}. The profile of a prefix decomposition (as defined in [68])
is the set of lengths of each of its prefixes, counting multiplicity. For example, the profile
of the prefix decomposition {0011, 01∗, 10∗, 110∗} is {4, 2, 2, 3}.
Any rectangle can be expressed as a disjoint union of some prefix rectangles. We call
the set of corresponding prefixes a prefix decomposition of the rectangle. For exam-
ple, the rectangle [00, 01] × [00, 10] admits a decomposition into 3 prefixes, namely
{(0∗, 0∗), (00, 10), (01, 10)}. In Section 3.1.6 we state an upper bound on the minimal
size of such prefix decompositions.
As observed in [66, Section 5.1] for binary trees, an element belongs to an interval if
and only if the intersection between the parent tuple of the element and any prefix
decomposition of the interval is nonempty. Similarly in quadtrees, the parent tuple of
a point consists exactly of the prefixes whose prefix rectangle contains that point. This
is why a point belongs to a rectangle if and only if the intersection between the parent
tuple of the point and any prefix decomposition of the rectangle is nonempty. As a result
of this property, in Sections 3.1.5, 3.1.6 we use prefix decomposition in order to generate
queries associated to rectangles.
3.1.3.5 Over-Covers
Given an arbitrary interval, consider a set of prefix ranges whose union contains the
interval (possibly strictly). The set of corresponding prefixes is called an over-cover of
the given interval. This notion was first defined in [68]. The profile of an over-cover is
defined just as for prefix decompositions.
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As an example, the interval [0011, 1101] admits the over-cover {0011, 01∗, 1∗}, which has
profile {4, 2, 1}. Note that this over-cover has size 3, even though the smallest prefix
decomposition the interval admits is {0011, 01∗, 10∗, 110∗} and has size 4.
Given an arbitrary rectangle, consider a set of prefix rectangles whose union contains
the rectangle. Just as in the case of intervals, we call the set of corresponding prefixes
an over-cover of the rectangle. For example, the rectangle [00, 01] × [00, 10] admits an
over-cover {(0∗, 0∗), (0∗, 1∗)}.
As observed in [66, Section 5.1] for binary trees, if an element belongs to an interval, the
intersection between the parent tuple of the element and any over-cover of the interval is
nonempty. Similarly for quadtrees, if a point belongs to a rectangle, then the intersection
between the parent tuple of the point and any over-cover of the rectangle is nonempty.
As a result of this property, in Sections 3.1.7, 3.1.8 we use prefix over-covers in order to
generate a query associated to a rectangle.
3.1.4 Searchable Encryption for Two-Dimensional Data
We start by giving context for our two-dimensional data-oriented solutions. Our aim is
to provide schemes that enable a client to delegate an encrypted version of a data set to
a semi-trusted, honest-but-curious server, in such a way that searching capabilities over
the encrypted data are preserved.
Assume that a client wants to upload a data set D to a server. The data set is composed
of tuples ((wi,1, wi,2), Di), where the document Di is any kind of plaintext (text, audio,
images, etc.) and (wi,1, wi,2) is the point in Λn where Di is located.
A 2-dimensional range searchable symmetric encryption scheme R first provides a client
with a symmetric key k by executing an algorithmR.Gen. Using this key k, an algorithm
R.Enc allows the client to build an encryption C of the data set D. Additionally, this
algorithm creates a searchable index I in the process, which is uploaded to the server
along with the ciphertexts C.
Afterwards, the client may want to retrieve the documents located in a rectangle R ∈ I2n.
The client can furnish this rectangle to the algorithm R.Trapdoor to generate a trapdoor
(or search token) T that encodes the given rectangle. To query for rectangle R, the client
sends T to the server.
The server is able to combine a trapdoor T and the searchable index I by using the public
algorithm R.Search. In this way, it obtains a tuple of ciphertexts, which correspond to
all documents located in the rectangle R.
We now give the formal definition of 2-dimensional range searchable symmetric encryp-
tion scheme.
Definition 3.1. A 2-dimensional range searchable symmetric encryption (2-DRSSE)
scheme R is a SSE scheme where
1. The output of R.Gen(λ) includes a bit-length n+ 1.
2. The input ofR.Enck is a collection D of plaintext documents, where each document
consists of some plaintext (e.g., the id of a file) and an attached point in Λn. That
is, D = ((wi,1, wi,2), Di)i.
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3. The input of R.Trapdoork is a rectangle R ∈ I2n, seen as the disjunction of all
points of R.
In this work, we use a SSE scheme S as a primitive for building 2-DRSSE schemes.
The solutions, presented sequentially in the next sections, provide different trade-offs
between security and efficiency. They use the following techniques:
• Prefix decompositions and binary trees: initial approach with remarkable effi-
ciency.
• Prefix decompositions and quadtrees: sacrifices efficiency in order to achieve a
smaller leakage.
• Over-covers and binary trees: induces false positives, but improves on both effi-
ciency and security.
• Over-covers and quadtrees: induces false positives, and sacrifices efficiency with
respect to the previous solution in order to achieve even smaller leakage.
Throughout the rest of the section, we fix a positive bit length n+1, so that all documents
are located at points of Λn.
3.1.5 Prefix Decomposition Using Binary Trees
In this section we present our first 2-DRSSE scheme. We first state the required results,
and we proceed by describing the construction.
Li and Omiecinski [70] proved that, for n ≥ 2, any interval in In admits a prefix de-
composition using at most 2n prefixes. We present an extension of this result. First, we
need the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Let t be a positive integer and let [a, b] be an interval of length at most 2t
such that
1. the least t significant bits of a are zero, or
2. the least t significant bits of b are one.
Then, [a, b] decomposes into at most max(1, t) prefixes.
Proof. Set a = an · · · a0, b = bn · · · b0 the bit representation of a, b.
We prove this lemma by induction on t. The result holds trivially for t = 0, 1. Now
assume t > 0 and consider the case 1. Then a = an · · · at0 · · · 0 and b = bn · · · b0 with
bi = ai for i = t . . . n. If bt−1 = 0 then [a, b] decomposes into at most t prefixes by
hypothesis. Otherwise, [a, b] splits into [a, a′] and [b′, b], where
a′ = an · · · at01 · · · 1 b′ = an · · · at10 · · · 0
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Since [a, a′] is a prefix, the case 1 follows by hypothesis. The case 2 is proved analogously.
The following theorem extends the result in [70] so that the bound on the number of
prefixes depends on the length of the given interval rather than on the underlying bit
length.
Theorem 3.3. Let t be a positive integer. Then, any interval [a, b] of length at most 2t
decomposes into at most max(t+ 1, 2t− 1) prefixes.
Proof. Set a = an · · · a0, b = bn · · · b0 the bit representations of a, b.
The result holds trivially for t = 0, 1. For t > 1, first suppose that ai = bi for all
t ≤ i ≤ n. If a = b then [a, b] decomposes into one prefix, and the result holds.
Otherwise, let k be the most significant bit such that ak < bk. We tackle the cases k < t
and k ≥ t separately.
First assume that k < t. Then, [a, b] splits into [a, a′] and [b′, b], where
a′ = an · · · ak+1ak1 · · · 1 b′ = an · · · ak+1bk0 · · · 0.
By Lemma 3.2, [a, b] decomposes into at most 2k ≤ 2(t− 1) prefixes.
Now suppose that k ≥ t. Let
a′ = an · · · at11 · · · 1 b′ = bn · · · bt00 · · · 0.
Since b−a+1 ≤ 2t observe that a′, b′ ∈ [a, b] satisfy b′ = a′+1. Thus, [a, b] = [a, a′]∪[b′, b].
Furthermore, if at−1 = 0, then [a, a′] has length at least 2t−1 + 1. Then [b′, b] must have
length at most 2t−1 − 1, and so bt−1 = 0. Similarly, if bt−1 = 1 then at−1 = 1. By
Lemma 3.2, one interval decomposes into at most t−1 prefixes and the other in at most
t prefixes, and so the result follows.
The proof of Theorem 3.3 describes a recursive procedure to compute the prefix decom-
position of an interval [a, b] ∈ In. This procedure follows directly from the constructive
argument in the proof, and we describe it as preDec in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: preDec([a, b], n+ 1) [70]
1 If some of a, b are larger or equal than 2n+1, then halt.
2 If a = b, return a.
3 Let an · · · a0, bn · · · b0 be the bit representations of a, b. Find the most significant bit k
for which ak < bk.
4 If ai < bi for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k, return an · · · ak+1∗ (return ∗ if k = n).
5 Append the prefixes returned by preDec([an · · · a0, an · · · ak1 · · · 1], n+ 1) to the output
string.
6 Append the prefixes returned by preDec([bn · · · bk0 · · · 0, bn · · · b0], n+ 1) to the output
string.
7 Return the output string.
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When encrypting a document located at a point (w1, w2), the idea behind the first
proposed scheme we propose is to attach the document to every possible tuple (w′1, w′2)
for w′i in the parent tuple of wi (i = 1, 2). Then, to generate a trapdoor for a rectangle
R = I1× I2, we query all tuples in the Cartesian product of the prefix decomposition of
both intervals I1, I2. Note that this implicitly defines a partition in rectangles of R.
Definition 3.4. Let S be a Boolean SSE scheme (see Definition 2.18). We define a 2-
dimensional range searchable symmetric encryption schemeR1 by means of the following
five polynomial-time algorithms:
R1.Gen(λ):
Return the output of S.Gen(λ), including the secret key k, and the bit-length n+1.
R1.Enck(D):
Given an input collection of plaintext documents with associated points D =
((wi,1, wi,2), Di)
N
i=1, let Pi,j denote the parent tuple of wi,j for i = 1, . . . , N and
j = 1, 2. Let
D′ =
((
w′i,1, w
′
i,2
)
, Di
)
w′i,1∈Pi,1,w′i,2∈Pi,2
i∈{1,...,N}
.
Return the output of S.Enck(D′).
R1.Trapdoork(R):
Given the rectangle R = I1 × I2 as input, denote by Qj the output of the al-
gorithm preDec(Ij , n + 1) for j = 1, 2. Denote the Boolean formula satisfied
only by the tuples in Q1 × Q2 by Φ =
∨
w1∈Q1
(
w1 ∧
(∨
w2∈Q2 w2
))
. Return
T = S.Trapdoork(Φ).
R1.Search(I,C, T ):
Return the output of S.Search(I,C, T ).
R1.Deck(C):
Return the output of S.Deck(C).
This scheme can be seen as a two-dimensional adaptation of the scheme defined in [68],
where only the one-dimensional case is described. However, the schemes in [68] choose
to reveal the length of all prefixes. This slightly speeds up the searching process with
respect to our construction, but also increases the leakage. We further discuss this issue
in Section 3.1.9.
3.1.6 Prefix Decomposition Using Quadtrees
In this section we present our second 2-DRSSE scheme.
We carry out the idea of the previous construction by using quadtrees. As we see in
Sections 3.1.9, 3.1.10, this has the effect of reducing the leakage incurred by the scheme,
while increasing the trapdoor size and search time.
We start by giving an analog to Theorem 3.3 for quadtrees. The proof follows a similar
argument as in Theorem 3.3, and it is given in Section 3.1.11.
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Theorem 3.5. Let t be a positive integer and let [a, b] × [c, d] be a rectangle such that
both [a, b] and [c, d] have length greater than 2t−1 and at most 2t. Then, it decomposes
into at most 7 · 2t+1 − 18t− 3 prefixes.
The procedure preDec in Algorithm 2 computes the prefix decomposition of a rectangle
R = [a, b]×[c, d], where [a, b], [c, d] ∈ In satisfy the restrictions of this theorem. It follows
directly from the constructive argument in the proof of Theorem 3.5.
Algorithm 2: preDec([a, b], [c, d], n+ 1)
1 If some of a, b, c, d are larger or equal than 2n+1, then halt.
2 Let a = an · · · a0, b = bn · · · b0, c = cn · · · c0, d = dn · · · d0 be the bit representations of
a, b, c and d.
3 If a = b, return {(an · · · a0, en · · · e0)}en···e0∈[c,d].
4 If c = d, return {(en · · · e0, cn · · · c0)}en···e0∈[a,b].
5 Find k1, k2 the most significant bits such that ak1 < bk1 and ck2 < dk2 .
6 If k1 = k2 and for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k1 we have ai < bi and ci < di, return
(an · · · ak1+1∗, cn · · · ck1+1∗).
7 If k1 = k2 but the previous condition is not satisfied, let A1 = [a, an · · · ak1+101 · · · 1],
A2 = [an · · · ak1+110 · · · 0, b], C1 = [c, cn · · · ck1+101 · · · 1], C2 = [cn · · · ck1+110 · · · 0, d].
Return the union of the outputs of preDec(Ai × Cj , n+ 1) for i, j = 1, 2.
8 If k1 < k2, return the union of the outputs of
preDec([a, b]× [c, cn · · · ck2+101 · · · 1], n+ 1) and
preDec([a, b]× [cn · · · ck2+110 · · · 0, d], n+ 1)
9 If k1 > k2, return the union of the outputs of
preDec([a, an · · · ak1+101 · · · 1]× [c, d], n+ 1) and
preDec([an · · · ak1+110 · · · 0, b]× [c, d], n+ 1)
When encrypting a document located at a point (w1, w2), the idea behind the second
proposed scheme is to attach the document to every element in the parent tuple of
(w1.w2). Then, to generate a query for a rectangle R = Ii× I2, we query all elements in
its prefix decomposition.
Definition 3.6. Let S be a SSE scheme (see Definition 2.18). We define a 2-DRSSE
scheme R2 by means of the following five polynomial-time algorithms:
R2.Gen(λ):
Return the output of S.Gen(λ), including the secret key k, and the bit-length n+1.
R2.Enck(D):
Given as input a collection of plaintext documents with associated points D =
((wi,1, wi,2), Di)
N
i=1, let Pi denote the parent tuple of the point (wi,1, wi,2).
Let D′ = (w′i, Di) w′i∈Pi
i∈{1,...,N}
.
Return the output of S.Enck(D′).
R2.Trapdoork(R):
Given the rectangle R, denote by Q the output of the function preDec(R,n + 1).
Let Φ =
∨
w∈Qw denote the Boolean formula satisfied only by the prefixes of Q.
Return T = S.Trapdoork(Φ).
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R2.Search(I,C, T ):
Return the output of S.Search(I,C, T ).
R2.Deck(C):
Return the output of S.Deck(C).
3.1.7 Over-Covers Using Binary Trees
In this section we present our third 2-DRSSE scheme. We first state the required results,
and we proceed by describing the construction.
There are mainly two drawbacks in using prefix decomposition in binary trees. The
first one is that the size of the trapdoor associated to a rectangle R usually increases
in the size of the partition of R that the prefix decomposition defines. Consequently,
by Theorem 3.3, larger rectangles can have larger trapdoors. The second one is that
the size of such trapdoors reveals information about the queried rectangle, since larger
trapdoors also correspond to larger rectangles.
These concerns are addressed by Faber et al. in [68], where they accordingly propose the
concept of over-cover. As defined earlier in Section 3.1.3.2, an over-cover of an interval is
a set of prefixes such that the union of the associated prefix ranges contains the interval.
As the following theorem states, the relaxation to over-covers allows prefix representa-
tions of constant size 3, and so it solves the concerns mentioned in the previous para-
graph.
Theorem 3.7 ([68]). Let t be an integer with 1 ≤ t ≤ n + 1, and let s, n′ be positive
integers with s < t and n′+2 < 2s. Then, any interval [a, b] ∈ In of length 2t+2s+n′+2
admits an over-cover of size 3, with profile {n− t+ 1, n− s+ 1,min{n− s, n− t+ 2}}.
However, Faber et al. note that the interval defined by the corresponding prefix ranges
is on average about 40% larger than the original interval (and at most 66% larger), and
so it may contain values outside the given range. This translates into possibly having a
large amount of false positives in the search results.
In order to mitigate this effect, we extend their result and reduce the false-positive rate,
while still being able to produce constant-sized over-covers. Given an interval length L,
we associate to it a parameter h ∈ {1, . . . , blog(L)c} prior to the generation of the over-
covers. For h = blog(L)c our over-covers are similar to the ones built in [68]. Our results
show that for smaller values of h we can produce over-covers covering a smaller range
and having more prefixes, thus reducing the false-positive rate at the cost of slightly
larger communication complexity and search time. The next lemma provides a first
approximation to building these over-covers.
Lemma 3.8. Let L < 2n−1 and h ≤ blog(L)c be positive integers. Then, every interval
of length L admits an over-cover with bL/2hc + 2 disjoint prefixes, where bL/2hc + 1
prefixes have length n− h+ 1 and one prefix has length n− h+ 2.
Proof. To prove this, let [a, b] = [an · · · a0, bn · · · b0] be an interval of length L. Consider
first the prefix an · · · ah∗ of length n−h+ 1 covering a, and consider also the bL/2hc+ 1
next consecutive prefixes of length n−h+ 1. Since the corresponding prefix ranges sum
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to a length of 2h(bL/2hc + 2), which is between L + 2h and L + 2h+1, the last of such
prefix ranges contains b.
Now, split the first prefix an · · · ah∗ and the last prefix bn · · · bh∗ into two prefixes of
length n− h+ 2 each
an · · · ah0∗ an · · · ah1∗,
bn · · · bh0∗ bn · · · bh1 ∗ .
Then, the interior prefixes (that is, all but the first and last prefixes of length n−h+ 2)
sum to a length of 2hbL/2hc+2 ·2h−1 > L. Therefore at least one of the outer prefixes of
the over-cover can be removed while still having an over-cover of [a, b], and the theorem
follows.
Note that the number of prefixes in the over-cover in the Lemma 3.8 is bL/2hc+ 2. We
now look for a reduction in the number of prefixes of the over-cover, since this quantity
has an impact on the communication complexity of our scheme. This is achieved by the
following lemma
Lemma 3.9. Given a positive integer r, all intervals admitting a prefix decomposition
in r consecutive prefixes of the same length admit a prefix decomposition in less than
2dlog(r + 1)e prefixes and with the same profile.
Proof. The lemma is trivially satisfied for r = 1.
Now, consider r prefixes of the same length l. When r is even, at least r − 2 prefixes
of length l can be merged pairwise into prefixes of length l − 1. And when r is odd, at
least r − 1 prefixes can be merged pairwise. Therefore, at least 2b(r − 1)/2c prefixes
can be merged pairwise, giving either one or two prefixes of length l and b(r − 1)/2c <
(r + 1)/2− 1 prefixes of length l − 1.
By applying the above argument recursively on r, we obtain a set of prefixes whose
profile depends exclusively on r and l. Furthermore, at step i we get either one or two
prefixes of length l − i + 1 and at most (r + 1)/2i − 1 prefixes of length l − i. This
argument can be repeated at most dlog(r+ 1)e times, giving a decomposition of at most
2dlog(r + 1)e prefixes.
By applying Lemma 3.9 to Lemma 3.8 we obtain an exponential reduction on the amount
of prefixes in the over-cover. Note that the resulting over-covers have the same profile for
intervals of equal length. The next theorem summarizes this, and gives upper bounds on
the size and false-positive rate of the resulting over-cover. We compile some particular
cases in Table 3.1.
Theorem 3.10. Let L < 2n−1 and h ≤ blog(L)c be positive integers, and set s = L/2h.
Then, every interval [a, b] ∈ In of length L admits an over-cover with the same profile,
of the same size σ and covering the same length ρ · L. Moreover σ depends exclusively
on bsc, and
σ ≤ 2dlog (bsc+ 2)e+ 1,
ρ ≤ 3/2s+ bsc/s.
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Proof. The bound on σ is a direct consequence of Lemmas 3.8, 3.9. Since the over-cover
given in Lemma 3.8 covers a total length of 2hbL/2hc+ 3 · 2h−1 and the original interval
has length L, the theorem follows.
A procedure to compute the over-cover of an interval [a, b] ∈ In follows directly from
the constructive arguments in the proofs of Lemmas 3.8 and 3.9. We define it as the
procedure preCov in Algorithm 3. Note that preCov uses a recursive sub-algorithm
reduceCov, which realizes the reduction provided by Lemma 3.9. The description of this
sub-algorithm can be found in Algorithm 4.
In practice, we associate to each interval of length L a parameter h ∈ {1, . . . , blog(L)c},
which is adjusted a priori as the largest value for which the false-positive rate achieves
a desirable bound. Then, when building an over-cover of any interval of length L, the
interval and the corresponding h parameter are fed into the preCov algorithm.
Algorithm 3: preCov([a, b], h, n+ 1)
1 If some of a, b are larger or equal than 2n+1, then halt.
2 Let L = b− a+ 1 and t = blog(L)c. Halt if L >= 2n−1, h < 1 or h > t.
3 Let a = an · · · a0, b = bn · · · b0 denote the bit representations of a, b.
4 Initialize two empty sets S, S1 and two variables i, s.
5 If ah−1 = 1, set i = 1 and s = bL/2hc+ 1, and add the prefix an · · · ah−1∗ to S1.
Otherwise, set i = 0 and s = bL/2hc, and add bn · · · bh−1∗ to S1.
6 Let α = an · · · ah.
7 While i ≤ s, add to S the prefix of length n− h+ 1 defined by α+ i, and increment i
by 1.
8 Output the union of S1 and reduceCov(S, n+ 1).
Algorithm 4: reduceCov(P, n+ 1)
1 If |P | = 1, output P and halt.
2 Parse P = (pi)
t
i=1 as an ordered tuple of n-bit prefixes pi = a
(i)
n · · · a(i)n−l+1∗ of length l,
sorted so that a
(i)
n · · · a(i)n−l+1 + 1 = a(i+1)n · · · a(i+1)n−l+1 for every i. If P is not of this
form, then halt.
3 Initialize two empty ordered tuples S1 and S and a variable i.
4 If a
(1)
n−l+1 = 0, set i = 1. Otherwise, append p1 to S1 and set i = 2.
5 If a
(t)
n−l+1 = 0, append pt to S1.
6 While i < t, append the prefix a
(i)
n · · · a(i)n−l+2∗ to S and set i = i+ 2.
7 Output S1 and the output of reduceCov(S, n+ 1).
The third proposed scheme follows the same idea as the R1 scheme defined in Sec-
tion 3.1.5. The difference is that, in the process of generating trapdoors for a rectangle
R = I1 × I2, we use over-covers of the corresponding intervals instead of prefix decom-
positions. This implicitly defines a set of rectangles whose union may strictly contain R,
and so there can be documents in the result set falling outside of the queried rectangle.
Definition 3.11. Let S be a Boolean searchable symmetric encryption scheme (see Def-
inition 2.18). We define a 2-dimensional range searchable symmetric encryption scheme
R3 by means of the following five polynomial-time algorithms:
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bL/2hc σ upper bound on ρ
1 3 150%
2 3 75.0%
3 4 50.0%
4 4 37.5%
5 5 30.0%
6 4 25.0%
7 5 21.4%
8 5 18.7%
9 6 16.6%
10 5 15.0%
Table 3.1: Number of binary tree prefixes σ and upper bound on the false-positive
rate ρ of an over-cover, related to the value L/2h.
R3.Gen(λ):
Return the output of S.Gen(λ), including the secret key k, and the bit-length n+1.
R3.Enck(D):
Given as input a collection of plaintext documents with associated points D =
((wi,1, wi,2), Di)
N
i=1, let Pi,j denote the parent tuple of wi,j for i = 1, . . . , N and
j = 1, 2. Let
D′ =
((
w′i,1, w
′
i,2
)
, Di
)
w′i,1∈Pi,1,w′i,2∈Pi,2
i∈{1,...,N}
.
Return the output of S.Enck(D′).
R3.Trapdoork(R):
Given the rectangle R = I1 × I2, let Lj denote the length of Ij and choose hj ∈
{1, . . . , blog(Lj)c} as a function of Lj for j = 1, 2. Denote by Qj the output of
preCov(Ij , hj , n+ 1) for j = 1, 2. Let
Φ =
∨
w1∈Q1
w1 ∧
 ∨
w2∈Q2
w2

denote the Boolean formula satisfied only by the tuples in Q1 ×Q2.
Return T = S.Trapdoork(Φ).
R3.Search(I,C, T ):
Return the output of S.Search(I,C, T ).
R3.Deck(C):
Return the output of S.Deck(C).
3.1.8 Over-Covers Using Quadtrees
In this section we present our fourth 2-DRSSE scheme. We first state the required
results, and we proceed by describing the construction.
Since, when using quadtrees, the trapdoor size depends on the size of the queried rectan-
gle by Theorem 3.5, both the efficiency and the privacy concerns stated at the beginning
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of the previous section hold in the R2 scheme. The concept of over-cover, which is natu-
rally adapted to quadtrees, mitigates both concerns. As defined earlier in Section 3.1.3.3,
an over-cover of a rectangle is a set of prefixes such that the union of the associated prefix
rectangles contains the rectangle.
The following theorem is an adaptation of Theorem 3.10. Applying over-covers al-
lows prefix representations of constant size and variable false-positive rate. When
building an over-cover of a rectangle with sides of length L, we consider a parame-
ter h ∈ {1, . . . , blog(L)c} taken as a function of L. The parameter h is adjusted as
the largest value for which the false-positive rate achieves an acceptable bound. For
h = blog(L)c this over-cover has size 13 and a false-positive rate of at most 525%. De-
creasing h also decreases the area covered by the over-cover, an thus the false-positive
rate. We compile some particular cases in Table 3.2.
Theorem 3.12. Let L < 2n−1 and h ≤ blog(L)c be positive integers, and set s = L/2h.
Then, every rectangle [a, b] × [c, d] ∈ I2n with sides [a, b], [c, d] of length L admits an
over-cover with the same profile, of the same size σ and covering the same area ρ · L2.
Moreover σ depends exclusively on bsc, and
σ ≤ 4dlog(bsc+2)e+3,
ρ ≤ (3/2s+ bsc/s)2.
Proof. Consider the over-covers given by Lemmas 3.8, 3.9. By decomposing in quadtree
prefixes each of the elements in the Cartesian product of these two over-covers, we find
a set of quadtree prefixes that have the same lengths for all intervals [a, b] and [c, d] as
considered.
Note that for each interval [a, b], [c, d] we have a prefix of size n − t + h + 1 and at
most two prefixes of length n − t + h − i for every i ∈ {0, . . . , 2dlog (s+ 2)e}, where
s = bL/2hc. Therefore, the number of quadtree prefixes found in this way is at most
1 + 4 · 2dlog (s+ 2)e + 4∑2dlog(s+2)ei,j=0 2|i−j|. Since it can be proved by induction that∑n
i,j=0 2
|i−j| = 2n+3−3n−7, this quantity amounts to 22dlog(s+2)e+5−4d2 log(s+2)e−27.
Since the original area is L2 and the area covered by the quadtree prefixes is (2hbL/2hc+
3 · 2h−1)2, the theorem follows.
The procedure preCov in Algorithm 5 computes an over-cover of a rectangle [a, b]×[c, d] ∈
I2n according to Theorem 3.10. It follows directly from the constructive argument in the
proof of Theorem 3.12.
The following fourth scheme follows the same idea as the R2 scheme defined in Sec-
tion 3.1.6. The only difference is that, in the process of generating trapdoors for a
rectangle R = [a, b]× [c, d], we use an over-cover of R instead of a prefix decomposition.
Also, note that the queried two-dimensional ranges are restricted so that both intervals
have equal length.
As in the previous case, this implicitly defines a set of two-dimensional ranges whose
union strictly contains R, and so there can be documents in the result set falling outside
the queried domain.
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bL/2hc σ upper bound on ρ
1 13 525%
2 19 206%
3 30 125%
4 34 89.0%
5 49 69.0%
6 48 56.2%
7 67 47.4%
8 67 41.0%
9 90 36.1%
10 79 32.2%
Table 3.2: Number of quadtree prefixes σ and upper bound on the false-positive rate
ρ of an over-cover, related to the value L/2h.
Algorithm 5: preCov([a, b], [c, d], h, n+ 1)
1 If some of a, b, c, d are larger or equal than 2n+1, then halt.
2 Halt if [a, b], [c, d] have different length, i.e., if b− a+ 1 6= d− c+ 1.
3 Let L = b− a+ 1 and t = blog(b− a+ 1)c. Halt if L ≥ 2n−1, h < 1 or h > t.
4 Let a = an · · · a0, b = bn · · · b0 denote the bit representations of a, b, c and d.
5 Initialize an empty set S.
6 Set S1 = preCov([a, b], h, n+ 1) and S2 = preCov([c, d], h, n+ 1).
7 For every (p, q) ∈ S1 × S2, denote p = pn · · · pr∗ and q = qn · · · qs∗, and let
p1 = pn · · · pr0 · · · 0, p2 = pn · · · pr1 · · · 1, q1 = qn · · · qs0 · · · 0, q2 = qn · · · qs1 · · · 1. Add
preDec([p0, p1], [q0, q1], n+ 1) to S.
8 Output S.
Definition 3.13. Let S be a searchable symmetric encryption scheme (see Defini-
tion 2.18). We define a 2-dimensional range searchable symmetric encryption scheme
R4 by means of the following five polynomial-time algorithms:
R4.Gen(λ):
Return the output of S.Gen(λ), including the secret key k, and the bit-length n+1.
R4.Enck(D):
Given as input a collection of plaintext documents with associated points D =
(Di, (wi,1, wi,2))
N
i=1, let Pi denote the parent tuple of the point (wi,1, wi,2).
Let D′ = (w′i, Di) w′i∈Pi
i∈{1,...,N}
.
Return the output of S.Enck(D′).
R4.Trapdoork(R):
Given the rectangle R = [a, b]× [c, d], let L1 and L2 denote the length of [a, b] and
[c, d], respectively. If L1 6= L2, the algorithm halts.
Choose h ∈ {1, . . . , blog(L1)c} as a function of L, and denote by Q the output of
the algorithm preCov(R, h, n + 1). Let Φ =
∨
w∈Qw denote the Boolean formula
satisfied only by those prefixes in Q.
Return T = S.Trapdoork(Φ).
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R4.Search(I,C, T ):
Return the output of S.Search(I,C, T ).
R4.Deck(C):
Return the output of S.Deck(C).
3.1.9 Security Analysis
In this section we use the Boolean OXT scheme by Cash et al. [93] as the underlying
SSE scheme in our constructions. By following the security analysis carried out in [93,
Section 5.3], we characterize the leakage profile under the L-semantic-security against
adaptive attacks security definition by Cash et al. for each of our schemes. We refer
the reader to the article [93] or to Section 2.5.1 for the security definition statement.
Also, note that the information leakage of searchable encryption schemes can often be
reduced by combining them with private information retrieval or oblivious random access
memory schemes. In this work we do not discuss these techniques. For more details,
see [68].
The L-semantic-security against adaptive attacks security definition is stated in the real-
ideal paradigm, and it is parametrized by a leakage function L. The input of L is the
whole outsourced data set and all exchanged queries.
If the scheme is L-semantically-secure, L outputs an upper bound for the leakage
incurred by the scheme in the security game. In other words, if the scheme is L-
semantically-secure, any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary having access to the
whole data set and to all queries exchanged during the game is not able to deduce any
extra information apart from what it is able to deduce from the output of L. In this
way, the output of L models what can potentially be leaked to the server in a protocol
execution that follows the security game.
We introduce some terminology and notation in order to describe the output of the
leakage function. This notation is inspired by spatial data, although our schemes deal
with general quantitative two-dimensional data sets. Suppose that the client uploads
the encryption of the collection of N plaintext documents ((wi,1, wi,2), Di)
N
i=1. For each
plaintext document ((w1, w2), D) we say that (w1, w2) is its location, w1 is its latitude,
and w2 is its longitude.
Also suppose that, during the game, the client adaptively sends M queries to the server
for documents located in rectangles (Ri)
M
i=1. In the process of generating trapdoors, any
such rectangle Ri = Ii,1 × Ii,2 is implicitly expressed as a collection of other rectangles.
This is done in different ways depending on the scheme:
• InR1, we consider the tuples of prefixes in the Cartesian product of preDec(Ii,1, n+
1) and preDec(Ii,2, n+ 1).
• In R2, we consider every prefix in preDec(Ri, n+ 1).
• In R3, we consider every tuple of prefixes in the Cartesian product of the over-
covers preCov(Ii,1, h1, n+ 1) and preCov(Ii,2, h2, n+ 1).
• In R4, we consider every prefix in preCov(Ri, h, n+ 1).
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Since every prefix expresses a prefix range (in R1, R3) or a prefix rectangle (in R2, R4),
this defines a collection of rectangles. We denote such collection by (Ri,1, . . . , Ri,mi) in
all cases. Also, for any rectangle R = I1 × I2, we say that I1 is its latitude and I2 is its
longitude.
We now characterize the leakage profile L by following the upper bounds on the allowed
leakage of the OXT scheme given in [93, Section 5.3].
The output of a leakage function L, such that all of the schemes R1, R2, R3 and R4 are
L-semantically-secure, is determined by:
• Total number of encrypted documents N .
• Results pattern RP: Encrypted documents corresponding to points located in Ri,j ,
for each i, j.
• Profile pattern Φ: Whether we are using binary trees or quadtrees, and mi for all
i = 1, . . . ,M .
In the cases of the R1 and R3 schemes, define the rest of the output of L by:
• Equality pattern s¯: Whether the latitude of two different Ri,j coincides.
• Size pattern SP: Number of documents in the latitude of Ri,j for each i, j.
• Intersection pattern IP: Encrypted documents whose latitude is contained in the
latitudes of two rectangles Ri,j having the exact same longitude.
And in the case of the R2 and R4 schemes, define the remainder of the output of L by:
• Equality pattern s¯: Whether Ri,j = Rk,l for any i, j, k, l.
Then, as a corollary to the analysis done in [93, Section 5.3], the schemes R1,R2,R3,R4
are L-semantically secure against adaptive attacks with L defined as above.
It is clear that N leaks the same information in all cases. We also deem the informa-
tion leaked by the results pattern RP as roughly equivalent in all cases, although it is
dependent on the expression (Ri,1, . . . , Ri,mi) of the queried rectangle Ri.
As to the profile pattern Φ, the situation is presumably very different depending on
whether one uses prefix decomposition or over-covers. As observed in [68, Section 3],
knowledge about mi can potentially determine the exact size of the queried rectangle.
When using over-covers, mi can be considered as constant for queries with equal length
according to Theorems 3.10 and 3.12, so Φ reveals at most the length of the latitude and
longitude of the queried rectangles. However, this leakage is reduced for larger values
of the parameter h, or when h is chosen so that mi does not exceed a small enough
constant. For instance, this leakage vanishes for h = blog(L)c. Thus, a stronger security
guarantee comes at the cost of a higher false-positive rate.
As an aside, observe that, if we had included the prefix lengths in the queries (as done for
one-dimensional range queries in [68]), then Φ would definitely reveal the exact lengths
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of the latitude and the longitude of the queried rectangles. Knowledge about prefix
lengths would also allow to distinguish between rectangles of the same size. This is fixed
in [68, Section 3] by introducing the concept of universal covers.
Regarding the equality pattern s¯, when using binary trees the leakage seems much
larger. The reason is that, for large and sparse enough data sets, knowledge about the
equality pattern and the result pattern can be used to decide whether the rectangles in
consideration are equal or not. When using quadtrees, s¯ is roughly equivalent to having
deterministic trapdoors, which is standard leakage in SSE.
Finally, when using binary trees, the size pattern SP and intersection pattern IP leak
additional information about documents in the same latitude or longitude than queried
rectangles.
3.1.10 Efficiency Analysis
In this section we provide the worst-case complexity analysis of the proposed schemes
and of some of the related schemes in the literature. As in the previous section, we
use the Boolean OXT scheme by Cash et al. [93] in the underlying SSE scheme for our
constructions.
3.1.10.1 Spatial Data
As stated in the introduction, we study the problem of searching over encrypted data
in the context of the project CLARUS: User-Centered Privacy and Security in the
Cloud [1]. In CLARUS, we focus on the two-dimensional range queries that ask for
the collection of features in the data set intersecting a given rectangle.
We consider the requirements derived from the use of the OGC R© Web Feature Service
Interface Standard (WFS) interface. WFS defines web interface operations for querying
and editing vector geographic features. In this case the user requests geographical fea-
tures across the web using platform-independent calls. These features can be described
by points, paths or polygons. Our queries can be described using PostGIS / PostgreSQL.
PostGIS is a spatial database extender that adds support for geographic objects allowing
location queries. We here focus on enhancing the security of SELECT queries with clause
WITH of the form ST_MakeEnvelope(X,Y,*), which creates a rectangle described by the
two opposite vertexes X and Y and returns the elements intersecting this rectangle.
3.1.10.2 Worst-Case Complexity Analysis
The complexity analysis in Table 3.3 is stated in terms of the resolution L = 2n+1. Thus,
L is the number of possible values in each dimension of the grid Λn, where the data is
located.
Index size is thought as the total size of the index. Trapdoor size and search processing
time are taken to be the size of a trapdoor associated to a rectangle and the time needed
to retrieve the corresponding results.
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Scheme Index Trapdoor Search
SBCSP [66] O(L2 logL) O(logL) O(L2 log2 L)
BW [65] O(L3) O(1) O(L2)
R1 O(L2) O(log2 L) O(L log2 L)
R2 O(L2) O(L logL) O(L3)
R3 O(L2) O(logL) O(L)
R4 O(L2) O(logL) O(L2)
Table 3.3: Worst-case efficiency comparison between 2-DRSSE schemes.
In writing the index size and the search processing time complexity analysis, we assume
that every point in the grid Λn holds up to one document. This assumption is reasonable
since the OXT scheme is suitable for static data sets, and plaintext documents are
initially thought to be identifiers (see [93, Section 2.1]). More precisely, when outsourcing
a data set with our schemes, the client encrypts documents of the form ((wi,1, wi,2), idi)
with the SSE scheme, and then associates outsourced ciphertexts to the particular idi
by other means.
We also assume that the h parameters in the trapdoor generation algorithm are taken so
that, when using over-covers, the client issues constant-sized trapdoors. This is indeed
the case when h = blog(L)c, or when h is chosen so that over-covers do not exceed a
small chosen constant size σ.
It is interesting to note that, even if in R3 and R4 the client issues a constant number of
trapdoors per queried rectangle, the size of the trapdoors is logarithmic in L. The use
of pseudo-random functions in the trapdoor generation algorithm of the OXT scheme
forces the size of every trapdoor to scale in logL, and thus it may be possible to obtain
constant-sized trapdoors by changing the underlying searchable encryption scheme.
3.1.11 Proof of Theorem 3.5
For presentation purposes, in this section we provide a proof of Theorem 3.5. We start
with the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3.14 (Side rectangles). Let t be a positive integer and let [a, b] × [c, d] be a
rectangle. Suppose that [a, b] and [c, d] have both length at most 2t and
1. [a, b] is a (n− t+ 1)-bit prefix and the least t significant bits of c are zero, or
2. [a, b] is a (n− t+ 1)-bit prefix and the least t significant bits of d are one, or
3. [c, d] is a (n− t+ 1)-bit prefix and the least t significant bits of a are zero, or
4. [c, d] is a (n− t+ 1)-bit prefix and the least t significant bits of b are one.
Then [a, b]× [c, d] decomposes in at most max(1, 2t+1 − 2) prefixes.
Proof. Denote by pSIDEt the size of the largest prefix decomposition of rectangles of the
form in the statement.
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Note that pSIDE0 = 1 and p
SIDE
1 = 2. Now consider the case 1) and assume that
t > 1. Then a = an · · · at0 · · · 0, b = an · · · at1 · · · 1, c = cn · · · ct0 · · · 0 and d =
cn · · · ctdt−1 · · · d0.
Note that [a, b] = an · · · at∗ splits into [a, a′] = an · · · at0∗ and [b′, b] = an · · · at1∗. We
have two cases:
If dt−1 = 0, since [a, a′]× [c, d] and [b′, b]× [c, d] both satisfy the conditions of the lemma
for t− 1, they admit a decomposition into at most pSIDEt−1 prefixes each.
If dt−1 = 1, then [c, d] decomposes into [c, c′] and [d′, d], where
c′ = cn · · · ct01 · · · 1 d′ = cn · · · ct10 · · · 0.
By the same argument as in the previous point, [a, b] × [d′, d] decomposes into at most
2pSIDEt−1 prefixes. Since [a, b]×[c, c′] clearly decomposes into two prefixes, we have pSIDEt ≤
2pSIDEt−1 + 2, and the result for 1) follows.
We omit the cases 2), 3), 4), since their proof is similar to that of 1).
Lemma 3.15 (Edge rectangles). Let t be a positive integer and let [a, b] × [c, d] be a
rectangle. Suppose that both [a, b] and [c, d] have length at most 2t and
1. the least t significant bits of a and c are zero, or
2. the least t significant bits of a and d are zero and one respectively, or
3. the least t significant bits of b and c are one and zero respectively, or
4. the least t significant bits of b and d are one.
Then [a, b]× [c, d] decomposes in at most max(1, 2t+2 − 3t− 3) prefixes.
Proof. Denote by pEDGEt the size of the largest prefix decomposition of rectangles of the
form in the statement, and denote by pSIDEt the size of the largest prefix decomposition
of rectangles of the form in the statement of Lemma 3.14.
Note that pEDGE0 = 1 and p
EDGE
1 = 2. Now assume t > 1 and consider the case 1).
Then, the n+ 1-bit representations of a, b, c, d are
a = an · · · at0 · · · 0 b = bn · · · b0
c = cn · · · ct0 · · · 0 d = dn · · · d0
with ai = bi and ci = di for all i ≥ t.
We consider four different cases.
Firstly, if bt−1, dt−1 = 0, there is a prefix decomposition of size at most pEDGEt−1 by
induction.
If bt−1 = 0 and dt−1 = 1, then [c, d] decomposes into [c, c′] ∪ [d′, d] where
c′ = cn · · · ct01 · · · 1 d′ = dn · · · dt10 · · · 0.
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This gives two sub-rectangles: one [a, b] × [c, c′] which is decomposable into at most
pSIDEt−1 prefixes by Lemma 3.14, and the other [a, b] × [d′, d] which is decomposable into
at most pEDGEt−1 prefixes.
If bt−1 = 1 and dt−1 = 0, a similar argument also exhibits a decomposition of size
pSIDEt−1 + pEDGEt−1 .
Finally, if bt−1, dt−1 = 1 then the intervals [a, b] and [c, d] split into [a, a′] ∪ [b′, b] and
[c, c′] ∪ [d′, d] respectively, where
a′ = an · · · at01 · · · 0 b′ = bn · · · bt10 · · · 0
c′ = cn · · · ct01 · · · 1 d′ = cn · · · ct10 · · · 0.
By a similar argument to the previous point, there is a prefix decomposition of size at
most 1 + 2pSIDEt−1 + pEDGEt−1 .
Since the last bound is the largest one, we get the result from pEDGEt ≤ 1 + 2pSIDEt−1 +
pEDGEt−1 .
We omit the cases 2), 3), 4), since their proof is similar to that of 1).
We now restate and prove Theorem 3.5.
Theorem 3.16 (Theorem 3.5). Let t be a positive integer and let [a, b] × [c, d] be a
rectangle such that both [a, b] and [c, d] have length greater than 2t−1 and at most 2t.
Then, it decomposes into at most 7 · 2t+1 − 18t− 3 prefixes.
Proof. Denote by pEDGEt the size of the largest prefix decomposition of rectangles of the
form in the statement of Lemma 3.15.
The result holds trivially for t = 0, 1, so assume t > 1. Write the n+1-bit representations
of a, b, c, d as
a = an · · · a0 b = bn · · · b0
c = cn · · · c0 d = dn · · · d0
If k1, k2 are the most significant bits such that ak1 < bk1 and ck2 < dk2 , then k1, k2 ≥ t−1
by hypothesis. We consider four different cases
Firstly, if k1, k2 = t − 1, then the intervals [a, b] and [c, d] split into [a, a′] ∪ [b′, b] and
[c, c′] ∪ [d′, d] respectively, where
a′ = an · · · at01 · · · 1 b′ = bn · · · bt10 · · · 0
c′ = cn · · · ct01 · · · 1 d′ = dn · · · dt10 · · · 0.
This divides [a, b] × [c, d] into four sub-rectangles, each of which is decomposable into
at most pEDGEt−1 prefixes by Lemma 3.15, and so we have a decomposition into at most
4pEDGEt−1 prefixes.
Secondly, suppose k1 = t− 1 and k2 ≥ t. Let
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a′ = an · · · at01 · · · 1 b′ = bn · · · bt10 · · · 0
c′ = cn · · · ct11 · · · 1 d′ = dn · · · dt00 · · · 0.
Since d−c+1 ≤ 2t observe that c′, d′ ∈ [c, d] satisfy d′ = c′+1. Thus, [c, d] = [c, c′]∪[d′, d].
Furthermore, if ct−1 = 0, then [c, c′] has length at least 2t−1 + 1. Then [d′, d] has length
at most 2t−1 − 1, and so dt−1 = 0. Similarly, if dt−1 = 1 then ct−1 = 1. Without
loss of generality, assume that ct−1 = 0 and dt−1 = 0. By Lemma 3.15, [a, b] × [c, c′]
is decomposable into at most pEDGEt−1 prefixes, and [a, a′] × [d′, d] and [b′, b′] × [d′, d] are
decomposable into at most pEDGEt−2 prefixes each. This yields a prefix decomposition of
[a, b]× [c, d] into at most pEDGEt−1 + 2pEDGEt−2 prefixes.
Thirdly, if k1 ≥ t and k2 = t − 1, we proceed similarly to the last point to get a prefix
decomposition of at most pEDGEt−1 + 2pEDGEt−2 prefixes.
Lastly, if k1, k2 ≥ t, by the same reasons as in the second point, we have
a′ = an · · · at11 · · · 1 b′ = bn · · · bt00 · · · 0
c′ = cn · · · ct11 · · · 1 d′ = dn · · · dt00 · · · 0
with b′ = a′ + 1 and d′ = c′ + 1, so [c, d] = [c, c′] ∪ [d′, d]. Also, it is not possible to
have both at−1 = 0 and bt−1 = 1, or to have both ct−1 = 0 and dt−1 = 1. Without
loss of generality, assume that at−1, bt−1, ct−1, dt−1 = 0. Then [a, a′] and [c, c′] split in
[a, a′′] ∪ [a′′′, a′] and [c, c′′] ∪ [c′′′, c′], where
a′′ = an · · · at01 · · · 1 a′′′ = an · · · at10 · · · 0
c′′ = cn · · · ct01 · · · 1 c′′′ = cn · · · ct10 · · · 0.
By Lemma 3.15, we have that [a, a′]× [c, c′] is decomposable in at most pEDGEt prefixes,
and each of [b′, b]× [d′, d], [a, a′′]× [d′, d], [a′′′, a′]× [d′, d], [a, a′]× [c, c′′] and [a, a′]× [c′′′, c′]
are decomposable in at most pEDGEt−1 prefixes each.
We thus get a decomposition of [a, b]× [c, d] into at most pEDGEt + 5pEDGEt−1 prefixes.
Since the last bound is the largest one, we get a prefix decomposition of at most the
claimed size.
A recursive procedure to compute the prefix decomposition of a rectangle R = [a, b] ×
[c, d], where [a, b], [c, d] ∈ In have just n+ 1-bit values, follows directly from this proof.
See Algorithm 2.
3.1.12 Conclusion
In this section we propose various techniques for searchable encryption allowing two-
dimensional queries on encrypted data. We analyze the trade-off between performance,
security and communication overhead of the presented options. Some solutions we pro-
vide take advantage of the Boolean search and inverted index properties of [93]. We also
present a technique based on over-covers that notably reduces the communication cost of
the queries at the expense of increasing the false-positive rate. It provides a convenient
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trade-off between the searching time and the covered region, thus giving flexibility in
reducing false positives at the cost of efficiency.
It is known that, when using searchable encryption, the server can infer statistical infor-
mation about the stored data. This leakage depends on the election of keywords used to
classify the data. It would be interesting to measure the information leakage in the case
of range queries, and to find an election of the keywords minimizing it in a way that
prevents some of the recent attacks to range searchable symmetric encryption [26–32].
In the case of two-dimensional spatial data, we deal with the case of documents indexed
by single locations. However, it would be interesting to deal with the case of data indexed
by paths and polygons. Although it is possible to index a particular document by many
points using our solutions, the server could potentially distinguish which documents are
attached to single points and which are attached to paths or polygons. A naive and
inefficient solution to prevent this leakage would be to store these documents separately
for every location.
A next step in this line of work is to deal with the single-writer multi-reader setting, in
which a single client uploads an encrypted data set and delegates search capabilities to
multiple clients. In this case, we are interested in providing access control on the query
results. More precisely, we can consider the case where each reader is authorized to
search only over data that is located within a region specified by an access policy. This
situation requires an extension of the searchable encryption scheme supporting access
control in the multi-client setting.
Finally, it would be interesting to find cryptographic schemes that enable efficient range
queries over encrypted data while protecting against leakage-abuse attacks [26–32], es-
pecially against [30]. While there exist ways to avoid [30] by using exclusively SSE
schemes, the leakage of the access pattern makes it difficult to guard against frequency
analysis attacks. The most direct way to prevent these attacks is to apply a PIR scheme
such as [123] instead of a SE scheme in our constructions. Applying PIR as in [124]
effectively prevents access pattern leakage, but it can have an impact both on efficiency
and on the security of the outsourced data set.
3.2 Public-Key Searchable Encryption with Conjunctive
and Subset Keyword Search
3.2.1 Introduction
External storage servers allow users to retrieve outsourced data selectively. However,
when such servers are managed by untrusted third parties, users are usually reluctant
to outsource their sensitive data in the clear.
Encrypting the data prior to outsourcing it is a good approach to overcome this security
concern. Nevertheless, traditional encryption schemes fail to provide selective retrieval
in an efficient and secure way. Searchable encryption deals with this problem by allow-
ing data owners to issue queries for encrypted outsourced data. Much like traditional
encryption schemes, searchable encryption schemes generally come in two distinct types,
serving different purposes: symmetric-key searchable encryption (SSE) [37] and public
key encryption with keyword search (PEKS).
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Public key encryption with keyword search schemes are searchable encryption schemes
set in the public key setting, where there may exist multiple data suppliers that send data
over to a single client. Public key encryption with keyword search was initially proposed
by Boneh et al. [38] in 2004. See Sections 1.4.2 and 2.5.2 for a brief introduction to
PEKS.
The keyword search protocol usually considered in PEKS involves the following entities:
• a set of data suppliers, which provides and encrypts the data to be outsourced,
• a storage server (e.g. an e-mail gateway or a database), which stores the out-
sourced data and executes the search process, and
• a client of the storage server, who retains the ability to generate queries for the
encrypted data.
In the protocol, the client sets up the scheme, keeps the secret key private and distributes
the public key to the data providers. By using the public key, the data providers can
generate searchable encrypted data and upload it to the storage server. In turn, the client
retains the ability to generate queries for the encrypted data. By sending such queries
to the storage server, the client empowers the storage server to select the encrypted data
items satisfying the query, and to return those data items to the client.
Regarding query expressiveness, the scheme in [38] achieves single-keyword queries.
Single-keyword PEKS schemes enable data providers to generate an encryption of a
keyword w, which is to be uploaded to the storage server. We call this encryption a
searchable index and we denote it by I(w). The client, holding the secret key, can build
a trapdoor T(w′) corresponding to some keyword w′. By sending T(w′) to the storage
server, the client empowers the storage server to learn whether any searchable index
I(w) satisfies w = w′ or not, but no other information about I(w) is revealed in this
process.
One of the most common enhancements of PEKS is conjunctive PEKS, which enables
conjunctive field keyword queries [42, 65, 73, 74]. Typically, in conjunctive PEKS data
providers can encrypt a tuple of keywords (w1, . . . , wm) by using the public key of the
client, producing a searchable index I(w1, . . . , wm). The client can use its secret key to
generate a trapdoor associated to a tuple of keywords (w′1, . . . , w′l), along with a set of
keyword fields or positions {j1, . . . , jl} ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}. When receiving this trapdoor, the
storage server is able to check whether the predicate
∧l
i=1(wji = w
′
i) holds or not by
using the index I(w1, . . . , wm) and the trapdoor.
Another enhancement of PEKS is subset PEKS, first defined in [65], which enables subset
queries. In subset PEKS, data providers can encrypt a tuple of keywords (w1, . . . , wm)
by using the public key of the client, producing a searchable index I(w1, . . . , wm). The
client can use its secret key to generate a trapdoor associated to m arbitrary sets of
keywords (A1, . . . , Am). When receiving this trapdoor, the storage server is able to
check whether the conjunctive subset query predicate
∧m
i=1(wi ∈ Ai) holds or not by
using the index I(w1, . . . , wm) and the trapdoor.
In most of the proposed applications for single-keyword PEKS, the ciphertexts that are
uploaded to the server by the data suppliers take the form
Encpk(D)‖I(w1)‖ · · · ‖I(wm),
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where pk is the public key of the client, Enc is some public-key encryption scheme, the
data item D is indexed by keywords w1, . . . , wm, and I(w1), . . . , I(wm) are the corre-
sponding searchable indexes. The client can recover the data items that are indexed by
the keyword w in position i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} by sending the trapdoor T(w) and the position
i to the server. The basic security property of PEKS schemes guarantees that the server
does not learn any information about the searchable indexes unless it has the knowledge
of a matching trapdoor.
Note that one could achieve conjunctive queries by using single-keyword PEKS schemes,
simply by querying for particular keywords as stated above, and computing the intersec-
tion of the results locally or in the storage server. When doing so, the server learns which
data items are indexed by each of the keywords. The benefits of using conjunctive PEKS
against using single-keyword PEKS in this way can mainly be in efficiency and security,
since trapdoors are usually much shorter, the intersection predicate is embedded in the
trapdoor and the intersection is computed at the storage server.
The earliest application scenario for PEKS, as suggested by Boneh et al. in [38], is e-mail
gateways. In this scenario, a user Alice wishes to read her e-mails, which are stored in an
untrusted e-mail gateway in an encrypted form. When retrieving her e-mails, she may
want the e-mail gateway to forward her just e-mails satisfying certain conditions, e.g.
containing the tag “urgent” or having a particular sender “Bob”. To enable the e-mail
gateway to filter the e-mail messages correctly, she sends the trapdoors corresponding
to these keywords to the gateway, e.g. T(“tag:urgent”) and T(“sender:Bob”).
Now, suppose user Bob wishes to send Alice an e-mail message D. He may encrypt D by
using Alice’s public key pk and then attach to it the sender information and the “urgent”
tag in the form of searchable indexes of the form I(“sender:Bob”) and I(“tag:urgent”).
Thus, Alice’s gateway would receive the message
Encpk(D)‖I(“sender:Bob”)‖I(“tag:urgent”).
By matching the attached searchable indexes with the stored trapdoors, the e-mail
gateway is able to learn which e-mail messages should be forwarded to Alice. However,
it learns nothing else about the messages in the process. This example illustrates an
application covered by PEKS that seems, a priori, hard to cover by using exclusively
symmetric-key mechanisms such as SSE.
Another natural application of PEKS schemes involves secure audit logs, and it was
devised by Waters et al. in [125]. In their proposed application, audit logs are stored in
an untrusted storage server in an encrypted form by using an Identity-Based Encryption
(IBE) scheme (e.g. [102, 120, 126–128]), and PEKS searchable indexes are attached to
it. Attributes for IBE and keywords for PEKS are related to the audit record at hand,
e.g. date and time. An investigator Bob may wish to be granted access to audit logs
recorded, for instance, on a particular date. To do so, Bob asks the key escrow agent,
say Alice, for the trapdoors and decryption keys corresponding to this particular date. If
Alice authorized Bob to issue this particular search, she would serve Bob the requested
IBE decryption keys and PEKS trapdoor, and Bob would then be able to retrieve the
audit logs of interest from the untrusted storage server.
Other applications include secure cloud storage [44], decryption key delegation systems
[73] and context-based forwarding [129]. Although SSE represents a much more efficient
solution than PEKS for cloud storage in the symmetric setting, PEKS schemes can
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be useful in applications involving asymmetric architectures, such as when sending or
sharing outsourced data.
The first PEKS scheme was presented by Boneh et al. [38] in 2004. This was immediately
followed by the first conjunctive searchable encryption scheme in the symmetric setting
by Golle et al. [130], and by an extension of PEKS to conjunctive PEKS by Park et
al. [74]. Many authors then presented alternative PEKS schemes that allow decryption
of indexes [65, 73, 118], multi-dimensional range queries [66], reduction of communica-
tion and storage costs [40, 41], extension to multi-user systems [42] or improvements
of security in various ways [43–48]. Among them, one of the most relevant is the work
by Boneh and Waters [65], in which they define the general notion of a Hidden-Vector
Encryption (HVE) scheme, providing an enhancement of expressiveness of the queries
that allows for conjunctive field keyword search, and also decryption of indexes.
Also, the relationship between PEKS schemes and Anonymous Identity-Based Encryp-
tion (AIBE), was first established in [38]. Most AIBE schemes (e.g., see [102, 120, 126–
128]) can be easily translated to PEKS schemes and vice-versa via a generic blackbox
transformation [38, 119].
We propose two PEKS schemes. The first one achieves conjunctive field keyword search.
We prove the computational consistency of this scheme, and we prove security under
the asymmetric DBDH assumption. Under the proposed security definition, our scheme
does not provide any security enhancement against using a single-keyword PEKS scheme
to issue conjunctive field keyword queries. Nevertheless, as we see in Section 3.2.7, it
improves all previous related schemes in terms of efficiency in the most critical opera-
tions. In addition, the trapdoors generated by using this first scheme consist of just one
group element, and the index size improves all previous conjunctive PEKS schemes.
The second proposed scheme enables a class of generalized subset queries, which includes
subset queries as defined in [65]. We prove the computational consistency of our scheme,
and we prove our scheme secure under the p−BDHI assumption. The proposed security
definition guarantees that nothing is leaked from searchable indexes apart from the
output of the search process. To the best of our knowledge, apart from the scheme in
[65] no other subset PEKS schemes have been proposed in the literature. The proposed
scheme improves [65] in terms of efficiency and expressiveness, and it does not assume
that keywords are taken from a finite keyword space.
The remainder of this section is structured as follows. In Section 3.2.2, we outline the
preliminaries needed in this work. Our constructions for conjunctive and subset PEKS
are described in Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.5. Sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.6 feature the consistency
and security proofs for our conjunctive and subset PEKS schemes, respectively. In
Section 3.2.7, we analyze the efficiency of our schemes. We give some final remarks and
future work directions in Section 3.2.8.
3.2.2 Preliminaries
We start this section by defining some general notation and by stating the general model
for the proposed PEKS schemes. We then give the consistency and security definitions,
providing the hardness assumptions on which we base the security of our schemes. We
finally give some implementation remarks.
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3.2.2.1 Notation
We start by giving some standard notation and definitions used in searchable encryption.
In this work, a keyword denotes a binary string w ∈ {0, 1}∗. We here define a document
as a tuple of keywords D = (w1, . . . , wm), and we say that keyword wi is in keyword
field (or position) i of D.
If D0,D1 are two documents, we denote by D0∆D1 the set of keywords appearing in ei-
ther D0 or D1, but not in both at the same time. So if, for instance, D0 = (“a”, “b”, “c”)
and D1 = (“a”, “d”, “e”), we would then have that D0∆D1 = {“b”, “c”, “d”, “e”}. We
also name D0∆D1 as the set of keywords distinguishing D0 and D1.
Given a positive integer m, we denote by [m] the set {1, . . . ,m}.
3.2.2.2 General Model for PEKS Schemes
We here give the model used for the proposed conjunctive and subset public-key search-
able encryption schemes. Although not stated, every algorithm apart from Gen takes
the public parameters as input.
Definition 3.17. We define a PEKS scheme S as consisting of four polynomial-time
algorithms:
S.Gen(λ): Probabilistic algorithm run by the client that, given a security parameter λ,
returns the private key sk, the public key pk and the public parameters params of
the scheme.
S.Encpk(D): Probabilistic algorithm run by data providers. It takes as input a docu-
ment D and returns a corresponding searchable index I.
S.Trapdoorsk(L, J): Algorithm run by the client that takes as input a tuple L of key-
words and a set J of positions. It returns a corresponding trapdoor T.
S.Search(I,T): Deterministic algorithm run by the server and taking as input a search-
able index I and a trapdoor T. It returns either 1 or 0.
3.2.2.3 Consistency Definition
The consistency property relates to the correctness of the scheme, in the sense that a
searchable index and a trapdoor should match in the search process exactly when the
underlying document and query also match. If a document and a query match, then by
construction of our schemes the corresponding searchable index and trapdoor match in
the search process. However, the converse does not necessarily hold. In this regard, the
usage of hash functions in the proposed schemes induces the existence of false positives
in the search process. Therefore, we must analyze the extent to which false positives
can be produced, and we recur to a notion of consistency defined by Abdalla et al. in
[119].
The consistency notions defined by Abdalla et al. in [119] are, in increasing strength
order, computational, statistical and perfect. We prove consistency in the random oracle
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model and under an adaptation of the weakest definition of consistency in [119], namely
computational consistency. We here state their definition for the particular cases of
conjunctive and subset PEKS schemes.
Let S be a PEKS scheme. Given a security parameter λ, we introduce a consistency
game in the following three phases:
• Setup. The challenger runs S.Gen on input λ, hands over the public parameters
and the public key pk to the adversary, and keeps the private key sk secret.
• Guess. The adversary outputs a document of the form D = (w1, . . . , wm) and a
tuple of keywords of the form L = (w′1, . . . , w′l) together with a set of positions
J = {j1, . . . , jl} ⊆ [m].
• Output. The challenger hands over the trapdoor T = S.Trapdoorsk(L, J) to the
adversary, and the adversary computes I = S.Encpk(D). If S.Search(I,T) = 1
and if there exists a ji ∈ J such that wji 6= w′i, then the adversary outputs a bit
b = 1. Otherwise, it outputs b = 0.
Definition 3.18 (Computational Consistency of Conjunctive PEKS [119]). A PEKS
scheme S is computationally consistent if the advantage of every PPT adversary A in
the above game
AdvA(λ) = Pr(b = 1)
is negligible in λ.
3.2.2.4 Hardness Assumptions
Here we provide the hardness assumptions used in the security analysis of the proposed
schemes.
The first scheme we propose is proved secure under the asymmetric Decisional Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman assumption (asymmetric DBDH). This assumption is proposed in the
work [102] by Boneh and Boyen as a generalization of the DBDH assumption (see [103])
to the asymmetric setting. The DBDH assumption is easily seen to imply DDH in the
target group GT .
Definition 3.19 (Asymmetric DBDH Assumption). Let G1 = 〈g〉, G2 = 〈h〉 be asym-
metric bilinear groups deterministically generated according to a security parameter
λ. We say the asymmetric DBDH assumption holds in G1 and G2 if for every PPT
algorithm B,
AdvB(λ) =
∣∣∣Pr(B(g, ga, gb, h, ha, hc, e (g, h)abc) = 1)
−Pr
(
B(g, ga, gb, h, ha, hc, e (g, h)r) = 1
)∣∣∣
is negligible in λ, where the probabilities are taken over a, b, c, r uniformly distributed
in Fq and over the random bits of B.
The second scheme we propose is proved secure under the Bilinear Diffie Hellman Inver-
sion Assumption (p − BDHI). This assumption is also proposed in [102]. According to
[100], the best known algorithm breaking p − BDHI is to solve the Discrete Logarithm
Problem (DLP) in G.
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Definition 3.20 (p − BDHI Assumption). Let G = 〈g〉 denote a symmetric bilinear
group deterministically generated according to a security parameter λ, and let p be a
positive integer. We say the p−BDHI assumption holds in G if for every PPT algorithm
B,
AdvB(λ) = Pr
(
B(g, ga, ga2 , . . . , gap) = e (g, g)1/a
)
is negligible in λ, where the probabilities are taken over uniformly distributed a ∈ Fq
and over the random bits of B.
In the proposed schemes and in the definitions above, bilinear groups are generated
according to the security parameter λ. We choose bilinear groups to have exponential
order in λ. See the security and consistency proofs for more details about this choice.
3.2.2.5 Security Definition
We now introduce the security definition used in this work. We adapt the security
definition introduced by Boneh et al. in [38] to the conjunctive and subset case of
Definition 3.17. All proofs in this work are set in the random oracle model (see [104]).
The used security definition is a semantic-security style definition that guarantees search-
able index indistinguishability in the face of an adversary with access to the public key
and to trapdoors not containing any keyword distinguishing the challenge candidate doc-
uments. Therefore, in the security definition we propose, the adversary is not allowed to
obtain trapdoors associated to any word that appears in one of the challenge candidate
documents, but not in both.
Let S be a PEKS scheme. Given a security parameter λ, we introduce a security game
in the following five phases:
• Setup. The challenger runs Gen on input λ, hands over the public parameters and
the public key pk to the adversary, and keeps the private key sk secret.
• Query Phase 1. The adversary adaptively requests the challenger for qT trapdoors
of its own choice, where qT is a polynomial value in the security parameter λ. We
denote the set of all keywords queried in this phase by W1.
• Challenge. The adversary outputs two challenge candidate documents D0,D1 sub-
ject to the restriction that keywords appearing in D0∆D1 have not been queried
in Query Phase 1. That is, (D0∆D1)∩W1 = ∅. The challenger throws a fair coin
b ∈ {0, 1}, and outputs the searchable index S.Enc(Db) corresponding to Db.
• Query Phase 2. The adversary proceeds just as in Query Phase 1, but it is not
allowed to ask for trapdoors containing keywords in D0∆D1. That is, if the set of
all keywords queried in this phase is W2, we impose (D0∆D1) ∩W2 = ∅.
• Guess. The adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} for b.
Definition 3.21 (Semantic Security against Adaptive Chosen Keyword Attacks). We
say that a PEKS scheme S is semantically secure against adaptive chosen keyword attacks
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if the advantage of every PPT adversary A in distinguishing b in the above game
AdvA(λ) =|Pr(b′ = b)− 1/2|
= |Pr(A(X) = b|X = b)− Pr(A(X) = b|X = 1− b)|
is negligible in λ.
For conjunctive PEKS, the security definition we consider is slightly weaker than in other
related works, in the following sense. Works such as [40, 42, 65, 116, 130, 131] impose the
natural restriction of serving the adversary just trapdoors coming from queries with equal
search outcome over the two challenge candidate documents. In the case of conjunctive
queries, the restriction we pose is stronger, since served trapdoors can not contain any
keywords distinguishing the challenge candidate documents. This implies that trapdoors
could leak which searchable indexes contain some of the keywords in the underlying
query, even if there is not a match.
In addition, the considered security definition does not provide trapdoor unlinkability
or remove the need for a secure channel for trapdoors, as studied for instance in [43, 44,
48, 118].
3.2.2.6 Implementation Remarks
We refer the reader to [132] for remarks and references on the following statements and
for a recent review on the state of the art of pairing computation.
Implementation of secure asymmetric bilinear groups for elliptic curve cryptography is
often based on BN, BLS, KSS or MNT elliptic curves. In turn, symmetric bilinear groups
are implemented in practice on supersingular elliptic curves.
Supersingular elliptic curves are well known to require large prime order groups for
the DLP to be intractable (since they have a small MOV exponent) and this would
enlarge the size of exchanged information in the proposed schemes. Moreover, recent
results on the discrete logarithm problem [133] have rendered symmetric bilinear groups
effectively obsolete for cryptographic purposes. Nevertheless, as in [134], we note that
the second scheme we propose can be implemented in asymmetric bilinear groups as well,
thus reducing the group order and increasing efficiency and security. In this context,
symmetric bilinear groups are used just to facilitate the construction of the formal
security proof.
We should note that asymmetric bilinear groups guarantee that we can securely and
efficiently hash onto G1. In particular, it is possible to efficiently and uniformly sample
from G1 without computing multiples of the generator g. The fact that we prove security
under the random oracle model forces the use of such hash functions in the proposed
schemes. See [107] for an explicit solution on secure hashing for BN curves.
3.2.3 Conjunctive PEKS Scheme
The proposed scheme can be seen as an analog to Boneh et al.’s scheme [38] by replacing
the symmetric computational-type hardness assumption with an asymmetric decisional-
type one. This replacement by a stronger assumption allows one to take advantage of
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the bilinearity of pairings and build a conjunctive PEKS scheme with small trapdoors
and indexes and efficient search process.
Following [40, 42, 73, 74, 130], we assume that the documents to be encrypted satisfy
that
1. two different keyword fields never hold the same keyword, and
2. every keyword field is defined.
As noted in the literature [74], this can be effectively achieved by appending a keyword
field identifier to every keyword. For instance, when encrypting a document of the form
(w1, . . . , wn), one can assume that wi = i‖w′i for some keyword w′i (which could be NULL
or ⊥) and for all i ∈ [m]. We implicitly assume keywords in documents and trapdoors
to be of this form.
We now describe the proposed conjunctive PEKS scheme. Although not stated, in the
following every algorithm apart from S1.Gen takes the public parameters as input.
Definition 3.22. We define a public-key encryption with conjunctive keyword search
scheme S1 by means of the following four polynomial-time algorithms:
S1.Gen(λ): Given a security parameter λ ∈ Z, fix two asymmetric bilinear groups G1,G2
of prime order q ≥ 2λ and denote the corresponding pairing by e : G1×G2 → GT .
Let g, h be random generators of G1,G2 respectively. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 be a
collision-resistant hash function. Define m ∈ Z as the fixed number of keywords in
every document, which we assume constant in λ and satisfying m ≤ (1 + log q)/2.
Choose β ∈ Fq uniformly at random. Output the public parameters params =
{G1,G2,GT , q, e, g, h,H,m}, the private key β and the public key α = hβ.
S1.Encα(D): Denote by D = (w1, . . . , wm) the input document consisting of a tuple of
m keywords wi ∈ {0, 1}∗. Then, uniformly generate a random nonce r ∈ Fq and
set
I0 = h
r
Ii = e (H(wi) , α
r) for i ∈ [m].
Output the index I = (I0, I1, . . . , Im).
S1.Trapdoorβ(L, J): Denote by L = (w1, . . . , wl) the input tuple of keywords (where
l ≤ m and wi ∈ {0, 1}∗) and by J = {j1, . . . , jl} ⊆ [m] the input set of positions.
Set
T0 =
(∏l
i=1H(wi)
)β
.
Output the trapdoor T, consisting of T0 along with the fields J to be queried.
S1.Search(I,T): Given the index I = (I0, I1, . . . , Im) and the trapdoor T = (T0, J),
where J = {j1, . . . , jl}, output 1 if
e (T0, I0) =
l∏
i=1
Iji .
Otherwise output 0.
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We next give the consistency and security theorems for our scheme. The proofs are
deferred to Sections 3.2.4.1 and 3.2.4.2, respectively.
Theorem 3.23. The proposed conjunctive PEKS scheme S1 is computationally consis-
tent under the random oracle model.
Theorem 3.24. Assume that the DBDH assumption holds. Then, the proposed con-
junctive PEKS scheme S1 is semantically secure against adaptive chosen keyword attacks
under the random oracle model.
3.2.4 Consistency and Security Proofs for Conjunctive PEKS Scheme
S1
In this section we present the consistency and security proofs of the conjunctive PEKS
scheme S1.
3.2.4.1 Consistency Proof for the Conjunctive PEKS Scheme S1
We dedicate this section to the proof of Theorem 3.23. By proceeding in a similar way
than in the proof by Abdalla et al. in [119], we prove consistency of the scheme S1 in
the random oracle model.
Let A be a PPT adversary in the consistency game defined in Section 3.2.2.3, having
access to the public parameters, to the public key pk and to the hash oracle H modeled
as a random oracle. Let WSet be the set of keywords queried to the hash oracle H
throughout the game, whose size qH is polynomial in λ. Let D = (w1, . . . , wm), L =
(w′1, . . . , w′l) and J = {j1, . . . , jl} ⊆ [m] denote the guess of A in the Guess phase,
where keywords are taken from WSet, and let J˜ be the set of positions ji ∈ J such that
wji 6= w′i. Without loss of generality, we rule out adversaries choosing J˜ = ∅ in the
Guess phase. Let r ∈ Fq denote the random nonce generated by A in the searchable
index generation of the Output phase.
Denote X = e
(∏
i∈J H(wi), h
βr
)
and also denote X ′ = e
(∏l
i=1H(w
′
i), h
βr
)
. Now note
that the output of A in the consistency game is 1 if and only if X = X ′. We proceed to
bound the probability of this event, which is AdvA(λ) by definition.
Let E be the event that there exist D = (w1, . . . , wm), L = (w
′
1, . . . , w
′
l) and J =
{j1, . . . , jl} ⊆ [m], among all possible guesses taking words in WSet, in such a way that
the equality
∏l
i=1H(wji) =
∏l
i=1H(w
′
i) is satisfied. If rβ = 0, then A always outputs
1. Otherwise, notice that X = X ′ happens only when E happens. Therefore,
AdvA(λ) ≤ (q − 1)
2
q2
Pr (E) +
2
q
Since q ≥ 2λ, it suffices to see that Pr (E) is negligible in λ.
Since H is modeled as a random oracle and since inversion permutes group elements, by
using Lemma 3.25 we see that Pr(E) ≤ q2mH m2
2m
q . This bound is negligible in λ, since
q ≥ 2λ, and m, qH are assumed to be constant and polynomial in λ, respectively.
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As a consequence of this result, we conclude the proof of Theorem 3.23. We next state
the lemma used above.
Lemma 3.25. Let G be a finite group of order q and neutral element 1. Let m,n be
positive integers with m ≤ (1 + log q)/2 and set X1, . . . , Xn independent and identically
distributed uniform random variables with support G.
Let An,2m denote the event that there exists a S ⊆ [n] with |S| ≤ 2m such that
∏
i∈S Xi =
1. Then we have
Pr (An,2m) ≤ n2mm2
2m
q
.
Proof. To make the notation simpler, denote At,t by At and set t = 2m. Notice that
An,t happens for X1, . . . , Xn exactly when it happens for some subset of X1, . . . , Xn with
min(n, t) terms. Therefore, by the union bound
Pr(An,t) ≤
(
n
t
)
Pr(At) ≤ ntPr(At).
We now lower bound the probability of the complementary event Act .
We first prove Pr(Act) ≥
∏t−1
i=0
q−2i
q by induction on t over positive integers. For t = 1
we have Pr(Ac1) =
q−1
q . For t > 1 note that, for A
c
t to happen with X1, . . . , Xt, the event
At−1 must happen with X1, . . . , Xt−1 and Xt can not take as a value any of the inverses
of the subproducts of X1, . . . , Xt−1. Therefore, there are at least q−2t−1 possible values
for Xt such that At happens and we get that Pr(A
c
t) ≥ q−2
t−1
q Pr(A
c
t−1) as claimed.
Now we have
Pr(At) ≤ 1−
t−1∏
i=0
q − 2i
q
≤ 1−
(
1− 2
t−1
q
)t
.
Since t ≤ 1 + log q, we can bound this last expression by using the binomial inequality,
obtaining Pr(At) ≤ t2t−1q , and the result is proved.
3.2.4.2 Security Proof for the Conjunctive PEKS Scheme S1
We dedicate this section to the proof of Theorem 3.24. As in [65], security is proved in
the random oracle model by means of a sequence of hybrid games.
Given two documents D0 = (w0,1, . . . , w0,m) and D1 = (w1,1, . . . , w1,m), let ∆ ⊆ [m]
denote the positions corresponding to keywords in D0∆D1. For j ∈ [m] let ∆j denote
the first min(j, |∆|) elements of ∆.
Let G0 be the security game defined in Section 3.2.2.5. Given j ∈ [m] we define a hybrid
game Gj , differring from G0 only in that the keywords in positions in ∆j of the challenge
index are chosen uniformly at random by the challenger.
Specifically, we introduce the security game Gj for j ∈ [m], consisting of the following
five phases:
• Setup. The challenger runs Gen, hands over the public parameters and the public
key pk to the adversary, and keeps the private key sk secret.
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• Query Phase 1. The adversary adaptively asks the challenger for qT trapdoors of
its own choice, where qT is a polynomial value in the security parameter λ. We
denote the set of all keywords queried in this phase by W1.
• Challenge. The adversary outputs two challenge candidate documents D0, D1,
subject to the restriction that keywords appearing in D0∆D1 have not been
queried in Query Phase 1. That is, (D0∆D1) ∩ W1 = ∅. The challenger throws
a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1} and computes the index I = (I0, I1, . . . , Im) corresponding
to Db. Then, for every i ∈ ∆j , the challenger replaces Ii with uniformly sampled
random elements from G1 and hands over this modified index to the adversary as
the challenge.
• Query Phase 2. The adversary proceeds just as in Query Phase 1, but it is not
allowed to ask for trapdoors containing keywords in D0∆D1. That is, if the set of
all keywords queried in this phase is W2, we impose (D0∆D1) ∩W2 = ∅.
• Guess. The adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} for b.
Let AdvA,Gj (λ) denote the advantage of the PPT adversary A in guessing b in the game
Gj . It is clear that AdvA,Gm(λ) is negligible in λ for every PPT adversary A because
in Gm the two challenge candidate documents share the same information with the
challenge index.
Note that G0 is the security game defined in Section 3.2.2.5. We prove through Proposi-
tion 3.26 that the proposed conjunctive PEKS scheme S1 is semantically secure against
adaptive chosen keyword attacks provided the DBDH assumption holds.
Proposition 3.26. Assume that the DBDH assumption holds. For any j ∈ {0, . . . ,m−
1} and for any PPT adversary A, the advantages of A in the games Gj and Gj+1, when
using the scheme S1, are negligibly close in λ. That is,
|AdvA,Gj (λ)−AdvA,Gj+1(λ)|
is negligible in λ.
Proof. Let A be a PPT adversary. For every j ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}, we build a PPT
DBDH distinguisher Bj taking a DBDH challenge tuple (g, ga, gb, h, ha, hc, v) as input
and interacting with A as the challenger in the security game of the scheme.
The distinguisher Bj is built in such a way that, for tuples with v = e (g, g)abc, A is
playing the game Gj , and for tuples with v random A is playing the game Gj+1. The
output of the DBDH distinguisher Bj depends on the output of A.
• Setup. The challenger Bj runs S1.Gen(λ) to obtain the public parameters of the
scheme params = {G1,G2, q, e, g, h,H,m}, where H is the hash oracle described
below. Bj hands over the public parameters and the public key ha to A.
• Hash Oracle. The hash oracle H is operated by Bj , and it maintains a list of tuples
of the form 〈w, s, c〉 with w ∈ {0, 1}∗, s ∈ Fq and c ∈ {0, 1}. The list is initially
empty. On input a keyword w ∈ {0, 1}∗, the oracle H operates as follows:
1. If there is an item in the list whose first element is keyword w, denote it by
〈w, s, c〉. Then:
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(a) If c = 0, the oracle returns gs.
(b) If c = 1, the oracle returns
(
gb
)s
.
2. If there is no item in the list whose first element is keyword w, then the
oracle flips a coin c ∈ {0, 1} with Pr(c = 1) = 1/(2qTm+ 1), samples s ∈ Fq
uniformly at random and inserts 〈w, s, c〉 into the list. Then, it proceeds to
give an output as in the previous point.
• Query Phase 1. When A requests a trapdoor for keywords L = (w1, . . . , wl) in
keyword fields J = {j1, . . . , jl}, the algorithm Bj first calls the oracle on input
each keyword wi and retrieves the associated oracle list tuples 〈wi, si, ci〉. Then,
if some coin flip ci = 1, Bj halts. Otherwise, Bj hands over to A the trapdoor T
consisting of T0 =
∏l
i=1 (g
a)si and J .
• Challenge. In this phase, the adversary A outputs a couple of documents D0 =
(w0,1, . . . , w0,m) and D1 = (w1,1, . . . , w1,m) with the restrictions stated in the secu-
rity game defined in Section 3.2.2.5 and above, and Bj throws a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1}.
Then, Bj calls the hash oracle on every keyword wb,i to fill the H-list with tuples
〈wb,i, sb,i, cb,i〉. The algorithm Bj halts if:
– For some i ∈ [m]\∆j+1 we have cb,i = 1, or
– cb,t = 0, where {t} = ∆j+1\∆j .
Then Bj samples a value r ∈ Fq uniformly at random, and computes the challenge
I = (I0, I1, . . . , Im) in the following way
I0 = h
r,
Ii =

unif. sampled from GT if i ∈ ∆j
vrsb,i if i ∈ ∆j+1\∆j 6= ∅
e ((ga)r, (hc)sb,i) if i ∈ [m]\∆j+1 6= ∅
and hands over I to A.
• Query Phase 2. Bj proceeds as in Query Phase 1.
• Guess. The adversary A outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} for b. If b = b′, Bj outputs 1,
and if b 6= b′, Bj outputs 0.
Since the DBDH assumption holds, AdvBj (λ) must be negligible in λ. But
AdvBj (λ) =|Pr(Bj(X) = 1|X = 1)− Pr(Bj(X) = 1|X = 0)|
=Pr(Bj does not halt) · |AdvA,Gj (λ)−AdvA,Gj+1(λ)|.
By Lemma 3.27, Pr(Bj does not halt) is non-negligible in λ, and the result is proved.
As a consequence of this result, we conclude the proof of Theorem 3.24. We next state
and prove the lemma referenced in the proof of Proposition 3.26, which is an adaptation
of a result in [38].
Lemma 3.27 ([38]). The probability that algorithm Bj does not halt is non-negligible in
the security parameter λ.
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Proof. We split the calculations between the query phases and the challenge phase.
In each of the query phases, we allow A to ask for a polynomial amount qT (in λ) of
trapdoor queries. This amounts to throwing at most 2mqT coins c with Pr(c = 1) =
1/(2qTm+ 1). Since Bj does not halt exactly when each and every one of these throws
outcome is 0, we have
Pr(Bj does not halt in query phases)
≥
(
1− 1
2mqT + 1
)2mqT
≥ 1/e,
which is non-negligible in λ.
For the challenge phase, B does not halt exactly when the coin throw corresponding
to the keyword in position ∆j+1\∆j (if nonempty) of the chosen challenge document is
1 and the coin throws corresponding to the keywords in positions in [m]\∆j+1 of the
chosen challenge document are all 0. Since, if D0 6= D1 then |[m]\∆j+1| ≤ m − 1, we
have:
Pr(Bj does not halt in the challenge phase)
≥
(
1− 1
2mqT + 1
)m−1 1
2mqT + 1
≥ 1
e
· 1
2mqT + 1
,
which is non-negligible in λ since m is constant in λ and qT is polynomial in λ, and we
get the stated lemma.
3.2.5 Subset PEKS Scheme
The second PEKS scheme we propose enables a class of subset queries. This class
includes subset queries as defined in [65].
Subset queries, as understood in [65], are specified by an ordered tuple of m sets of
keywords (A1, . . . , Am). Then, a document D = (w1, . . . , wm) satisfies such a query if
and only if the predicate (w1 ∈ A1) ∧ · · · ∧ (wm ∈ Am) holds. The scheme we propose
considers subsets in a partition of D instead of keywords wi in this last predicate.
More concretely, in the Gen algorithm we fix a partition J1, . . . , Jm of [m]. Given a
document D = (w1, . . . , wm), write Bi = {wj}j∈Ji for every i ∈ [m]. Given a query
L = (w′1, . . . , w′l), J = {j1, ..., jl}, where J is written in increasing order, consider Ai =
{w′k}jk∈Ji for every i ∈ [m]. Then, the document D satisfies the query L, J if and only
if the predicate (B1 ⊆ A1) ∧ · · · ∧ (Bm ⊆ Am) holds. Note that we also admit empty
keyword fields in documents, which are denoted by keywords ⊥.
For the sake of clarity, before formally stating the proposed construction, we give a brief
example illustrating the internal workings of the scheme.
The Gen algorithm of the scheme fixes a tuple of possibly repeated field identifiers
(f1, . . . , fm). We take m = 8 and (f1, . . . , f8) = (1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3) as an example.
When encrypting documents in Enc, the documents D = (w1, . . . , wm) can be thought
of as a collection of sets of keywords, where keywords in positions having the same field
identifier belong to the same set. Also, the keyword ⊥ is allowed, and it stands for
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a null entry. For instance, following the example above, the document D defined by
D = (w1, w2, w3, w4, w5,⊥, w7,⊥) can be thought of as the following collection of sets
({w1, w2, w3}, {w4, w5}, {w7}).
When generating trapdoors, we input a query consisting of a tuple of keywords L =
(w1, . . . , wl) and a set of positions J = {j1, . . . , jl} written in increasing order. As above,
keywords in positions having the same field identifier are thought to belong to the same
set. Thus, in the example above, the query for words L = (w′1, w′2, w′3, w′4, w′5, w′6, w′7) at
positions J = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8} can be thought of as the collection of sets composed by
({w′1, w′2, w′3}, {w′4, w′5, w′6}, {w7}).
Now, a document matches a query in the Search algorithm exactly when the sets of
keywords defined by the document are contained in the sets of keywords defined by
the query, in a sequential way. That is, following the example above, a match happens
exactly when
({w1, w2, w3} ⊆ {w′1, w′2, w′3}) ∧ ({w4, w5} ⊆ {w′4, w′5, w′6})
∧ ({w7} ⊆ {w′7}).
We now describe the proposed subset PEKS scheme. Although not stated, in the fol-
lowing every algorithm apart from S2.Gen takes the public parameters as input.
Definition 3.28. We define a public-key encryption with subset keyword search scheme
S2 by means of the following four polynomial-time algorithms:
S2.Gen(λ): Given a security parameter λ ∈ Z, fix a symmetric bilinear group G of prime
order q ≥ 2λ and denote the corresponding pairing by e : G × G → GT . Let g
be a random generator of G. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → G and H1 : GT → {0, 1}∗ be
collision-resistant hash functions. Set m ∈ Z the maximum number of keywords
in every document, which we assume constant in λ and satisfying m ≤ (1 +
log q)/2. Define a tuple (f1, . . . , fm) of possibly repeated field identifiers describing
which field does each word in the documents belong to, where each fi ∈ [m].
Choose a ∈ Fq uniformly at random. Output the public parameters params =
{G, q, e, g,H,H1,m, (f1, . . . , fm)}, the private key β = (βi)mi=1 and the public key
α = (αi)
m
i=1, where βi = a
−i and αi = ga
i
.
S2.Encα(D): Given as input D = (w1, . . . , wm) the document consisting of a tuple of m
keywords wi in the domain {0, 1}∗∪{⊥}, generate r1, . . . , rm ∈ Fq uniform random
nonces in such a way that fi = fj implies ri = rj .
Set
I0 = H1
(
e
(∏
i∈[m]:wi 6=⊥H(wi)
ri , g
))
Ii = α
ri
i for i ∈ [m].
Output the index I = (I0, I1, . . . , Im).
S2.Trapdoorβ(L, J): Given L = (w1, . . . , wl) the input tuple of keywords with l ≤ m,
and the set of keyword fields J = {j1, . . . , jl} ⊆ [m] written in increasing order,
set
Ti = H(wi)
βji for i ∈ {1, . . . , l}.
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Output the trapdoor T, consisting of T1, . . . , Tl along with the fields J to be
queried.
S2.Search(I,T): Parse the index I as I = (I0, I1, . . . , Im) and the trapdoor T as T =
(T0, {j1, . . . , jl}). For every t ∈ [m], let Jt denote the set of elements i ∈ [l] such
that fji = t. For every i ∈ [l], compute vi = e (Ti, Iji).
Output 1 if there exists subsets J ′t ⊆ Jt for t ∈ [m] such that
I0 = H1
 m∏
t=1
∏
i∈J ′t
vi
 .
Otherwise output 0.
We next give the consistency and security theorems for our scheme. The proofs are
deferred to Sections 3.2.6.1 and 3.2.6.2, respectively.
Theorem 3.29. The proposed subset PEKS scheme S2 is computationally consistent
under the random oracle model.
Theorem 3.30. Assume that the (m+1)−BDHI assumption holds. Then, the proposed
subset PEKS scheme S2 is semantically secure against adaptive chosen keyword attacks
under the random oracle model.
3.2.6 Consistency and Security Proofs for the Subset PEKS Scheme S2
In this section, we give the consistency and security proofs for the subset PEKS scheme
S2.
3.2.6.1 Consistency Proof for the Subset PEKS Scheme S2
We dedicate this section to the proof of Theorem 3.29.
We prove consistency in the random oracle model of the scheme S2 in a similar fashion
than in the proof by Abdalla et al. in [119].
Let A be a PPT adversary in the consistency game defined in Section 3.2.2.3, which has
access to the public parameters, to the public key pk and to the hash oracles H,H1,
which are modeled as random oracles. Let WSet, TSet be the sets of polynomial (in
λ) size qH , qH1 which consist of keywords queried to the hash oracles H,H1 throughout
the game, respectively. Write (f1, . . . , fm) the tuple of field identifiers in the public
parameters. Let D = (w1, . . . , wm) and L = (w
′
1, . . . , w
′
l) and J = {j1, . . . , jl} ⊆ [m]
(written in increasing order) denote the guess of A in the Guess phase.
For j ∈ [m], let Dfj denote the set of keywords in D at positions having field identifier
fj . Let J˜ be the set of positions ji ∈ J such that w′i 6⊆ Dfji . Without loss of generality,
we rule out adversaries choosing J˜ = ∅ in the Guess phase. Let r1, . . . , rm ∈ Fq denote
the random nonces generated by A in the searchable index generation of the Output
phase.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC TECHNIQUES FOR SECURING DATA IN THE CLOUD 
Jordi Ribes González 
 
3.2. PEKS with Conjunctive and Subset Keyword Search 89
Denote X = e
(∏
i∈[m]:wi 6=⊥H(wi)
ri , g
)
and, given a subset J ′ ⊂ J , denote X ′ =
e
(∏
ji∈J ′ H(w
′
i)
rji , g
)
. Now note that the output of A in the consistency game is 1
if and only if X = X ′ or H1(X) = H1(X ′) for some J ′ ⊆ J with J ′ ∩ J˜ 6= ∅.
Let E denote the event that there exist D = (w1, . . . , wm), L = (w
′
1, . . . , w
′
l) and J =
{j1, . . . , jl} ⊆ [m], among all possible guesses taking words in WSet in such a way that
we have
∏
i∈[m]:wi 6=⊥H(wi)
ri =
∏
i∈[l]H(w
′
i)
rji . Likewise, let E1 be the event that there
exist T, T ′ ∈ TSet in such a way that H1(T ) = H1(T ′).
If all r1, . . . , rm 6= 0, then X = X ′ has nonzero probability of happening only when
E happens (note that by ranging over all possible J we remove the need to include
the J ′ above in the argument). Likewise H1(X) = H1(X ′) has nonzero probability of
happening only when E1 happens. Therefore
AdvA(λ) ≤
(
1− m
q
)
(Pr(E) + Pr(E1)) +
m
q
.
Since q ≥ 2λ and m is constant in λ, it suffices to prove that Pr(E) and Pr(E1) are
negligible in λ.
By computing the probability of the complementary and using the binomial inequality,
we see that Pr(E1) ≤ q2H1/q. Now, since H is modeled as a random oracle and since
inversion permutes group elements, by using Lemma 3.25 we see that Pr(E) ≤ q2mH m2
2m
q .
The obtained bounds are indeed negligible in λ, since q ≥ 2λ, and m, qH are assumed to
be constant and polynomial in λ, respectively.
As a consequence of this result, we conclude the proof of Theorem 3.29.
3.2.6.2 Security Proof for the Subset PEKS Scheme S2
We dedicate this section to the proof of Theorem 3.30.
We prove security in the random oracle model by proceeding similarly to [38].
Suppose that there exists a PPT adversary A breaking the security game defined in
Section 3.2.2.5 with advantage not negligible in λ. We then build a successful PPT
(m+1)−BDHI distinguisher B taking an (m+1)−BDHI challenge tuple (g, ga, . . . , gam+1)
as input. By interacting with A as the challenger in the security game defined in Sec-
tion 3.2.2.5, B computes e (g, g)1/a with non-negligible advantage in λ.
• Setup. The challenger B runs Gen(λ) and generates the public parameters of the
scheme params = {G, q, e, g,H,H1,m, (f1, . . . , fm)}, where H,H1 are handles to
the hash oracles described below. B hands over the public parameters and the
public key (ga, . . . , ga
m
) to A.
• Hash Oracle H. The oracle is operated by B, which maintains a list of tuples of
the form 〈w, s, c〉 with w ∈ {0, 1}∗, s ∈ Fq and c ∈ {0, 1}. The list is initially
empty. On input a keyword w ∈ {0, 1}∗, the oracle H operates as follows:
1. If there is an item in the list whose first element is keyword w, denote it by
〈w, s, c〉. Then:
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(a) If c = 0, the oracle returns gs.
(b) If c = 1, the oracle returns
(
ga
m+1
)s
.
2. If there is no item in the list whose first element is keyword w, then the
oracle flips a coin c ∈ {0, 1} with Pr(c = 1) = 1/(2qTm+ 1), samples s ∈ Fq
uniformly at random and inserts 〈w, s, c〉 into the list. Then, it proceeds to
give an output as in the previous point.
• Hash Oracle H1. The oracle is operated by B, which maintains a list of tuples of
the form 〈t, V 〉 with t ∈ GT and V ∈ {0, 1}∗. The list is initially empty. On input
an element t ∈ GT , the oracle H1 operates as follows:
1. If there is an item in the list whose first element is t, denote it by 〈t, V 〉. The
oracle returns V .
2. If there is no item in the list whose first element is t, then the oracle samples
V ∈ GT uniformly at random and inserts 〈t, V 〉 into the list. Then, it proceeds
to give an output as in the previous point.
• Query Phase 1. When A requests a trapdoor for keywords L = (w1, . . . , wl) in
positions J = {j1, . . . , jl} written in increasing order, the algorithm B first calls
the H oracle on input each keyword wi and retrieves the associated oracle list
tuples 〈wi, si, ci〉. Then, if some coin flip ci = 1, B halts. Otherwise, B hands over
to A the trapdoor T consisting of Ti = (gam−ji+1)si for i ∈ {1, . . . , l}, and J .
• Challenge. The adversary outputs two documents D0 = (w0,1, . . . , w0,m), D1 =
(w1,1, . . . , w1,m) with the restrictions stated in the security game defined in Sec-
tion 3.2.2.5, and B throws a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1}.
Then, B calls the hash oracle on every keyword wb,i to fill the H-list with tuples
〈wb,i, sb,i, cb,i〉. The algorithm B halts if some cb,i = 1.
Then B uniformly chooses J ∈ GT and random nonces r1, . . . , rm ∈ Fq in such a
way that if fi = fj then ri = rj , and it computes the challenge I = (I0, I1, . . . , Im)
in the following way
I0 = J, Ii =
(
ga
i−1)ri
and hands over I to A. In addition, B halts if ∑i sb,iri ≡ 0 (mod q) and, if not, it
stores C = (
∑
i sb,iri)
−1 (mod q).
• Query Phase 2. B proceeds as in Query Phase 1.
• Guess. The adversary A outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} for b. Then, B picks a random
element 〈t, V 〉 from the list in H1, and returns tC .
Note that the challenge is well-formed, and that it implicitly imposes the equality J =
H1
(
e
(
g
∑
i sb,iri , g
)1/a)
. If B does not halt, then it perfectly simulates a real attack game
up until the moment when A issues an H1 oracle query for t0 = e
(
g
∑
i s0,iri , g
)1/a
or
t1 = e
(
g
∑
i s1,iri , g
)1/a
.
Let E denote the event that A issues a query for t0 or t1 in a real attack game. We
now lower bound the probability of E . Under the random oracle model, if E does not
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happen, then B does not reveal any information about b. Therefore,
Pr(b′ = b) = Pr(E)Pr(b′ = b|E) + 1
2
Pr(¬E)
=
1
2
+ Pr(E)
(
Pr(b′ = b|E)− 1
2
)
so we can express the advantage of A by
AdvA(λ) = |Pr(b′ = b)− 1
2
|
= Pr(E) ·
∣∣∣∣Pr(b′ = b|E)− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12Pr(E)
and Pr(E) ≥ 2AdvA(λ).
Now, suppose that
1. B does not abort,
2. A eventually issues an H1 oracle query for either t0 or t1, i.e. E happens, and
3. B chooses b such that A queries the H1 oracle for tb (this is well defined, since A
does not receive any information about b until E happens).
Then, if B calls the hash oracle H1 on input tb in the Guess phase, it successfully
computes e (g, g)1/a. Since B uniformly samples an element from all inputs processed
by the hash oracle H1 to generate its output in the Guess phase, the probability of B
breaking the (m+ 1)−BDHI assumption in the above situation is at least 1/qH1 , where
qH1 is the polynomial amount of queries issued to the H1 oracle. This implies
AdvB(λ) = Pr(B(g, . . . , gam+1) = e (g, g)1/a)
≥ 1
qH1
Pr(B does not abort)Pr(E)1
2
≥ 1
qH1
Pr(B does not abort)AdvA(λ).
By following the same argument as in Lemma 3.27, we see that Pr(B does not abort)
is non-negligible in λ. Since A breaks the security game defined in Section 3.2.2.5 with
non-negligible advantage and qH1 is polynomial in λ, we conclude that AdvB(λ) is non-
negligible as well.
As a consequence of this result, we conclude the proof of Theorem 3.30.
3.2.7 Efficiency Analysis
We next lay out the efficiency measures of the proposed schemes and of other similar
searchable encryption schemes. We state the size and the time needed to generate an
encrypted index and a trapdoor, and also the time taken to perform a search operation.
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We omit multiplication time, hash evaluation time, key setup time, field identifiers
size and key storage size in the efficiency analysis. Notice that the search time refers
to performing a search operation for a single encrypted index. This is the case of
the application examples stated in Section 3.2.1, where the search time over a set of
encrypted indexes scales linearly in the number of encrypted indexes.
To analyze performance, we implement our schemes S1 and S2 and the schemes in [74]
by using the PBC library [135], and we provide the estimated running times for each
algorithm. All simulations ran on an Intel R© CoreTM i7-4510U CPU at 2.00GHz and
8GB memory under Ubuntu 16.04.1 LTS.
For the sake of comparison, we use symmetric bilinear groups (type A pairings in the
PBC library documentation) in all implementations. Also, as suggested in the PBC
library documentation [135], we fix a 512-bit base field order and a 160-bit group order
to instantiate the bilinear group. In our implementations, we did not use pre-processing
or any of the functions that the PBC library provides in order to speed up computations.
3.2.7.1 Conjunctive PEKS Scheme
Since we restrict the analysis to conjunctive PEKS schemes, the schemes [43, 47, 66, 118,
131] lie out of the scope of the analysis. However, we include the single-keyword PEKS
scheme [38] by Boneh et al. in our analysis for the sake of comparison, extending it to
the conjunctive case by considering the concatenation of indexes and trapdoors and the
sequential evaluation of the Search algorithm. Note that, for the single-keyword case
m = l = 1, our scheme and [38] have equivalent efficiency marks.
We also restrict the analysis to the public-key setting, so we leave out schemes such as
[40, 44, 116]. Other schemes such as [41, 130] are omitted due to security considerations.
The size and time efficiency measures can be found in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 respectively.
Scheme Index size Trapdoor size
[38] BDOP mE +mF lE
[74] PKL I 2E +mF E
[74] PKL II 2mE 2E
[73] PCL (2m+ 1)E 2E + F
[65] BW (2m+ 2)E (2l + 1)E
[42] HL (m+ 2)E 3E
S1 E +mF E
m: number of keywords in the index
l: number of keywords in the trapdoor
E: size of elliptic curve point
F : size of finite field element
Table 3.4: Size efficiency comparison of conjunctive PEKS schemes.
Note that the proposed scheme achieves the lowest efficiency marks for index size, trap-
door size, trapdoor generation time and search time. This is not so for the index gen-
eration time, which is constrained by the computing power of the senders. However,
in many applications the search time and the index and trapdoor size measures are far
more critical, since they are constrained by the throughput of the network and by the
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Scheme Index time Trapdoor time Search time
[38] BDOP me+ 2mG lG le
[74] PKL I me+ (m+ 2)G G e+G
[74] PKL II (4m+ 1)G+X 2G 2e+G
[73] PCL (4m+ 1)G+ 2X 2G 2e
[65] BW (6m+ 2)G (5l + 1)G (2l + 1)e
[42] HL (2m+ 2)G 3G 3e
S1 me+ 2G2 G1 e
m: number of keywords in the index
l: number of keywords in the trapdoor
e: pairing evaluation time
G: exponentiation time in symmetric bilinear group G
G1: exp. time in asymmetric bilinear group G1
G2: exp. time in asymmetric bilinear group G2
X: exponentiation time in finite field
Table 3.5: Time efficiency comparison of conjunctive PEKS schemes.
computing power of the storage server, and search operations may be executed several
times per encrypted index.
In Table 3.6, we give the estimated running times in milliseconds for Table 3.5 by
arbitrarily fixing m = 8 and l = 8, and using 48-bit keywords. For implementation
reasons, we do not give the performance analysis for the schemes in [42, 73], mainly
because they require the evaluation of multiple independent hash functions. We also
omit the analysis of the conjunctive PEKS scheme in [65] for efficiency reasons.
Scheme Index time Trapdoor time Search time
[38] BDOP 58.7ms 36.5ms 7.33ms
[74] PKL I 53.1ms 29.7ms 2.73ms
[74] PKL II 59.8ms 3.08ms 3.26ms
S1 35.9ms 26.5ms 0.94ms
Table 3.6: Performance analysis of conjunctive PEKS schemes.
We observe that S1 achieves the best index computation and search time in the studied
case. Also, the second scheme in [74] gives the best trapdoor computation time. This is
achieved in [74] by removing the need for an admissible encoding scheme, thus replacing
products in the bilinear group by sums in the underlying finite field.
3.2.7.2 Subset PEKS Scheme
We now give the efficiency measures for the proposed subset PEKS scheme and the
related subset PEKS scheme by Boneh and Waters [65]. For the sake of comparison,
we assume that subset queries are always as defined in [65]. See the beginning of Sec-
tion 3.2.5 for more details.
One of the main differences between both schemes is that in the proposed scheme the
keyword space is an arbitrary exponential-sized keyword space {0, 1}∗, while in [65]
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keywords are taken from a small polynomial-sized keyword space. We denote by n
the size of this keyword space in the efficiency analysis. Another difference is that,
in the scheme we propose, the number of keywords in queries is limited at S2.Setup.
We denote by L the maximum number of keywords in a trapdoor. The size and time
efficiency measures can be found in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 respectively.
Scheme Index size Trapdoor size
[65] BW (2nm+ 2)E (2nm+ 1)E
S2 LE +H lE
n: size of the keyword space
m: number of keywords in the index
l: number of keywords in the trapdoor
L: maximum number of keywords in a trapdoor
E: size of elliptic curve point
F : size of finite field element
H: size of strings in Im(H1) ⊆ {0, 1}∗
Table 3.7: Size efficiency comparison between subset PEKS schemes.
Scheme Index time Trapdoor time Search time
[65] BW (6nm+ 2)G (5nm+ 1)G (2nm+ 1)e
S2 e+ 2LG lG le
n: size of the keyword space
m: number of keywords in the index
l: number of keywords in the trapdoor
L: maximum number of keywords in a trapdoor
e: pairing evaluation time
G: exponentiation time in symmetric bilinear group G
X: exponentiation time in finite field
Table 3.8: Time efficiency comparison between subset PEKS schemes.
We now give the estimated running times in milliseconds for the S2 scheme. Since
the performance of the subset PEKS scheme in [65] depends strongly on the size of
the keyword space, it is difficult to choose parameters allowing a sensible comparison.
Therefore, we omit the performance analysis of [65].
We arbitrarily fix m = 8, l = 8, and use 48-bit keywords. We also instantiate the index
and the trapdoor so that the search operation takes the longest possible. In the proposed
scheme, the computation of an index and a trapdoor takes an estimated time of 39.5ms
and 36.6ms respectively, and the search time is approximately 7.57ms.
3.2.8 Conclusion
PEKS schemes enable public key holders to encrypt documents, while the secret key
holder is able to generate queries for the encrypted data. In our work we present two
PEKS schemes enabling conjunctive and subset queries. We propose a security notion
for PEKS and we prove the proposed schemes secure under the asymmetric DBDH
assumption and the p−BDHI assumption, respectively. We also prove the computational
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consistence of the given constructions. The main strength of our schemes lies in their
efficiency since, as shown in the provided efficiency analysis, they improve all previous
related schemes in some of the most critical operations.
The proposed schemes could possibly admit various extensions. For example, we believe
it is possible to extend our subset PEKS scheme to allow decryption of searchable indexes
by embedding messages in the target group, as done in works such as [65]. Such an
extension would simplify the retrieval of messages in the search process.
In [119], Abdalla et al. prove computational consistency for the PEKS scheme [38] by
Boneh et al., and give a modified scheme achieving the stronger notion of statistical
consistency. Since the conjunctive PEKS scheme we propose here can be seen as a
natural extension to the scheme in [38] to the conjunctive case, it would be interesting
to find similar modifications that improve consistency.
It would also be interesting to maintain a good efficiency and security trade-off while
improving the security notion. For example, by providing tight security proofs in the
standard model, or by removing the need for a secure channel for trapdoors.
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Chapter 4
Outsourcing Kriging
Interpolation Computations
In this chapter, we present our contributions to secure outsourced computation. Due to
requirements in the CLARUS project, we aim to securely outsource Kriging interpolation
computations.
Kriging is a spatial interpolation algorithm which provides the best unbiased linear pre-
diction of an observed phenomena by taking a weighted average of samples within a
neighborhood. It is widely applied in areas such as geo-statistics where, for example, it
may be used to predict the quality of mineral deposits in a location based on previous
sample measurements. In this chapter, we present a method for the private outsourcing
of Kriging interpolation using a tailored modification of the Kriging algorithm in combi-
nation with homomorphic encryption. Our solution allows crucial information relating
to measurement values to be hidden from the cloud service provider.
4.1 Introduction
Kriging [18–21] is a well-recognized form of linear interpolation that gives a predic-
tion z∗0 of the value z0 of some phenomena at an unobserved location (x0, y0) in a
two-dimensional region. The quality of a Kriging prediction relies on some variogram
parameters, which reflect the assumption that measurements taken at nearby locations
are more likely to be similar than measurements taken far apart. Such parameters must
be carefully selected prior to interpolation. The prediction is then formed as a weighted
sum of measurement values, where measurements taken close to (x0, y0) are given a
greater weight than those far away. Kriging was designed with geo-statistical applica-
tions in mind, for instance to predict the best location to mine based on the mineral
deposits found at previous boreholes within a region, but it has also found applications
in a variety of settings including remote sensing, real-estate appraisal and computer
simulations.
Kriging has been identified as a good candidate process to be outsourced, based on the
practical and legislative requirements of industrial users (for instance, [1, 75]). Many
users may need access to a Kriging prediction service since, for example, legal frameworks
may require such data to be shared among relevant authorities [136]). A secured storage
97
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server may be preferable to distributing copies of the entire data set to each authorized
user, especially when data sets are large and/or user devices are constrained. Further,
Kriging might need to be performed over data owned by multiple organizations, with
an independent cloud service provider performing processing duties on behalf of all
concerned parties. Centralized outsourcing also makes sense when remote sensors take
frequent measurements and push the results to a central database.
Consider a client C that owns a Kriging data set, consisting of measurements taken at
various locations, which it wishes to outsource to an honest-but-curious cloud service
provider S. Client C would like to make use of both the storage and computational
power of S to make a Kriging service on its data set available to multiple users. Further,
other data generating nodes may be authorized by C to add and remove data to and
from the outsourced data set.
A trivial solution consists of encrypting all data using a symmetric encryption scheme
and using the server only for Storage-as-a-Service. To compute a Kriging prediction,
all relevant data is retrieved, decrypted and computed on locally. Unfortunately, this
solution may not be efficient, particularly if client devices have limited computational
power or storage capacity, and require a high bandwidth during queries. This may be
an issue if, for example, a surveyor in the field requires an on-line Kriging prediction
service. Mobile data services may be expensive, intermittently available or slow.
An alternative is to compute the entire Kriging process on encrypted data by encrypting
all data using Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)1. Unfortunately, Kriging involves
several computations that are currently challenging when using FHE, including com-
puting square roots and natural exponentiations. It is possible to outsource the Kriging
process and protect all information using FHE. However this results in prohibitively
high encryption and decryption costs, as well as a large amount of interactivity and
local computations, which may diminish the benefits of cloud computing. Preliminary
experiments using the SEAL library [137], admittedly without optimization of code or
parameter choices, did not yield promising results when computing a Kriging prediction
using a data set of more than three measurements. While the use of FHE schemes should
be explored further in future works, particularly to reflect advances in FHE schemes, we
show in this work that such schemes are not strictly required in this setting.
Our proposed solution uses additive homomorphic encryption to outsource Kriging in-
terpolation efficiently. We make a trade-off by protecting only the most sensitive pa-
rameters. That is, we protect the measurement values in the data set, the generated
Kriging predictions and the variogram parameters chosen by the client. We do not hide
locations of measurements or queries, noting that measurement locations may well be
externally observable (e.g. if measurements come from previous mining operations).
Our main contribution is to show that the Kriging process can be adapted in such
a way that the sensitive variogram parameters may be factored out from the online
computation, while the remainder of the Kriging computation may be performed on
encrypted measurement values using an additively homomorphic encryption scheme.
We thus gain a practical, efficient and secure solution to outsourced, private Kriging
interpolation. An outline of our protocol is as follows:
1In fact, it suffices to consider Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption rather than FHE as the func-
tionality is fixed and has a reasonably low multiplicative depth.
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1. The client C uploads an encrypted data set, comprising n measurements, to the
server S. The cost of this step is O(n) due to encryption of the measurement
values.
2. The server S prepares the Kriging data set for future queries. This process com-
prises plaintext operations that are also necessary in an unprotected outsourced
Kriging scheme.
3. The client C makes a query to S requesting a Kriging prediction at a location
(x0, y0). This is done in plaintext with virtually no cost.
4. The server S computes the interpolation on encrypted measurements. The cost
with respect to an unprotected outsourced Kriging scheme is increased by O(n),
due to operations over encrypted data.
5. The client C decrypts the result.
Cryptographically-secured Kriging was previously studied in a different setting, where
a server owns a data set and clients may query the data set at a previously unsampled
location [76]: the queried location and the resulting prediction should remain protected
from the server, while the data set held by the server should be protected from the
client. Two solutions are proposed in [76] which, unlike our solution, support only one
variogram model and require high communication complexity, interactivity and local
computation. The first is based on creating random dummy queries to hide the queried
location, and using an oblivious transfer protocol to hide predictions for all but the
legitimate query location. The second solution uses the Paillier encryption scheme in
an interactive protocol requiring multiple round-trips between client and server. In [77]
collaborative private Kriging was investigated, where users combine their data sets to
achieve more accurate Kriging predictions.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2 we describe the
Kriging interpolation process. In Section 4.3 we define our system model and we analyze
the required security properties of each piece of data in our setting. In Section 4.4 we
introduce the idea of a canonical variogram, which is used in our construction to allow
the server to compute a Kriging prediction without relying on the sensitive parameters.
Our construction is given in Section 4.5 and we discuss its performance in Section 4.6.
Finally, we give some final remarks and outline some potential directions for future work
in Section 4.7.
4.2 Kriging Interpolation
This section outlines the background theory of Kriging interpolation. For more detail,
see [18–21]. There are many variants of Kriging, but we focus on the widely used
Ordinary Kriging variant.
The Kriging process starts with a set of measurements taken at some locations in a
spatial region, and it produces predictions of the measurements at unsampled locations.
We denote the spatial region by R ⊂ R2 and the locations of sampled measurements by
P = (r1, r2, . . . , rn), where each ri = (xi, yi) ∈ R. The Euclidean distance between two
locations ri, rj ∈ R is denoted by d(ri, rj). We refer to the set of taken measurements
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by S = (z1, z2, . . . , zn), where zi is measured at the location ri ∈ P . The Kriging data
set is then the tuple (P, S).
The Kriging process allows a client to query an arbitrary location r0 ∈ R in order to
receive a prediction z∗0 of the true value z0 that would be measured at r0.
4.2.1 Random Fields and Stationarity Assumptions
In order to apply the Kriging interpolation technique, the observed phenomena is viewed
as a realization of a random field which satisfies certain properties related to the observed
measurements. A random field generalizes the notion of stochastic process, by allowing
the underlying parameter to take values other than real numbers. In the case of spatial
interpolation, a random field Z is defined as a collection of real-valued random variables
{Z(r)}r∈R, all defined in the same probability space, and indexed by locations r in a
fixed planar region R ⊆ R2.
Given a set of n samples S = (z1, . . . , zn) taken at positions P = (r1, . . . , rn), every
sample zi ∈ S can be viewed as a realization of the random variable Z(ri), indexed by
the position ri ∈ P in a random field Z. Given such realizations, a linear predictor Z∗
of the random field Z is defined as a random field of the form
Z∗(r) = λ0 +
n∑
i=1
λiZ(ri), where λi ∈ R.
We say a linear predictor Z∗ is unbiased if the expectation E(Z(r)− Z∗(r)) = 0 for all
r ∈ R. Moreover, we say that a linear predictor Z∗ is best or optimal if, for every location
r ∈ P , it minimizes the prediction variance Var(Z(r)−Z∗(r)) among all unbiased linear
predictors.
The Kriging interpolation technique aims at finding a best unbiased linear predictor for
the random field Z derived from a Kriging data set (P, S). In this sense, note that Kriging
deals with the same problem as linear least squares does in random fields. However, in
order to derive such a predictor from sampled values, additional assumptions are usually
made on the stationarity of the random field. The most widely applied Kriging process
is Ordinary Kriging. This form of Kriging stems from two stationarity assumptions: the
second-order stationarity assumption and the intrinsic stationarity assumption.
The second-order stationarity assumption states that the first and second-order moments
of the random variables in the random field are shift invariant.
Definition 4.1. A random field Z parametrized by elements of a region R ⊆ R2 is
defined to be second-order stationary if the following conditions are satisfied:
• The mean E(Z(r)) does not depend on r ∈ R, and
• The covariance Cov(Z(r), Z(r + h)) is a function of only the separating vector h
for every r, r + h ∈ R.
The intrinsic stationarity assumption considers variance of increments in place of the
covariance.
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Definition 4.2. A random field Z parametrized by elements of a region R ⊆ R2 is
defined to be intrinsic stationary if the following conditions are satisfied:
• The mean E(Z(r)) does not depend on r ∈ R, and
• The variance of the increments Var(Z(r + h) − Z(r)) is a function of only the
separating vector h for every r, r + h ∈ R.
Second-order stationarity implies intrinsic stationarity [21] and thus we restrict our
attention to the more general intrinsic stationarity assumption. Our techniques are,
however, applicable to Ordinary Kriging in general.
The intrinsic stationarity assumption naturally leads to the notion of theoretical var-
iogram [19, 138] which models the spatial dependency between the random variables
Z(r). Given an intrinsic stationary random field Z, the theoretical variogram γˆ : R→ R
is defined as the function γˆ(h) = Var(Z(r+ h)−Z(r)). Under the intrinsic assumption,
γˆ(h) depends only on the norm of h [21]. Hence, we may view γˆ as a function defined
over the positive real numbers.
4.2.2 The Kriging Prediction
Informally, the Kriging interpolation technique consists of three phases:
1. Computing the experimental variogram: One of the underlying assumptions of
the Kriging process is that two measurements of a phenomenon will be similar
when measured in nearby locations. Using the sampled data set, one can plot the
experimental variogram to show the dependence between measurements sampled
at locations at certain distances h.
2. Fitting a variogram model : Nevertheless, the experimental variogram is not usu-
ally sufficient to use directly in the Kriging prediction, since sampled data at every
required distance may not be available. Therefore, one selects a parametric vari-
ogram model and empirically chooses model parameters to fit a curve to the points
of the experimental variogram.
3. Computing the prediction: Using the variogram, one can determine appropriate
weights for each measurement by taking into account the distance between each
measurement and the queried location). The Kriging prediction is then computed
as a weighted sum of the measured samples.
Let N(h) = {(zi, zj) : d(ri, rj) ∈ (h−∆, h+ ∆)} be the set of all pairs of measurements
taken approximately distance h apart2. The experimental variogram γ∗ plots, for every
distance h such that N(h) 6= ∅:
γ∗(h) =
1
2N(h)
∑
(zi,zj)∈N(h)
(zi − zj)2.
2The approximation tolerance ∆ can be increased when the Kriging data set does not include enough
sample points at a close enough distance.
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A suitable variogram function γ : R≥0 → R, in phase 2, must satisfy a set of condi-
tions [18, 19]. The most commonly used models require that γ(0) = 0, that γ(h) is
positive and bounded, and the existence of the limits limh→0+ γ(h) and limh→∞ γ(h).
These models are parametrized by the following three variables:
• The nugget effect η: The limit of γ(h) as h→ 0+.
• The sill ν: The limit of γ(h) as h→∞.
• The range ρ: Controls how fast γ(h) approaches ν as h increases.
Typically, one chooses a variogram model from a set of standard parametric variogram
models, and then fits the model to the experimental variogram by empirically adjusting
the nugget effect, sill and range parameters. A selection of the most common choices of
bounded variogram models are, for h > 0:
• The bounded linear model : γ(h) = ν − (ν − η)
(
1− hρ
)
1(0,ρ)(h).
• The exponential variogram model : γ(h) = ν − (ν − η)e−h/ρ.
• The spherical variogram model : γ(h) = ν − (ν − η)
(
1− 3h2ρ + h
3
2ρ3
)
1(0,ρ)(h).
• The Gaussian variogram model : γ(h) = ν − (ν − η)e−h2/ρ2 .
where 1I(x) = 1 if x ∈ I, and 1I(x) = 0 otherwise.
Let γ be one of the above variogram models instantiated with empirically chosen param-
eters. To construct the best unbiased linear predictor of the phenomenon at a queried
location r0 = (x0, y0) ∈ R, we first form the Kriging matrix K ∈ R(n+1)×(n+1) with
elements
• Ki,j = γ(d(ri, rj)) for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n,
• Kn+1,i = Ki,n+1 = 1 for i 6= n+ 1, and
• Kn+1,n+1 = 0.
Next, define a real vector v ∈ Rn+1 with vi = γ(d(r0, ri)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and vn+1 = 1.
Let λ = (λi)
n+1
i=1 satisfy Kλ = v. The (Ordinary) Kriging prediction z
∗
0 of the value z0
of the phenomena at the unmeasured location r0 is computed as the weighted sum of
the sampled measurements, with the weights defined by λ. That is,
z∗0 =
n∑
i=1
λizi.
The set of linear equations defined by K and v are known as the Normal Equations.
They are derived by imposing that the induced linear predictor is unbiased (by ensuring
that the first n weights sum to one, i.e.,
∑n
i=1 λi = 1) while minimizing the variance of
the induced linear predictor [21].
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The resulting minimized variance σ∗20 is called the (Ordinary) Kriging variance, and it
is described by the following expression
σ∗20 = λn+1 +
n∑
i=1
λiγ(d(r0, ri)).
The Kriging variance allows the construction of confidence intervals for each prediction,
and thus it describes the error associated to the prediction. For a reference on the
computation of confidence intervals in this context, see [19].
We define a variogram function to be non-degenerate if η 6= ν, i.e. if γ is non-constant for
h > 0. We restrict our attention to non-degenerate variogram functions. It is easy to see
that using the degenerate variogram (also called the nugget effect variogram [21]) results
in the average Kriging predictor z∗0 =
∑n
i=1 zi/n at all unsampled locations r0 /∈ P , with
Kriging variance σ∗20 = n+ 1.
4.3 Private Outsourced Kriging Interpolation
Consider a system comprising a client C that owns a Kriging data set (P, S) along with a
choice of variogram γ, a server S that is willing to perform outsourced Kriging on behalf
of the client, and additional users U that are authorized by C to issue Kriging queries
to S. Furthermore, there may be additional data generating nodes (e.g. other users
or remote sensors) that may update the outsourced data set by producing additional
measurement data or by removing prior or outdated measurements. The requirements
of each entity are as follows:
• The data owner must choose the variogram to be used and upload a Kriging data
set, and it should be able to update data and request Kriging predictions.
• Data users may request Kriging predictions and update data.
• Data generating nodes should only be able to update data.
• The server should only be able to perform Kriging predictions, and should do so
without learning the sensitive data used in the computation. We assume that the
server S is honest-but-curious, i.e. it follows the Kriging protocol since its business
model may depend on doing so, but it may attempt to learn information about
the outsourced data.
Informally, the protocol runs as follows. The data owner C chooses the variogram to
be used and runs the Outsource algorithm to generate the protected data set to be
sent to the server, as well as the keys that are issued to authorize entities to update
the outsourced data set or to perform Kriging queries respectively. Upon receipt of
the protected data, the server may run the Setup algorithm to process the data and to
perform any necessary precomputation. After this step, the system is ready to accept
queries. The data owner or an authorized data user holding the query key may request
a Kriging prediction at a specified location by running the Query algorithm to generate
a query token Q. This is sent to the server, who then runs the Interpolate algorithm
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using the processed database to generate an encrypted prediction and an encoding of the
Kriging variance (which estimates the error in the prediction). An entity authorized to
perform queries may learn the prediction and variance by running the Decrypt algorithm.
To dynamically update the outsourced data set, an authorized entity in possession of
the update key may run the AddRequest algorithm on a specified location r′ and mea-
surement z′, or the DeleteRequest algorithm on a specified location r. These algorithms
produce an addition token αr′,z′ or a deletion token δr respectively that is sent to the
server. Upon receipt of such a token, the server may run the Add or Delete algorithm
respectively to update the database accordingly.
For the purposes of our work, we assume that any user authorized to generate a Kriging
query is also permitted to update the data set. If this should not be the case, then the
proposed construction can be easily modified to include a digital signature computed on
any addition or deletion token, where the signing key is contained in the update key but
not in the query key. The server should then be trusted to reject any tokens that do not
have a valid signature. In this way, only users in possession of the private signature key
would be able to update the data set.
Definition 4.3. A private outsourced Kriging interpolation scheme comprises the fol-
lowing algorithms:
• (C,UK,QK) $←− Outsource(1λ, P, S, γ): A probabilistic algorithm run by C which
takes as input a security parameter λ, the Kriging data set comprising measure-
ment locations P and measurement values S and the chosen variogram γ. It
produces an encrypted data set C that may be outsourced to the server, an up-
date key UK that may used to update the outsourced data set, and a query key
QK which may be used to form Kriging queries.
• DB ← Setup(C): A deterministic algorithm run by S which takes as input the
encrypted data set C. This algorithm enables S to perform any necessary process-
ing that will enable it to compute Kriging predictions, and produces a processed
outsourced data set DB.
• Q $←− Query(r0, QK): A probabilistic algorithm run by C or by a data user in U
which takes as input a location r0 = (x0, y0) ∈ R for which a Kriging prediction
should be computed, and the query key QK. It produces a query token Q to be
sent to S.
• (Z˜0, σ˜0∗2) ← Interpolate(Q,DB): A deterministic algorithm run by S that, given
a query token Q and the database DB, returns an encrypted Kriging interpolation
Z˜0 and the partially computed Kriging variance σ˜0
∗2.
• (z∗0 , σ∗20 ) ← Decrypt(Z˜0, σ˜0∗2, QK): A deterministic algorithm run by C or a user
in U that takes as input the Kriging results Z˜0 and σ˜0∗2 from the server and the
query key QK, and outputs the Kriging prediction z∗0 and the Kriging variance
σ∗20 at the queried location.
• αr′,z′ ← AddRequest(r′, z′, UK): A deterministic algorithm run by C, a data user
in U or a data generating node. It takes a location r′, a measurement value z′ and
the update key UK, and outputs an addition token αr′,z′ .
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• DB′ ← Add(DB, αr′,z′,): A deterministic algorithm run by S which takes as input
the current outsourced database DB and an addition token αr′,z′, and outputs an
updated database DB′ representing the Kriging data set (P ∪ {r′}, S ∪ {z′}).
• δr ← DeleteRequest(r, UK): A deterministic algorithm run by C, a data user in U
or a data generating node. The algorithm takes as input a location r ∈ P and the
update key UK and outputs a deletion token δr.
• DB′ ← Delete(DB, δr): A deterministic algorithm by the server which takes as
input the current database DB and a deletion token δr and outputs an updated
database DB′ representing the Kriging data set (P \ {r}, S \ {zr}) where zr ∈ S is
the measurement corresponding to location r ∈ P in DB.
We now analyze the security requirements of each component within a Kriging system.
Table 4.1 summarizes the analysis.
• The measurement values zi ∈ S are highly sensitive and business-critical and must
be protected at all times.
• In the current work, we consider the coordinates ri ∈ P of previous measurements
to not be sensitive. This is reasonable, since in some applications they may be
externally observable, for instance if they are the locations of previous mining
activity.
• The queried location r0 at which a new prediction should be computed may reveal
areas of particular interest to the user. The sensitivity of this relies on the setting
and on individual user requirements. However, in practice, Kriging queries are
often made at every location within a region to produce a heat map of a phe-
nomenon, which may limit the sensitivity of individual query locations. Further,
the basic assumption of Kriging is that the quality of prediction degrades with dis-
tance. Thus, the best Kriging results will be obtained when the queried location
lies broadly within the region of prior observed measurements.
• The computed prediction z∗0 is highly sensitive as it may form the basis of future
decisions and may be business-critical, and must be protected.
• The choice of variogram model, without the variogram parameters, may reveal
some information about the overall trend of the spatial dependencies of the mea-
surements. We assume that this is not particularly sensitive information.
• The range parameter ρ of the variogram is a constant scaling of the region R
denoting the inter-measurement distance h at which the spatial dependency be-
comes negligible. For distances h > ρ, the variogram approaches the variance of
the measurements [21], which is represented by the sill ν.
The nugget effect η reveals the spatial dependency at very small distances.
In this work, we assume that the range is not sensitive as it merely scales the region
R, and we also assume that information revealed by the nugget and sill may be
sensitive. Even in applications where this direct information on the variance and
spatial dependency of measurements is deemed non-sensitive, it may be the case
that the variogram parameters are commercially sensitive. These parameters must
be chosen empirically to best fit the experimental data, a process which may be
time-consuming, and the quality of predictions depends on how well the variogram
matches the experimental variogram.
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Data ri zi (x0, y0) z
∗
0 γ model ρ ν η
Protection 7 3 7 3 7 7 3 3
Table 4.1: Data protection offered by our private outsourced Kriging scheme.
4.4 Our Techniques
In this section we introduce the main concept used in our construction, namely the
canonical variogram. We then show how to factor out the variogram parameters in
the Normal equations, which ultimately allows us to remove these parameters from the
outsourced data set and to use them only to recover the final prediction on the client
side.
The crux of our solution for the private outsourcing of Kriging interpolation is to observe
how the Kriging solution varies according to the variogram nugget effect η, the sill ν, and
range ρ in the non-degenerate case. We define a canonical variogram for each variogram
model by arbitrarily fixing the parameters η = ρ = 1 and ν = 0, although our results
clearly translate to other choices.
Since the Kriging process is inherently linear, we show how to factor out the sensitive
parameters η and ν from the variogram to leave just the canonical variogram. Using
this result and an additively homomorphic scheme, an untrusted server can compute a
related Kriging prediction and variance without any knowledge of η, ν and the actual
measurements. The variogram parameters can then be efficiently re-added by the client
locally to compute the final prediction.
Definition 4.4 (Canonical Variogram). Let γ(h) be a non-degenerate variogram func-
tion with nugget effect η, sill ν and range ρ. We define its associated canonical variogram
as the function γ˜ : R≥0 → R satisfying γ˜(0) = 0 and
γ˜(h) = − 1
ν − ηγ(ρh) +
ν
ν − η for h > 0. (4.1)
Note that for any non-degenerate variogram function coming from the parametric var-
iogram models defined in Section 4.2, the canonical variogram depends only on the
considered model itself and not on any parameters. This is the case for several other
parametric variogram models used in practice.
Now, given a Kriging data set (P, S) of n measurements, a query position r0 /∈ P and
a variogram function γ with nugget effect η, sill ν and range ρ, let Kλ = v be the
corresponding Normal equations as defined in Section 4.2. Our main result in this stage
is that it suffices to consider a canonical version of the Normal equations that depends
only on the chosen variogram model, as well as on P and on the range parameter ρ of
γ.
Definition 4.5. We define the canonical Normal equations as the linear system obtained
from the Normal equations Kλ = v by replacing
• every ri ∈ P by ri/ρ,
• the query position r0 by r0/ρ,
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• the variogram γ(h) by the canonical variogram γ˜(h),
and we denote the canonical Normal equations by K˜λ˜ = v˜.
Note that, since the canonical variogram is parameterless, the canonical Normal equa-
tions involve only the variogram model and the locations in P scaled by the inverse of
the range parameter ρ. We make extensive use of this observation in our construction.
Indeed, this observation allows us to take advantage of the linearity of the Kriging pre-
dictor in order to protect the measurements and the interpolation value, while the sill
and the nugget parameters ν, η are hidden from the server by storing them locally.
The solution to the canonical Normal equations can be described as follows:
Proposition 4.6. Let K,K ′ ∈ R(n+1)×(n+1) be real matrices, and let v, v′ ∈ Rn+1 be
real vectors such that:
• there exist a, b ∈ R such that K ′i,j = aKi,j + b and v′i = avi + b for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n,
• Ki,n+1 = Kn+1,i = K ′i,n+1 = K ′n+1,i = vn+1 = v′n+1 = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
• Kn+1,n+1 = K ′n+1,n+1 = 0.
Then, if λ ∈ Rn+1 satisfies Kλ = v, the vector λ′ ∈ Rn+1 defined by
λ′i = λi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
λ′n+1 = aλn+1
satisfies K ′λ′ = v′.
Proof. Note that (K ′λ′)i = avi + b
∑n
i=1 λi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and (K ′λ′)n+1 = 1. Since∑n
i=1 λi = 1 by the last equation of the system Kλ = v, the result follows.
This result extends an observation by [19], which states that summing a constant to
the variogram does not alter the solutions of the Normal equations, and that such
a transformation of the variogram may sometimes be necessary in order to obtain a
numerically stable Kriging prediction.
We apply this proposition to the Normal equations with a = −1/(ν − η) and b =
ν/(ν−η), and consider the canonical Normal equations. By the definitions of the Kriging
prediction and the Kriging variance in Section 4.2, we directly obtain the following
Corollary.
Corollary 4.7. Let z∗0 and z˜0
∗ be the Kriging predictions computed from the Normal
and the canonical Normal equations described above, respectively. Denote by σ∗20 and
σ˜0
∗2 the Kriging variance associated to each of the predictors. Then
z˜0
∗ = z∗0 and σ˜0
∗2 = − 1
ν − ησ
∗2
0 +
ν
ν − η .
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Therefore, in case that the employed variogram is non-degenerate, the Kriging prediction
is independent of the sill ν and nugget η parameters of the variogram, while the range
parameter ρ scales positions. We also see that, when applying a linear transformation to
the variogram, the Kriging variance of the obtained Kriging predictor varies according
to the same transformation.
4.5 Our Construction
We now outline the operation of each of the algorithms in Definition 4.3. Let H =
(H.Gen,H.Enc,H.Dec) be an IND-CPA-secure additive HE scheme, such as the Paillier
encryption scheme [108]. Then:
• (C,UK,QK) $←− Outsource(1λ, P, S, γ): If γ is a degenerate variogram function,
halt and return ⊥. In this case, our protocol fails. However, if γ is degenerate, the
variogram is constant (the so-called nugget effect model) and models a purely ran-
dom variable with no spatial correlation. Hence it is particularly easy to compute
predictions in this case: the prediction is z∗0 =
∑
zi/n for r0 6∈ P and the variance
is σ∗20 = n+ 1.
Otherwise, generate a key-pair for the homomorphic encryption scheme:
(pk, sk)
$←− H.Gen(1λ).
Recall that P ⊆ R2 is the ordered set of locations (ri)ni=1 and that S ⊆ R is the
ordered set of measurements (zi)
n
i=1. Recall also that the variogram γ comprises
three parameters: the nugget η, the sill ν and the range ρ. Let γ˜ be the canonical
variogram associated to γ, as defined in Section 4.4. Define
UK = (pk, ρ) and QK = (sk, η, ν, ρ).
To account for the factor of ρ in the input to γ in equation 4.1, compute
P˜ = ((xi/ρ, yi/ρ))
n
i=1.
Finally, encrypt each measurement in S and define the ordered set
Z = (H.Encpk(zi))ni=1.
Output C = (P˜ ,Z, γ˜), along with UK and QK.
• DB ← Setup(C): Instantiate the matrix K˜ from the canonical Normal equations
using positions in r′i ∈ P˜ and the canonical variogram function γ˜:
– K˜i,j = γ˜(d(r
′
i, r
′
j)) for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n,
– K˜n+1,i = K˜i,n+1 = 1 for i 6= n+ 1, and
– K˜n+1,n+1 = 0.
Return DB = (K˜, C).
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• Q $←− Query(r0, QK): Let r0 = (x0, y0) and, recalling that ρ is contained within
QK, return Q = (x0/ρ, y0/ρ).
• (Z˜0, σ˜0∗2) ← Interpolate(Q,DB): Recall that C = (P˜ ,Z, γ˜). If Q ∈ P˜ , then the
exact measurement is contained in the outsourced data set and no prediction is
required. Let j be the index such that Q = rj , and return (Zj ,⊥), where ⊥ is a
distinguished symbol denoting that the prediction is exact.
Otherwise, compute the vector v˜ from the canonical Normal equations using the
locations r′i ∈ P˜ , the query position Q and the canonical variogram γ˜:
– vi = γ˜(d(Q, r
′
i)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and
– vn+1 = 1.
Compute the solution λ˜ to the canonical Normal equation K˜λ˜ = v˜. This step
essentially computes the Kriging coefficients λ using the canonical variogram and
the scaled locations without requiring the parameters of the variogram. Then,
using the homomorphic property of the encryption, compute:
Z˜0 =
n∑
i=1
λ˜iZi and σ˜0
∗2 = λ˜n+1 +
n∑
i=1
λ˜iγ˜(Q, r
′
i).
Return the encrypted prediction Z˜0 and the partially computed Kriging variance
σ˜0
∗2.
• (z∗0 , σ∗20 )← Decrypt(Z˜0, σ˜0∗2, QK): First decrypt the Kriging prediction:
z˜0
∗ = H.Decsk(Z˜0),
where sk is contained within QK. Then, if σ˜0
∗2 =⊥, set σ∗20 = 0. Else, compute
the Kriging variance
σ∗20 = ν − (ν − η)σ˜0∗2.
This final step essentially adds back in the parameters of the variogram, which
were removed for outsourcing, using the result from Corollary 4.7.
• αr′,z′ ← AddRequest(r′, z′, UK): Let ra = r′ρ and compute the ciphertext
Za = H.Encpk(z′),
where ρ and pk are contained within UK. Output the addition token
αr′,z′ = (ra, Za).
• DB′ ← Add(DB, αr′,z′): Recall that αr′,z′ = (ra, Za). Compute the updated data
set: if ra ∈ P˜ then let j be the index such that rj = ra and modify Zj ∈ Z to be
Za. Otherwise, set C
′ = (P˜ ∪ {ra},Z ∪ {Za}, γ˜). Return the output of Setup(C ′).
• δr ← DeleteRequest(r, UK): Return δr = r/ρ.
• DB′ ← Delete(DB, δr): If δr /∈ P˜ , return DB as there is nothing to remove.
Otherwise, let j be the index such that r = rj in P˜ . Compute the updated data
set C ′ = (P˜ \ {rj},Z \ {Zj}, γ˜) and return the output of Setup(C ′).
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC TECHNIQUES FOR SECURING DATA IN THE CLOUD 
Jordi Ribes González 
 
110 Outsourcing Kriging Interpolation Computations
4.6 Discussion
The correctness of the scheme is immediate from Corollary 4.7 as well as the correctness
and homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme H. These homomorphic prop-
erties enable addition and scalar multiplication of ciphertexts, all while ensuring that
the results decrypt correctly. Corollary 4.7 shows that the Kriging prediction, as well as
the Kriging variance, can be computed by applying a linear transformation to the result
computed using the canonical (parameterless) variogram. Correctness of the updates is
apparent because the addition and deletion tokens format the data in the same way as
the original data set. Since the server is trusted to act honestly but curiously, it shall
modify the data set correctly. The remainder of the update algorithms then simulate a
new setup procedure running Setup on a new Kriging data set from Outsource.
In terms of security, it is easy to see that the measurement values are always in encrypted
form while outsourced, and that the leakage is bounded by the variogram model as well
as both the queried and observed locations scaled by the inverse of range parameter ρ.
Thus, assuming no collusion between the server and users, the data is protected from
the server. Furthermore, the homomorphic and security properties of the encryption
scheme permit the computation to be performed on the measurements while they are in
encrypted form. At no point during the computation is the data revealed. The security
of the encryption scheme requires each ciphertext to be indistinguishable from a random
number, while the final prediction Z˜0 computed by the server comprises a weighted sum
of such pseudorandom numbers. Thus, Z˜0 is a valid ciphertext and is indistinguishable
from random, and hence the server cannot learn the prediction from this value.
It is also clear that neither the variogram parameters η and ν, nor any values computed
from them, are ever revealed to the server. The final parameter of the variogram, the
range ρ, is never explicitly given to the server. However, the server does learn the
coordinates of measurements scaled by ρ. Hence, the range could be revealed if the
server has existing knowledge of the measurement locations. Of the three variogram
parameters, we believe that the range is the least sensitive, since it reveals how quickly
the variogram approaches the sill (i.e. the distance at which the spatial correlation
between measurements becomes negligible) but does not reveal anything relating to the
measurement values themselves.
Even though the queried location is revealed in the plain to the server, we note that
the mechanism of Tugrul and Polat [76] may easily be used to gain a weak form of
secrecy: during the Query algorithm, the party carrying out the query may choose q−1
additional locations from the region, and scale each of them by ρ. The query token then
comprises q randomly permuted scaled locations. The server must perform Interpolate
for each location, and the client may discard all results except the one it is interested
in. Unlike [76], we do not require an oblivious transfer protocol since the querier is
authorized to learn as many queries on the data set as it wishes. However, as in [76],
the server may guess the location of interest with probability 1/q, but it can not learn
the prediction at this location.
Data generating nodes cannot learn Kriging predictions as they do not have the decryp-
tion key and H is assumed to be IND-CPA-secure.
Regarding the performance evaluation of our scheme, we have implemented our scheme
in Python 3.4.3 using the PHE library [139] to provide the Paillier encryption scheme.
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Figure 4.1: Graphs showing the timing costs of each algorithm.
The implementation is intended as a proof of concept to evaluate the efficiency of the
proposed solution. The encryption scheme has not been further optimized beyond that
provided by default in the PHE library, and does not use the provided countermeasures to
avoid leaking the exponent of floating point numbers. We remark that implementations
of Paillier typically manage issues related to fixed-point arithmetic and overflows in a
transparent manner. It is not the aim of this work to discuss such issues. All code is
executed locally on a t2.micro Amazon EC2 instance with a 2.5GHz Intel Xeon processor
and 1GB memory running Ubuntu 14.04.4. In practice, one would expect the server to
have a better specification. All timings are averaged over 30 iterations, each on a new
randomly generated data set.
Figures 4.1a and 4.1b give some simple timing results using our construction. Fig-
ure 4.1b shows the per-algorithm costs excluding the update algorithms. The cost of
the Outsource algorithm dominates all others due to the cost of n encryption opera-
tions. Hence, for clarity, Figure 4.1a shows the same results with the exclusion of the
Outsource algorithm. It can be seen that, with the exception of the high one-time cost
of Outsource, which may be amortized over many queries, the remaining client-side pro-
cesses are very efficient. The server must perform quadratic work to execute Setup, but
this will be required relatively rarely, i.e. during initial setup and when the outsourced
data set is updated. The online workload of the client is very low, while the online work
of the server is linear in the size of the data set and greater than the workload of the
client, making outsourcing worthwhile. We believe that these experiments are sufficient
to demonstrate the performance and scalability of our solution. To our knowledge, the
range of the number of measurements is reasonable compared to what may be used in
practice. For example, the well-known Meuse data set [140], often used to illustrate the
Kriging process, comprises 155 measurements.
4.7 Conclusion
In this work analyze the Kriging algorithm to identify the required interaction and the
required data protection when the process is outsourced. We allow a client to outsource
the storage of large data sets to a cloud service provider, and to request the computation
of Kriging estimates while retaining the privacy of the sensitive measurements. We
discuss a number of potential solutions and we present efficient solutions that strike a
balance between efficiency and security. This exploration provides a suitable solution
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to users that wish to outsource functionality but are worried about data privacy, and it
may aid designers in privately outsourcing similar functionalities, particularly regression
and interpolation computations.
Although we believe our solution to be a good first step, there is obviously much that
can be improved going forwards. In particular, other techniques should be studied to
enable matrix inversion on encrypted data, as this can be a bottleneck in outsourced
algorithms such as Kriging.
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Chapter 5
Local Bounds for the Optimal
Information Ratio of Secret
Sharing Schemes
In this chapter we present our contributions to secret sharing. We remind that secret
sharing schemes are cryptographic schemes whose aim is to protect a secret piece of
information by dividing it into shares. This is done in such a way that the secret
can only be reconstructed from some combinations of shares. Given a secret sharing
scheme Σ, its access structure Γ is the collection of combinations of shares that allow
the reconstruction of the secret.
The secret sharing literature considers mainly two complexity measures: the information
ratio and the optimal information ratio. The information ratio of a secret sharing scheme
Σ is the ratio between the length of the largest share of the scheme and the length of the
secret, and it is denoted by σ(Σ). The optimal information ratio of an access structure
Γ is the infimum of σ(Σ) among all schemes Σ with access structure Γ, and it is denoted
by σ(Γ).
The main result of our work is that, for every two access structures Γ and Γ′, |σ(Γ) −
σ(Γ′)| ≤ |Γ ∪ Γ′| − |Γ ∩ Γ′|. We prove this constructively. Given any secret sharing
scheme Σ for Γ, we present a method to construct a secret sharing scheme Σ′ for Γ′
that satisfies the inequality σ(Σ′) ≤ σ(Σ) + |Γ ∪ Γ′| − |Γ ∩ Γ′|. As a consequence of
this result, we see that close access structures admit secret sharing schemes with similar
information ratio. We extend this property to other families of secret sharing schemes
and models of computation, such as the family of linear secret sharing schemes, span
programs and Boolean formulas. In order to understand the studied property, we also
analyze the limitations of the techniques for finding lower bounds on the information
ratio and other complexity measures. We examine the behavior of these bounds when
we add or delete subsets from an access structure.
5.1 Introduction
Secret sharing is cryptographic primitive that is used to protect a secret value by dis-
tributing it into shares. Secret sharing is used to prevent both the disclosure and the loss
113
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of secrets. In the typical scenario, a user called the dealer holds the secret value, and it
generates a set of shares. Then, it sends each share privately to a different participant.
A subset of participants is authorized if their shares determine the secret value, and
forbidden if their shares do not contain any information on the secret value. The family
of authorized subsets is called the access structure of the scheme. If every subset of
participants is either authorized or forbidden, we say that the scheme is perfect. In this
work we just consider perfect secret sharing schemes that are information-theoretically
secure, that is, schemes whose security does not rely on any computational assumption.
Secret sharing schemes were introduced by Shamir [50] and Blakley [51] in 1979, and
are used in many cryptographic applications such as secure multiparty computation,
attribute-based encryption and distributed cryptography (see [121] for more details).
These applications require the use of efficient secret sharing schemes, namely schemes
with short shares, efficient generation of the shares and efficient reconstruction of the
secret. The information ratio of a secret sharing scheme Σ is the ratio of the maximum
length in bits of the shares to the length of the secret value, and we denote it by σ(Σ).
The information ratio is widely used as a measure of the efficiency of secret sharing
schemes. Linear secret sharing schemes are of particular interest because they have
homomorphic properties, and because the shares are generated by using linear mappings,
simplifying the generation of shares and the reconstruction of the secret.
Ito, Saito and Nishizeki [52] presented a method to construct a secret sharing scheme
for any monotone increasing family of subsets. Viewing access structures as monotone
Boolean functions, Benaloh and Leichter [53] presented a method to construct a secret
sharing scheme from any monotone Boolean formula. However, for almost all access
structures, the information ratios of the schemes constructed using these and other
general methods [52, 53, 78] are exponential in the number of participants. In order
to understand the length of shares required to realize an access structure Γ, one recurs
to the optimal information ratio σ(Γ) of Γ, which is defined as the infimum of the
information ratios of all the secret sharing schemes for Γ.
The computation of the optimal information ratio of access structures is generally diffi-
cult, and concrete values are known only for certain families of access structures such as
particular families of multipartite access structures (e.g. [79–81]), access structures with
a small number of participants (e.g. [82]) or access structures with small minimal sets
(e.g. [83]). A common method to obtain bounds for this parameter is to define random
variables associated to the shares and to the secret, and then apply the information
inequalities of the Shannon entropy of these random variables. Csirmaz [141] used a
connection between the Shannon entropy and polymatroids to develop a technique for
finding lower bounds. Using this technique, it is possible to find an access structure with
n participants for which the optimal information ratio is Ω(n/ log(n)). Currently, this
is the best lower bound on the information ratio for an access structure.
Monotone span programs over a finite field F are equivalent to linear secret sharing
schemes with secret in F [78, 121]. This connection is very useful to extend bounds on
the complexity of monotone span programs to bounds on the information ratio of linear
secret sharing schemes. Robere et al. [142] showed that there is an access structure that
requires linear secret sharing schemes of information ratio 2Ω(n
1/14 log(n)).
For every perfect secret sharing scheme, the information ratio must be at least 1. The
schemes that attain this bound are called ideal, and their access structures are also
called ideal. Brickell and Davenport [143] showed that the access structure of ideal
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secret sharing schemes determines a matroid. Conversely, entropic matroids determine
ideal access structures, but a little is known about the access structures associated to
other families of matroids. The connection between ideal access structures and matroids
is a powerful tool to characterize families of ideal access structures, e.g. [80], and it
allows to transform secret sharing problems into combinatorial ones.
Beyond this connection, we lack of general criteria to determine if an access structure
admits an efficient scheme. For instance, we lack of a criterion to determine if an access
structure admits secret sharing scheme with information ratio at most r, for some r > 1.
Moreover, we do not know general properties of the family of access structures admitting
efficient schemes. For other models of secret sharing, recent works provide interesting
results on the characterization of the structures accepting efficient schemes [144, 145],
but it is not clear how to extend them to the perfect model.
The main objective of this work is to find properties of the access structures that admit
efficient secret sharing schemes. The specific question we consider is whether or not
access structures that are close admit secret sharing schemes with similar information
ratios. More concretely, the objective is to bound the difference between the optimal
information ratios of access structures that differ on a small number of subsets. Answers
to this question may help understand the limitations of secret sharing, and the behavior
of the optimal information ratio as a function from the set of all the access structures
with a certain number of participants to the real numbers.
Our main result is that |σ(Γ)−σ(Γ′)| ≤ |Γ∪Γ′|− |Γ∩Γ′| for every two access structures
Γ and Γ′. The proof of this result is constructive. Given any secret sharing scheme
Σ for Γ, we can construct a secret sharing scheme Σ′ for Γ′ that satisfies σ(Σ′) ≤
σ(Σ) + |Γ ∪ Γ′| − |Γ ∩ Γ′|. Moreover, if Σ is linear, then Σ′ is linear as well. The
construction relies on a combinatorial result that allows to describe Γ′ through unions
and intersections of Γ and of other access structures of a particular kind. Then, using
an extension of the techniques of Benaloh and Leichter [53], we generate secret sharing
schemes for the desired access structure.
An immediate consequence of this bound is that the access structures that are close
to access structures with efficient secret sharing schemes also admit efficient schemes,
and that the access structures that are close to access structures requiring large shares
also require large shares. Furthermore, this bound has consequences on cryptographic
schemes and protocols that use secret sharing. For instance, using the results in [49],
we see that close Q2 adversary structures admit secure multiparty computation pro-
tocols of similar complexity, in the passive adversary case. In the context of access
control, for similar policies, we can build attribute-based encryption schemes of similar
complexity [24].
Using the common terminology for functions between metric spaces, we can say that the
optimal information ratio is a Lipschitz function with constant 1. Moreover, we prove
that this constant is optimal, that is, that σ is not Lipschitz for any constant smaller
than 1.
By taking advantage of the combinatorial nature of our main result, we extend this
bound to other models of computation. We are able to bound the formula leafsize and
the monotone span program size for monotone Boolean functions, obtaining analogous
results. In order to understand this property, we also analyze the limitations of the
techniques for finding lower bounds on the information ratio. We study the nature of the
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bounds based on the Shannon inequalities [141, 146], the Razborov rank measure [147],
the critical subfamilies method [148] and submodular formal complexity measures. We
describe the behavior of these bounds when we add or delete subsets from an access
structure.
The search for bounds on the information ratios of close access structures is motivated
by a work by Beimel, Farra`s and Mintz [149]. They presented a method that, given a
secret sharing scheme Σ for an access structure Γ and an access structure Γ′ with Γ′ ⊆ Γ
and min Γ′ ⊆ min Γ, provides a secret sharing scheme for Γ′ (where min Γ stands for
the family of minimal subsets of Γ). They showed that if Γ and Γ′ are graph access
structures, dist(min Γ,min Γ′) is small and Σ is efficient, then the new scheme is also
efficient. We also revise one of these techniques, and we provide an alternative general
combinatorial formulation of a result in [149] that can also be extended to other models
of computation.
In Section 5.2 we define secret sharing, and in Section 5.3 we show preliminary results
about secret sharing and access structures. Section 5.4 is dedicated to our main bound on
the information ratio of secret sharing schemes. In Section 5.5 we analyze the asymptotic
behavior of the optimal information ratio, and Section 5.6 presents other secret sharing
constructions used for bounding the optimal information ratio. Sections 5.7 and 5.8
analyze the existing techniques for finding lower bounds on the information ratio. In
Section 5.9 we present results for Boolean formulas. Finally, we state some conclusions
and open problems in Section 5.10.
5.2 Definition of Secret Sharing
This work is dedicated to unconditionally secure secret sharing schemes. In this section
we define access structure and secret sharing scheme, and we present the complexity
measures used in this work. The definition of secret sharing is taken from [121]. For an
introduction to secret sharing, see for instance [121, 122].
Definition 5.1 (Access Structure). Let P be a set. A collection Γ ⊆ P(P ) is monotone
increasing if B ∈ Γ and B ⊆ C ⊆ P implies C ∈ Γ. An access structure is a collection
Γ ⊆ P(P ) of non-empty subsets of P that is monotone increasing. The family of minimal
subsets in Γ is denoted by min Γ.
Definition 5.2 (Distribution Scheme). Let P = {1, . . . , n} and let K be a finite set. A
distribution scheme on P with domain of secrets K is a pair Σ = (Π, µ), where µ is a
probability distribution on a finite set R, and Π is a mapping from K × R to a set of
n-tuples K1 ×K2 × · · · ×Kn. The set R is called the set of random strings and Kj is
called the domain of shares of j.
For a distribution scheme (Π, µ) and for any A ⊆ P , we denote by ΠA(s, r) the entries
of Π(s, r) indexed by elements in A. If A = {i}, we set Πi(s, r) = ΠA(s, r).
Definition 5.3 (Secret Sharing). Let K be a finite set of secrets with |K| ≥ 2. A
distribution scheme (Π, µ) on P with domain of secrets K is a secret-sharing scheme
realizing an access structure Γ if the following two requirements hold for every A =
{i1, . . . , ir} ⊆ P :
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• If A ∈ Γ, then there exists a reconstruction function ReconA : Ki1× . . .×Kir → K
such that for every k ∈ K,
Pr ( ReconA(ΠA(k, r)) = k ) = 1. (5.1)
• If A /∈ Γ, then for every a, b ∈ K, and for every possible vector of shares v =
(sj)j∈A,
Pr ( ΠA(a, r) = v ) = Pr ( ΠA(b, r) = v ) . (5.2)
In a secret sharing scheme, we usually consider that there is an additional participant
p0 not in P called the dealer. The dealer distributes a secret k ∈ K according to Σ
by first sampling a random string r ∈ R according to µ, computing a vector of shares
Π(k, r) = (s1, . . . , sn), and privately communicating each share sj to party j. The
subsets of participants in P satisfying condition (5.1) are called authorized, and the ones
satisfying condition (5.2) are called forbidden. In this work we just consider perfect
secret sharing schemes, that is, schemes in which every subset of participants is either
authorized or forbidden.
Definition 5.4 (Linear Secret Sharing Scheme). Let F be a finite field. A secret sharing
scheme Σ = (Π, µ) is (F, `)-linear if K = F`, the sets R, K1, . . ., Kn are vector spaces
over F, µ is the uniform distribution on R, and Π is F-linear.
For a secret sharing scheme Σ on P , the information ratio of Σ is defined as
σ(Σ) =
max1≤j≤n log |Kj |
log |K| ,
and the total information ratio of Σ is
σT(Σ) =
∑
1≤j≤n log |Kj |
log |K| .
We say that Σ is ideal if σ(Σ) = 1. In this case, we say that its access structure is ideal
as well.
For an access structure Γ, we define the optimal information ratio σ(Γ) as the infimum
of the information ratio of secret sharing schemes for Γ. Also, we define the optimal
total information ratio σT(Γ) as the infimum of the total information ratio of the secret
sharing schemes for Γ. Analogously, for every power of a prime q we define λq,`(Γ)
and λTq,`(Γ) as the infimum of the information ratios and total information ratios of the
(Fq, `)-linear secret sharing schemes for Γ, respectively. In cases in which the finite field
and the domain of secrets are not relevant, we use λ(Γ) and λT(Γ), the infimum of the
information ratios and total information ratios of the linear secret sharing schemes for Γ.
If a participant i ∈ P does not receive any share from the dealer in a secret sharing
scheme, we set Ki = {⊥}. In this case, we say that i is not relevant in its access
structure because i is not in any subset of min Γ.
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5.3 Preliminaries
First, we introduce some notation on access structures and we recall some of their prop-
erties. We use some definitions that are common in extremal combinatorics. See [150]
for more details.
Let P be a set. We define the distance between B,B′ ⊆ P(P ) as
dist(B,B′) = |B ∪ B′| − |B ∩ B′|,
which is the size of the symmetric difference of the two sets. In this work, we measure
the closeness between families of subsets by this distance. Observe that dist(B,B′) =
|B \ B′|+ |B′ \ B|.
A family of subsets B ⊆ P(P ) is an antichain if A * B for every A,B ∈ B. For any
B ⊆ P(P ) we define minB and maxB as the families of minimal and maximal subsets in
B, respectively. Both minB and maxB are antichains. We define the complementary of
B as Bc = P(P )\B. The degree of i ∈ P in B, denoted by degi B, is defined as the number
of subsets in B containing i. For every set A ⊆ P , we define the closure of a set A as
cl(A) = {B ⊆ P : A ⊆ B}. We also define the closure of B as cl(B) = ⋃A∈B cl(A). The
closure of any family of subsets is monotone increasing, and so it is an access structure.
A family of subsets B ⊆ P(P ) is an access structure if and only if cl(B) = B. If Γ is an
access structure, then cl(min Γ) = Γ and Γc is monotone decreasing.
5.3.1 Some Families of Ideal Access Structures
Now we define three parametrized families of access structures. As we show below,
these access structures admit short formulas and ideal secret sharing schemes. For any
nonempty set A ⊆ P , we define the access structures
FA = {B ⊆ P : B * A}, SA = {B ⊆ P : A ( B}, TA = cl(A).
The access structure TA is the smallest access structure that contains A, and it is usually
called the trivial access structure for A. The access structure SA is TA minus {A}, and
minSA = {A ∪ {p} : p ∈ P \ A} is the sunflower of A [150]. The access structure FA
is the biggest access structure not containing A, and it has just one maximal forbidden
subset, that is A. Its minimal access structure is minFA = {{i} : i /∈ A}.
Now we present secret sharing schemes for the families of access structures FA, SA and
TA introduced above. These secret sharing schemes are ideal, and they are valid for any
finite set of secrets K with |K| ≥ 2. Moreover, if K = F` for some finite field F, then we
show that these access structures also admit ideal (K, `)-linear secret sharing schemes.
Let K = {a0, . . . , am−1} be a set of size m ≥ 2. For the constructions we present below,
we assume that K is a group. In the case that K is not a group, our constructions will
be defined over Zm by using a bijection between K and Zm. Without loss of generality,
let P = {1, . . . , n} and A = {1, . . . , t} for some t ≤ n.
• FA: Since minFA = {{i} : i /∈ A}, the participants in A are not relevant, and so
we just need to define the shares of the participants in P \ A. Let Kj = {⊥} for
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j ∈ A and Kj = K for j ∈ P \ A. In this case there is no need for randomness.
A secret sharing scheme for FA is defined by the mapping Π with Πj(k) = k for
j ∈ P \A.
• SA: For A ( P , consider Kj = K for j = 1, . . . , n, and µ the uniform distribution
on R = Kt. A secret sharing scheme for SA is defined by the mapping Π with
Πj(k, r) = rj for 1 ≤ j ≤ t and Πj(k, r) = k −
∑t
i=1 ri for t+ 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Observe
that adapting this scheme we can construct an ideal secret sharing for any access
structure Γ with min Γ ⊆ minSA. For A = P , we have SP = FP .
• TA: Since minTA = {A}, we just need to define the shares of the participants in
A. Consider Kj = K for j ∈ A, Kj = {⊥} for j ∈ P \ A, and µ the uniform
distribution on R = Kt−1. A secret sharing scheme for TA is defined by the
mapping Π with Πj(k, r) = rj for 1 ≤ j < t and Πt(k, r) = k −
∑t−1
i=1 ri.
Given a secret sharing scheme Σ on P and A ⊆ P , we define Σ|A as the secret sharing
scheme on P in which only the participants in A receive the shares from Σ. The access
structure of Σ|A on P is Γ|A = {B ⊆ P : B ∩A ∈ Γ}, and min(Γ|A) = min Γ ∩ P(A).
5.3.2 ANDs and ORs of Secret Sharing Schemes
For any access structure Γ on P , we can define the Boolean function f : P(P )→ {0, 1}
satisfying f(A) = 1 if and only if A ∈ Γ. This function is monotone increasing because
f(A) ≤ f(B) for every A ⊆ B.
Benaloh and Leichter [53] presented a recursive algorithm that, given a monotone
Boolean formula computing the function f associated to Γ, creates a secret sharing
scheme realizing Γ. The domain of secrets in this construction is Zm, and the scheme
is obtained by translating the AND and OR logic operations into secret sharing opera-
tions [53]. Roughly speaking, the OR of two schemes Σ1 and Σ2 is a scheme in which
the same secret is shared independently by using Σ1 and Σ2. In the case of the AND
operation, the secret s is split into r and s + r, where r is a random value in Zm, and
then r is shared by means of Σ1 and r + s is shared independently by means of Σ2.
Here we consider an extension of the secret sharing operations defined by Benaloh and
Leichter [53] that is valid for arbitrary secret sharing schemes. We define AND and
OR operations between any secret sharing schemes with the same domain of secrets.
Since we did not find a precise description of these extended operations in the literature,
we prefer to define them rigorously. Notice that the properties of these operations are
crucial for our results in σ and λ. The proof of Lemma 5.5 is similar to the one in [53],
but we show it for the sake of completeness.
Let Σ1 = (Π
1, µ1) and Σ2 = (Π
2, µ2) be two secret sharing schemes on a set of partic-
ipants P that have the same domain of secrets K, satisfying that µ1 and µ2 are inde-
pendent probability distributions on some finite sets R1 and R2, and let Πi : K ×Ri →
Ki1 × . . .×Kin for i = 1, 2.
We define the OR of Σ1 and Σ2 as the secret sharing scheme Σ1 ∨ Σ2 = (Π, µ) where
Π : K × R → K1 × . . . × Kn is the mapping with R = R1 × R2, Ki = K1i × K2i for
i = 1, . . . , n, and
Πi(k, r1, r2) = (Π
1
i (k, r1),Π
2
i (k, r2))
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for i = 1, . . . , n; and µ is the product of µ1 and µ2.
To define the AND of Σ1 and Σ2, we need to introduce an additional scheme. Let
Σ3 = (Π
3, µ3) be the ideal secret sharing scheme on P ′ = {1, 2} with access structure
Γ = TP ′ = {P ′} described above, with domain of secrets K, set of random strings
R3 = K, and uniform probability distribution µ3 on K. The AND of Σ1 and Σ2 is the
secret sharing scheme Σ1∧Σ2 = (Π, µ) where Π : K×R→ K1× . . .×Kn is the mapping
with R = R1 ×R2 ×R3, Ki = K1i ×K2i for i = 1, . . . , n, and
Πi(k, r1, r2, r3) = (Π
1
i (Π
3
1(k, r3), r1),Π
2
i (Π
3
2(k, r3), r2))
for i = 1, . . . , n; and µ is the product of µ1, µ2 and µ3.
Lemma 5.5. Let Σ1 and Σ2 be two secret sharing schemes on the same set of par-
ticipants and with the same set of secrets. Let Γ1 and Γ2 be their access structures,
respectively. Then the access structures of the schemes Σ1 ∧Σ2 and Σ1 ∨Σ2 are Γ1 ∩Γ2
and Γ1 ∪ Γ2, respectively.
Proof. Let Recon1A, Recon
2
A and Recon
3
A be the reconstruction functions of the schemes
Σ1, Σ2 and Σ3, respectively. First we prove that the access structure of Σ1∨Σ2 is Γ1∪Γ2.
For a subset A ∈ Γ1, we define ReconA as Recon1A over the elements from Σ1. If A /∈ Γ1
but A ∈ Γ2, we define ReconA as Recon2A over the elements from Σ2. Then subsets in
Γ1 ∪ Γ2 can recover the secret. If A /∈ Γ1 and A /∈ Γ2, then A is forbidden in Σ1 ∨ Σ2,
because for every a, b ∈ K and for every possible vector of shares (sj)j∈A = (s1j , s2j )j∈A,
Pr ( ΠA(a, r1, r2) = (sj)j∈A ) = Pr
(
Π1A(a, r1) = (s
1
j )j∈A
) · Pr (Π2A(a, r2) = (s2j )j∈A )
= Pr
(
Π1A(b, r1) = (s
1
j )j∈A
) · Pr (Π2A(b, r2) = (s2j )j∈A )
= Pr ( ΠA(b, r) = (sj)j∈A ) .
Now we prove that the access structure of Σ1 ∧Σ2 is Γ1 ∩Γ2. For a subset A ∈ Γ1 ∩Γ2,
we can reconstruct the secret by applying Recon3A to the outputs of Recon
1
A and Recon
2
A,
and so A is authorized. If A is neither in Γ1 nor Γ2, then A is forbidden in Σ1 ∧ Σ2.
Now suppose that A is in Γ1 but not in Γ2. For every a, b ∈ K and for every possible
vector of shares (sj)j∈A = (s1j , s
2
j )j∈A,
Pr
(
ΠA(a, r1, r2, r3) = (s
1
j , s
2
j )j∈A
)
=
= Pr
(
Π1A(Π
3
1(a, r3), r1) = (s
1
j )j∈A
) · Pr (Π2A(Π32(a, r3), r2) = (s2j )j∈A )
= Pr
(
Π1A(r3, r1) = (s
1
j )j∈A
) · Pr (Π2A(a− r3, r2) = (s2j )j∈A )
= Pr
(
Π1A(Π
3
1(b, r3), r1) = (s
1
j )j∈A
) · Pr (Π2A(Π32(b, r3), r2) = (s2j )j∈A )
= Pr
(
ΠA(b, r1, r2, r3) = (s
1
j , s
2
j )j∈A
)
,
and so A is forbidden. For A ∈ Γ2 \ Γ1 the proof is analogous, and for A /∈ Γ2 ∩ Γ1 the
proof is immediate.
In both operations, each participant receives a share from Σ1 and a share from Σ2,
so σ(Σ1 ∧ Σ2) = σ(Σ1 ∨ Σ2) ≤ σ(Σ1) + σ(Σ2), and σT(Σ1 ∧ Σ2) = σT(Σ1 ∨ Σ2) =
σT(Σ1) + σ
T(Σ2). Therefore, for every two access structures Γ1 and Γ2 we have that
σ(Γ1 ∪ Γ2) and σ(Γ1 ∩ Γ2) are smaller than or equal to σ(Γ1) + σ(Γ2). Both operations
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preserve linearity. That is, if Σ1 and Σ2 are (F, `)-linear secret sharing scheme for a
finite field F and ` > 0, then both Σ1 ∨ Σ2 and Σ1 ∧ Σ2 are (F, `)-linear.
Now we present two well-known constructions for every access structure Γ [52]. Since
Γ =
⋃
A∈min Γ TA and each TA admits an ideal secret sharing scheme on A, using the OR
operation we can construct a scheme Σ for Γ with σ(Σ) = deg(min Γ) ≤ |min Γ|. Since
Γ =
⋂
A∈max Γc FA and each FA admits an ideal secret sharing scheme on P \A, we can
construct a secret sharing scheme Σ with σ(Σ) ≤ |max Γc|.
Remark 5.6. All the results in this section can be adapted to other kinds of secret sharing
schemes: perfect secret sharing schemes defined by discrete random variables [121],
statistical secret sharing schemes [121], or computational secret sharing schemes [151].
The AND and OR operations can also be defined in these models, but in some cases
they require additional restrictions.
5.4 The Main Result
We dedicate this section to the proof and the analysis of the following theorem, which
is the main result of this work.
Theorem 5.7. Let Γ,Γ′ be two access structures on a set P . Then
|σ(Γ)− σ(Γ′)| ≤ dist(Γ,Γ′).
The approach we follow to give an upper bound for |σ(Γ) − σ(Γ′)| for any two access
structures Γ and Γ′ is the following. Given a secret sharing scheme Σ for Γ, we show a
way to construct a secret sharing scheme Σ′ for Γ′ with σ(Σ′) ≤ σ(Σ) + dist(Γ,Γ′). In
order to do so, we find a description of Γ′ in terms of Γ and some ideal access structures,
which is presented in Lemma 5.8. Then, according to this description, we can construct
Σ′ by reusing Σ in a special form, according to the description of Γ′. This theorem is a
direct consequence of Proposition 5.9.
The motivation for reusing Σ in the construction of Σ′ is that, if Γ and Γ′ are close,
Σ already satisfies most of the reconstruction and privacy requirements we need for Σ′.
Our construction is an elegant method to delete subsets from Γ, that is, to find a solution
for the case Γ′ ⊆ Γ. In this situation, we revoke the right of some subsets in Γ to learn
the secret.
Lemma 5.8. Let Γ,Γ′ be two access structures on P . Then
Γ′ =
(
Γ ∩
⋂
A∈I
FA
)
∪
⋃
A∈J
TA,
where I = max(Γ \ Γ′) and J = min(Γ′ \ Γ).
Proof. Recall that Γ′ = ∪A∈Γ′TA = ∩A/∈Γ′FA. First, consider the following two cases:
1. If Γ ⊆ Γ′, then
Γ′ =
⋃
A∈Γ
TA ∪
⋃
A∈Γ′\Γ
TA = Γ ∪
⋃
A∈J
TA.
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2. If Γ′ ⊆ Γ, then
Γ′ =
⋂
A/∈Γ
FA ∩
⋂
A∈Γ\Γ′
FA = Γ ∩
⋂
A∈I
FA.
Suppose that Γ is not contained in Γ′ and vice versa. Then consider their intersection
and observe that Γ ∩ Γ′ ⊆ Γ. Following the arguments used above in case 2 we obtain
that
Γ ∩ Γ′ = Γ ∩
⋂
A∈I′
FA,
where I ′ = max(Γ \ (Γ ∩ Γ′)) = max(Γ \ Γ′) = I. Since Γ ∩ Γ′ ⊆ Γ′, following the
arguments used above in case 1 we obtain that
Γ′ = (Γ ∩ Γ′) ∪
⋃
A∈J ′
TA,
where J ′ = min(Γ′ \ (Γ ∩ Γ′)) = min(Γ′ \ Γ) = J . This concludes the proof.
Proposition 5.9. Let Γ,Γ′ be two access structures on P . Then
σ(Γ′)− σ(Γ) ≤ |max(Γ \ Γ′)|+ |min(Γ′ \ Γ)|.
Proof. Let Σ be a secret sharing scheme for Γ. By Lemma 5.8, the access structure Γ′
is realized by the secret sharing scheme
Σ′ =
(
Σ ∧
∧
A∈I
ΣFA
)
∨
∨
A∈J
ΣTA ,
where I = max(Γ \ Γ′), J = min(Γ′ \ Γ), and ΣFA and ΣTA are ideal secret sharing
schemes for FA and TA, respectively. Then σ(Σ
′) ≤ σ(Σ) + |I|+ |J |.
Since |max(Γ \ Γ′)| + |min(Γ′ \ Γ)| ≤ |Γ \ Γ′| + |Γ′ \ Γ| = dist(Γ,Γ′), Theorem 5.7 is a
consequence of the previous proposition.
In the proof of Proposition 5.9, we construct a secret sharing scheme for Γ′ in terms of
ANDs and ORs of a scheme for Γ and of schemes for access structures of the form TA
and FA. These access structures admit ideal schemes for any set of secrets. Therefore,
this result is also valid if we restrict ourselves to secret sharing schemes for a particular
secret size, for example to secret sharing schemes sharing one bit. In addition, these
access structures also admit ideal (F, `)-linear secret sharing schemes for any finite field
F, for any nonempty A ⊆ P and for any ` > 0. Hence, if we have an (F, `)-linear secret
sharing scheme realizing Γ, we obtain an (F, `)-linear secret sharing scheme for Γ′.
Corollary 5.10. Let Γ,Γ′ be two access structures on P, and let Fq be a finite field. For
every ` ≥ 1,
|λq,`(Γ)− λq,`(Γ′)| ≤ dist(Γ,Γ′).
As a consequence of the previous results, the access structures that are close to access
structures with efficient secret sharing schemes also admit efficient schemes, and the
access structures that are close to access structures requiring large shares also require
large shares.
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Some applications of secret sharing schemes do not require a complete definition of the
access structure. They require subsets in a family A ⊆ P(P ) to be forbidden, and
subsets in a family B ⊆ P(P ) to be authorized. We say that an access structure Γ is
compatible with A and B if A ⊆ Γc and B ⊆ Γ. If A∪B 6= P(P ), then there is a certain
degree of freedom when choosing the access structure. The number of subsets that are
not required to be authorized or forbidden is r = 2n − (|A|+ |B|). If we know σ(Γ) for
an access structure Γ that is compatible with A and B, then we can deduce that the
smallest optimal information ratio of the access structures compatible with A and B is
at least σ(Γ)− r.
5.4.1 The Lipschitz Constant of the Optimal Information Ratio
Next, we present an example that shows that, for distance equal to one, it is not possible
to improve the general bound in Theorem 5.7 and in Corollary 5.10. More concretely,
we describe access structures Γn, Γ
′
n and Γ
′′
n with n ≥ 3 such that dist(Γ′′n,Γn) =
dist(Γ′′n,Γ′n) = 1 and |σ(Γ′′n) − σ(Γn)| = |σ(Γ′′n) − σ(Γ′n)| = 1 − 1/(n − 2). For dis-
tance greater than one, we do not know whether the bounds in Theorem 5.7 and in
Corollary 5.10 are tight.
Example 5.1. Consider the access structures Γn and Γ
′
n on P = {1, . . . , n} with
min Γn = {{1, i} : 2 ≤ i ≤ n} and min Γ′n = {{1}, {2, . . . , n}}. These access structures
admit ideal secret sharing schemes for every set of secrets, and ideal linear secret shar-
ing schemes for any finite field F. Now consider the access structures Γ′′n with min Γ′′n =
{{1, i} : 2 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {{2, . . . , n}}. Observe that Γ′′n = Γn ∪ {{2, . . . , n}} = Γ′n \ {{1}},
and so dist(Γ′′n,Γn) = dist(Γ′′n,Γ′n) = 1. By Theorem 5.7 and Corollary 5.10, σ(Γ′′n) ≤ 2
and λ(Γ′′n) ≤ 2. It was proved in [81] that λ(Γ′′n) = σ(Γ′′n) = 2− 1/(n− 2) for n ≥ 3.
Now we use the notion of Lipschitz continuity to describe the properties of the opti-
mal information ratio. Let f : X → Y be a function mapping a metric space (X, dX)
to a metric space (Y, dY ), where dX and dY denote the distance functions in the do-
main X and in the range Y , respectively. We say that f has Lipschitz constant k if
dY (f(x), f(y)) ≤ k · dX(x, y) for every x, y ∈ X. In this case we also say that f is
k-Lipschitz.
In the context of this work, we view the information ratio σ as a function whose domain
is Mn, the collection of access structures on {1, . . . , n}, and whose range is R≥1. Observe
that (Mn, dist) and R≥1 with the Euclidean distance are metric spaces. Then, we can
state the following result, which is in fact equivalent to Theorem 5.7.
Corollary 5.11. The optimal information ratio is 1-Lipschitz.
By the Example 5.1, it is not possible to give a better general Lipschitz constant for σ.
The notion of Lipschitz is often used in continuous domains. However, it has also been
used in discrete domains, for example in the study of differential privacy (e.g. [152]). The
Lipschitz property provides valuable information about the sensitivity of the function
when we vary the input. In this case, it illustrates that close access structures have
similar optimal information ratio. Therefore, in Mn we have regions in which the access
structures admit secret sharing schemes with low information ratio, for instance around
ideal access structures. The distribution of these regions and their density in Mn is an
open problem. Moreover, the characterization of the values of R≥1 that have a preimage
by σ is also an open problem.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC TECHNIQUES FOR SECURING DATA IN THE CLOUD 
Jordi Ribes González 
 
124 Local Bounds for the Optimal Information Ratio of Secret Sharing Schemes
5.5 Asymptotic Behavior of the Bound
Our work is focused on the local behavior of the optimal information ratio, and our
results are motivated by the study of the optimal information ratio of access structures
that are close. In this section we analyze the asymptotic behavior of the optimal in-
formation ratio, and the convenience of bounding the difference between the optimal
information ratio of two access structures by the distance between them.
In Section 5.4.1, we presented pairs of access structures at distance one which satisfy
that the difference between their optimal information ratios tends to one. We did not
find an equivalent result for distance greater than one, but we can show some examples
that suggest that our bounds are still useful for large distances, in general.
First, we analyze the bound in Proposition 5.9. Let f : N→ R be a function satisfying
that σ(Γ′)− σ(Γ) ≤ f(r) for every two access structures Γ and Γ′, where r = |max(Γ \
Γ′)| + |min(Γ′ \ Γ)|. Now we consider a well-known family of access structures defined
by Csirmaz in [141], which we denote by F . For every Γ in F , σ(Γ) = Ω(n/ log n),
where n is the number of participants, n = N + logN , and N is the number of minimal
authorized subsets. Observe that, since x/ log x is an increasing function for x > e we
have that n/ log n ≥ N/ logN for N ≥ 3, and so σ(Γ) = Ω(N/ logN).
If we take Γ to be the empty access structure and Γ′ to be in F , we then see that
σ(Γ′) − σ(Γ) = Ω(N/ logN) and that |max(Γ \ Γ′)| + |min(Γ′ \ Γ)| = N . Hence, we
obtain the restriction that f(r) = Ω(r/ log r). Therefore, if it were possible to improve
the bound in Proposition 5.9, it could be improved at most by a logarithmic factor.
Now we analyze the bound in Corollary 5.10. We consider two different families of access
structures, and we analyze the bound using particular results for these families. Let Fq
be a finite field, ` a positive integer, and let g : N → R be a function that satisfies
|λq,`(Γ)−λq,`(Γ′)| ≤ g(d) for every two access structures Γ and Γ′, where d = dist(Γ,Γ′).
Let H be the family of access structures on a set of n participants, n even, in which
all subsets of size strictly greater than n/2 are authorized, and the ones of size strictly
smaller than n/2 are forbidden. There are 2(
n
n/2) access structures in H, including the
n/2-threshold access structure. Observe that for every access structure in H, half of the
access structures in H are at a distance greater than or equal to ( nn/2)/2.
Linear secret sharing schemes can be represented by matrices (see for instance [121,
122]). In an (Fq, `)-linear secret sharing scheme with information ratio at most s, the
dealer is associated to ` rows, which can be considered to be fixed to any set of linearly
independent vectors in F`q. Each participant is associated to at most `s rows, and so
we have at most s`n + ` rows. By linear algebra, since P is an authorized subset, we
can always find an equivalent (Fq, `)-linear secret sharing scheme in which the number
of columns is smaller or equal than the number of rows minus `. Hence, the number
of matrices of this kind is at most qs
2`2n2 . The number of access structures Γ with
λq,`(Γ) ≤ s is thus smaller than qs2`2n2 . Now we take
s =
2n/2−1
`2n5/4
√
log q
.
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Using the property that
(
n
n/2
) ∼ 2n√
pin/2
, if we compare qs
2`2n2 with 2(
n
n/2), we see that
almost all access structures Γ in H satisfy λq,`(Γ) ≥ s. This counting argument is similar
to the one in [153].
We take Γ to be the n/2-threshold access structure. Then there exists Γ′ in H with
λq,`(Γ
′) ≥ s at a distance d = dist(Γ,Γ′), where ( nn/2)/2 ≤ d ≤ ( nn/2). These access
structures satisfy
|λq,`(Γ)− λq,`(Γ′)| ≥ 1 + s = Ω
( √
d
` log(d)
√
log q
)
.
Hence, we obtain the restriction that g(d) = Ω(
√
d/ log d).
Now we consider the family of forbidden graph access structures. Given a graph G =
(V,E), the forbidden graph access structure determined by G is the access structure
on V containing all the pairs in E and all subsets of size at least 3. In this case, the
distance between the access structures determined by G = (V,E) and G′ = (V,E′) is
|E ∪ E′| − |E ∩ E′|. As a consequence of the results in [154], for any two forbidden
graph access structures Γ and Γ′ and for every large enough finite field Fq we have
|λq,1(Γ) − λq,1(Γ′)| = O˜(d1/4), where d = dist(Γ,Γ′). The results in [155] show that
every forbidden graph access structure admits a non-linear secret sharing scheme of
information ratio nO(
√
log logn/ logn) = no(1). This suggests that there may exist a better
bound for |σ(Γ)− σ(Γ′)| for forbidden graph access structures.
5.6 Other Constructions for Close Access Structures
In the previous section, we presented a way to describe an access structure Γ′ in terms
of another access structure Γ. This combinatorial result was used to construct a secret
sharing scheme for Γ′ by using a secret sharing scheme for Γ.
In this section we present a method to construct secret sharing schemes that follows
the same strategy, but which uses different combinatorial results. As in the previous
section, we are able to provide bounds on the optimal information ratio of access struc-
tures. These bounds are useful for access structures whose minimal sets are in a special
disposition. We use combinatorial results that are different from the ones presented in
the previous section. In particular, the results are based on a new combinatorial notion
of (B1,B2)-covering, which will be used to construct secret sharing schemes. The interest
in using (B1,B2)-coverings is that we can transform the problem of finding an efficient
scheme into the search of small coverings, and so translate a secret sharing problem into
a purely combinatorial one.
5.6.1 (B1,B2)-Coverings
We introduce here a notion of covering that will be used to find useful descriptions of
minimal access structures that are close.
Definition 5.12. Let B1,B2 ⊆ P(P ) be two families of subsets satisfying B1∩B2 = ∅. A
family of subsets C ⊆ P(P ) is a (B1,B2)-covering if it satisfies the following properties:
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1. for every A ∈ B1 and for every B ∈ C, A * B, and
2. for every A ∈ B2 there exists B ∈ C such that A ⊆ B.
Example 5.2. Let B ⊆ P(P ) be an antichain and let A ∈ B. Then C = {P \{i} : i ∈ A}
is an ({A},B \ {A})− covering.
Next, we present in Lemma 5.13 a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence
of coverings, and we present in Lemma 5.14 a technical result that is used in the proof
of Theorem 5.15.
Lemma 5.13. Let B1,B2 ⊆ P(P ). There exists a (B1,B2)-covering if and only if
A * B for every A ∈ B1 and B ∈ B2.
Proof. Let C be a (B1,B2)-covering. For every A ∈ B1 and B ∈ B2, cl(A) ∩ C = ∅ and
cl(B)∩ C 6= ∅, so A * B. Conversely, if A * B for every A ∈ B1 and B ∈ B2, then B2 is
a (B1,B2)-covering.
Lemma 5.14. Let B1,B2 ⊆ P(P ). A (B1,B2)-covering is also a (B1,B3)-covering for
every B3 ⊆ B2.
Beimel, Farra`s and Mintz constructed efficient secret sharing schemes for very dense
graphs [149]. Some of these constructions have been recently improved in [156]. The
next theorem abstracts some of the techniques used in [149, Lemma 5.2] and [149, Lemma
5.4]. The proof of the theorem uses colorings of hypergraphs. A coloring of B ⊆ P(P )
with c colors is a mapping µ : P → {1, . . . , c} such that for every A ∈ B there exists
u, v ∈ A with µ(u) 6= µ(v).
Theorem 5.15. Let B1,B2 ⊆
(
P
k
)
be two families of subsets with B1 ∩ B2 = ∅ for
some k > 1. If B1 has degree d, then there is a (B1,B2)-covering of degree at most
2kkkdk−1 lnn.
Proof. Due to Lemma 5.13, if B1 ⊆
(
P
k
)
, the biggest family of subsets B′2 ⊆
(
P
k
)
admitting
a (B1,B′2)-covering is B′2 =
(
P
k
) \ B1. By Lemma 5.14, it is enough to restrict our proof
to the case B2 =
(
P
k
) \ B1.
In order to construct a (B1,B2)-covering, we use colorings of B1. Given a coloring µ of
B1, we consider the family of subsets of elements in P of the same color. Observe that if
all the elements in a subset A ⊆ P have the same color by µ, then it implies that B * A
for every B ∈ B1.
The existence of the covering is proved by using the probabilistic method (see for in-
stance [157]). We choose r = 2kkkdk−1 lnn random colorings µ1, . . . , µr of B1 with 2kd
colors. For every coloring µi, we define Ci = {µ−1i (c) : c is a color of µi}, that is, Ci is
the collection of maximal monochromatic subsets in µi. Now we show that C = ∪ri=1Ci
is a (B1,B2)-covering with probability at least 1− 1/(k!).
Let A = {v1, . . . , vk} ∈ B2. We fix i and compute the probability that A ⊆ B for some
B ∈ Ci, which is equivalent to say that A is monochromatic in µi. Fix an arbitrary
coloring of B1 ∩ P(P \ A) with domain P \ A. We prove that conditioned on this
coloring, the probability that A is monochromatic in an extended coloring of B1 is at
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least 1
2(2kd)k−1 . Let B ∈ B1 with v1 ∈ B. If B \ {v1} is monochromatic, then the color of
v1 must be different from the color of B \ {v1}. Thus, there are at most d colors that v1
cannot take. By extending this argument, we see that there are at most kd colors that
do not allow A to be monochromatic. Thus the probability that v1 is colored by one of
the remaining 2kd− kd colors is at least one half, and the probability that in this case
v2, . . . , vk are colored in the same color as v1 is at least 1/(2kd)
k−1. Then A ⊆ B for
some B ∈ Ci with probability at least 1/(2(2kd)k−1).
The probability that A * B for every B ∈ C is(
1− 1
2(2kd)k−1
)r
≤ e−
r
2(2kd)k−1 =
1
nk
.
Thus, the probability that C is not a (B1,B2)-covering is less than
(
n
k
)
/nk ≤ 1/k!. In
particular, such a covering exists.
This result has also consequences in graph theory, which corresponds to the case k = 2.
It implies that every graph G = (V,E) with E ⊆ (V2) admits an equivalence cover of
degree 16d lnn, where d is the degree of the complementary graph (V,
(
V
2
)\E) (see [149]
for more details).
As we show in the next subsection, the following proposition allows the construction of
Boolean formulas and secret sharing schemes for access structures.
Proposition 5.16. Let Γ,Γ′ be two access structures with min Γ′ ⊆ min Γ. If C is a
(min Γ \min Γ′,min Γ′)-covering, then
min Γ′ = {A ∈ min Γ : A ⊆ B for some B ∈ C}.
Proof. For every subset A ∈ min Γ′, there exists B ∈ C with A ⊆ B. For every A ∈
min Γ \min Γ′, A * B for every B ∈ C, and so the equality holds.
5.6.2 Secret Sharing Constructions Using Coverings
The main result of this subsection is Theorem 5.18. The quality of the bounds in this
theorem depends on the degree of a covering. In Theorem 5.15, we provide a bound
on the degree of coverings. In Example 5.4, we show an access structure for which this
technique provides optimal secret sharing schemes.
Lemma 5.17. Let Γ,Γ′ be two access structures with min Γ′ ⊆ min Γ. Let Σ be a secret
sharing scheme for Γ. If there exists a (min Γ\min Γ′,min Γ′)-covering of degree d, then
there exists a secret sharing scheme Σ′ for Γ′ with
σ(Σ′) ≤ dσ(Σ) and σT(Σ′) ≤ dσT(Σ).
Proof. Let C be a (min Γ\min Γ′,min Γ′)-covering of degree d. We define a secret sharing
scheme Σ′ as the OR of all the secret sharing schemes Σ|A for A ∈ C. By Proposition 5.16,
Σ′ realizes Γ′. In this scheme, each i ∈ P receives degi(C) shares. Since degi(C) ≤ d,
σ(Σ′) ≤ dσ(Σ), and σT(Σ′) = ∑A∈C σT(Σ|A) ≤ dσT(Σ).
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Example 5.3. Let Γ,Γ′ be two access structures with dist(min Γ,min Γ′) = 1 and
min Γ′ ⊆ min Γ. Observe that in this case dist(Γ,Γ′) can be much bigger than 1. As
we saw in Example 5.2, there exists a (min Γ \ min Γ′,min Γ′)-covering C of degree at
most n − 1. Hence, given a secret sharing scheme Σ for Γ we can construct a secret
sharing scheme for Γ′ whose information ratio is less than (n− 1)σ(Σ).
Theorem 5.18. Let Γ,Γ′ be two access structures on P . If there exists a (min Γ \
min Γ′,min Γ′)-covering of degree d, then
σ(Γ′) ≤ dσ(Γ) + t and σT(Γ′) ≤ dσT(Γ) + nt,
where t = deg(min Γ′ \min Γ).
Proof. Let Γ′′ be the access structure defined by min Γ′′ = min Γ′ ∩min Γ. Observe that
min Γ\min Γ′ = min Γ\min Γ′′, and that every (min Γ\min Γ′,min Γ′)-covering is also a
(min Γ \min Γ′′,min Γ′′)-covering by Lemma 5.14. Given a secret sharing scheme Σ for
Γ, there is a secret sharing scheme Σ′′ for Γ′′ with σ(Σ′′) ≤ dσ(Σ) and σT(Σ′′) ≤ dσT(Σ)
by Lemma 5.17. Then, using the construction in the proof of Proposition 5.9, we can
construct a secret sharing scheme Σ′ with access structure Γ′ as Σ′ = Σ′′ ∨ Σ′′′, where
Σ′′′ =
∨
A∈I ΣTA and I = min(Γ
′ \ Γ′′) = min Γ′ \min Γ.
In Example 5.3, we studied the case of two access structures Γ and Γ′ such that
dist(min Γ,min Γ′) = 1, and the technique we described can be extended to distances
greater than 1. By Theorems 5.15 and 5.18, if min Γ′ ⊆ min Γ, |A| ≤ k for every
A ∈ min Γ, and if the degree of min Γ \ min Γ′ is d, then σ(Γ′) ≤ (2kkkdk−1 lnn)σ(Γ).
This result was proved in [149], and it was improved for the case k = 2 [149, Theorem
6.1]. The covering technique has also been studied in [86], which describes other methods
to find lower bounds and constructions.
In the following example, we use a technique involving coverings to construct an optimal
secret sharing scheme.
Example 5.4. Let P be a set of n = 2` + 1 participants for some ` > 0. Consider a
partition P = {a} ∪ P1 ∪ P2, where |P1| = |P2| = `. Let Γ be the 2-threshold access
structure on P and let Σ be an ideal secret sharing scheme for Γ. Let Γ′ be the access
structure on P with min Γ′ =
(
P
2
) \ {{a, b} : b ∈ P2}. By [149, Theorem 7.1], it holds
that σT(Γ′) ≥ n+ ` = 3`+ 1. Now we prove that this bound is tight.
Let C = {C1, C2} be the (min Γ \min Γ′,min Γ′)-covering with C1 = {a} ∪ P1 and C2 =
P1∪P2. Using the construction described in Lemma 5.17, we obtain that Σ′ = Σ|C1∨Σ|C2
is a secret sharing scheme for Γ′. It satisfies σT(Σ′) = σT(Σ|C1)+σT(Σ|C2) = `+1+2` =
3`+ 1. Therefore we conclude that σT(Γ′) = n+ `.
5.6.3 A Construction Using Sunflowers
In Proposition 5.20, we present another secret sharing construction that follows a pro-
cedure analogous to the one in Theorem 5.7, which uses a different description of the
access structures.
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Lemma 5.19. Let Γ,Γ′ be two access structures on P . Let Γ˜ be the access structure
defined by min Γ˜ = (min Γ) ∩ Γ′. Then
Γ′ = Γ˜ ∪
⋃
A∈Γ\Γ′
GA ∪
⋃
A∈J
TA,
where GA = cl((minSA) ∩ Γ′) and J = min(Γ′ \ Γ).
Proof. Let Γ′′ = Γ ∩ Γ′. According to Lemma 5.8, we can describe Γ′ as Γ′ = Γ′′ ∪⋃
A∈J TA. We dedicate the rest of the proof to show that Γ
′′ = Γ˜ ∪⋃A∈Γ\Γ′ GA. Since
Γ = min Γ ∪⋃A∈Γ minSA, we have that
Γ′′ = cl(Γ′′) = cl(Γ ∩ Γ′) = cl((min Γ ∪ (Γ \min Γ)) ∩ Γ′)
= cl((min Γ) ∩ Γ′) ∪
⋃
A∈Γ
GA = Γ˜ ∪
⋃
A∈Γ
GA.
Let B1 = Γ \ Γ′, B2 = min(Γ∩ Γ′), and B3 = (Γ∩ Γ′) \min(Γ∩ Γ′). Let Ai =
⋃
A∈Bi GA
for i = 1, 2, 3. Observe that B1 ∪ B2 ∪ B3 = Γ, that Γ′′ = Γ˜ ∪ A1 ∪ A2 ∪ A3 and that
A3 ⊆ A2.
We claim that A2 ⊆ Γ˜ ∪ A1. Let A ∈ B2. If A ∈ min Γ, then A ∈ Γ˜ because B2 ⊆ Γ′,
and so minSA ⊆ Γ˜. Suppose that A /∈ min Γ. Then there exists B ∈ Γ satisfying
A ∈ minSB, and in particular A ∈ (minSB) ∩ Γ′. Since A ∈ min(Γ ∩ Γ′), we have that
B ∈ Γ \ (Γ ∩ Γ′) = Γ \ Γ′ = B1. Then cl(minSA) ⊆ cl(A) ⊆ GB. Therefore A2 ⊆ Γ˜ ∪A1
and so Γ′′ = Γ˜ ∪ A1, which concludes the proof.
Proposition 5.20. Let Γ,Γ′ be two access structures. Let Γ˜ be the access structure with
min Γ˜ = (min Γ) ∩ Γ′. Then
σ(Γ′) ≤ σ(Γ˜) + dist(Γ′,Γ).
Proof. Let Σ and Σ˜ be secret sharing schemes for Γ and Γ˜, respectively. We use
Lemma 5.19 to construct a secret sharing scheme for Γ′. Observe that for every A ∈ Γ,
(minSA) ∩ Γ′ ⊆ minSA. Hence, using the scheme described for SA in Section 5.3 we
can construct an ideal secret sharing scheme for GA, which we call Σ
′′
A. Then the access
structure Γ′ is realized by the secret sharing scheme
Σ′ =
(
Σ˜ ∨
∨
A∈Γ\Γ′
Σ′′A
)
∨
∨
A∈Γ′\Γ
ΣTA ,
where ΣTA is an ideal secret sharing scheme for TA. It satisfies σ(Σ
′) ≤ σ(Σ˜) + |Γ \Γ′|+
|Γ′ \ Γ| = σ(Σ˜) + dist(Γ,Γ′).
Theorem 5.7 and Proposition 5.20 are based on similar constructions, but they cannot
be compared, in general.
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5.7 Lower Bounds on the Information Ratio
In this section, and in the following one, we study techniques for finding lower bounds
on the information ratio. For these bounds, we analyze the effect of adding and deleting
subsets in the access structure
If we view the secret and the shares of a scheme as random variables, we can compute the
entropy of the secret and of the shares. Then, we can obtain bounds on the information
ratio using the Shannon information inequalities and other information inequalities (see
for instance [121, 146, 158]). We study the lower bound on σ(Γ) introduced by Mart´ı-
Farre´ and Padro´ [146], which is denoted by κ(Γ). The bound κ exploits the connection
between secret sharing schemes and polymatroids, and we present it in the following.
The value of κ for an access structure can also be obtained by requiring the Shannon
inequalities on the entropies of the shares and the secret (see [122, 141] for more details).
The main result in this section is Theorem 5.23, which shows a property of κ that is
analogous to the one in Theorem 5.7. We dedicate Section 5.7.1 to the proof of this
theorem.
Definition 5.21. A polymatroid is a pair S = (Q, f) formed by a finite set Q, the
ground set , and a rank function f : P(Q)→ R satisfying the following properties.
• f(∅) = 0.
• f is monotone increasing : if X ⊆ Y ⊆ Q, then f(X) ≤ f(Y ).
• f is submodular : f(X ∪ Y ) + f(X ∩ Y ) ≤ f(X) + f(Y ) for every X,Y ⊆ Q.
Additionally, if f(X) ≤ |X| for every X ⊆ Q and f is integer-valued, then we say that
S is a matroid.
Definition 5.22. Let Γ be an access structure on P and let S = (Q, f) be a polymatroid
with Q = P ∪ {p0}. Then S is a Γ-polymatroid if f({p0}) = 1 and if it satisfies the
following properties for every A ⊆ P :
• If A ∈ Γ then f(A ∪ {p0}) = f(A).
• If A /∈ Γ then f(A ∪ {p0}) = f(A) + 1.
For every access structure Γ on P , we define κ(Γ) as the infimum of maxp∈P f(p) over
all Γ-polymatroids S = (Q, f). It satisfies σ(Γ) ≥ κ(Γ) [146]. Most of the known lower
bounds on the optimal information ratio have been obtained by computing the exact
value of κ, or by computing lower bounds on κ. The exact value of κ can be obtained by
solving a linear programming problem. More details about this technique can be found
in [158]. Next, we present the main result of this section.
Theorem 5.23. Let Γ,Γ′ be two access structures on P . Then
|κ(Γ)− κ(Γ′)| ≤ dist(Γ,Γ′).
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The proof of this theorem is constructive, and resembles that of Theorem 5.7. In this
case we show that, given a Γ-polymatroid, we can construct a Γ′-polymatroid in which
the rank of the singletons increases at most by dist(Γ,Γ′). The proof requires new
technical lemmas and constructions on polymatroids and we defer it to Section 5.7.1.
The access structures presented in Example 5.1 have the property that σ and κ coincide,
and so we have the same asymptotic behavior for κ. That is, κ is 1-Lipschitz and it is
not possible to give a better general Lipschitz constant for κ.
An access structure Γ is a matroid port if there exists a Γ-polymatroid S that is a matroid.
If Γ is a matroid port, then κ(Γ) = 1 [143, 146]. As a consequence of Theorem 5.23, the
κ value of access structures that are close to matroid ports is small. Mart´ı-Farre´ and
Padro´ [146] showed that, if an access structure Γ is not a matroid port, then κ(Γ) ≥ 3/2.
Hence, if Γ is at distance 1 of a matroid port it holds that 3/2 ≤ κ(Γ) ≤ 2.
Csirmaz [141] proved that κ(Γ) ≤ n for every access structure Γ. Therefore, the previous
theorem only provides useful bounds for access structures that are very close. However,
it illustrates the nature of the optimization problems with restrictions derived from
Shannon inequalities and the access structure, which may be interesting for other results
of information theory.
Recently, this method has been extended to non-Shannon inequalities, for instance
in [158–160]. For an access structure Γ on P and for a family of information inequali-
ties or rank inequalities I, we can define κI(Γ) as the infimum of maxp∈P f(p) over all
Γ-polymatroids satisfying the restrictions of I. An interesting open problem is to study
for which restrictions I Theorem 5.23 can be extended to κI .
5.7.1 Proof of Theorem 5.23
This subsection is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 5.23. Here we use notation intro-
duced in [160, 161] to describe polymatroids and some technical results in [161]. For a
function F : P(Q)→ R and subsets X,Y, Z ⊆ Q, we denote
∆F (Y :Z|X) = F (X ∪ Y ) + F (X ∪ Z)− F (X ∪ Y ∪ Z)− F (X)
and ∆F (Y :Z) = ∆F (Y :Z|∅). Observe that ∆F (Y :Z|X) = ∆F (Y :X ∪ Z)−∆F (Y :X).
In order to simplify the notation, we write F (x) instead of F ({x}) for any x ∈ Q.
Proposition 5.24 ([161]). A map f : P(Q) → R is the rank function of a polymatroid
with ground set Q if and only if f(∅) = 0 and ∆f (y :z|X) ≥ 0 for every X ⊆ Q and
y, z ∈ Q \X.
If S = (Q, f) is a Γ-polymatroid, then ∆f (p0 :A) = 1 if A ∈ Γ and ∆f (p0 :A) = 0 if A /∈ Γ.
In this case, f(A ∪ {p0}) = f(A) + 1−∆f (p0 :A) for every A ⊆ P . Next, we enumerate
some properties of Γ-polymatroids that will be used in the proof of Proposition 5.26.
Lemma 5.25. Let Γ be an access structure and let S = (Q, f) be a Γ-polymatroid.
Then, for every A ⊆ Q and p, q ∈ Q \A we have
p1) ∆f (p:p|A) = f(p ∪A)− f(A) ≥ 0.
p2) ∆f (p:A ∪ {q}) ≥ ∆f (p:A)
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p3) ∆f (p:q|A ∪ {p0})−∆f (p:q|A) =
= ∆f (p0 :A ∪ {p, q}) + ∆f (p0 :A)−∆f (p0 :A ∪ {p})−∆f (p0 :A ∪ {q}).
Below we define the AND and OR operations on Γ-polymatroids. We show in Proposi-
tion 5.26 that these operations are well defined and that the resulting polymatroids are
associated to the intersection and union of access structures, respectively.
Proposition 5.26. Let Γ1 and Γ2 be two access structures on P . Let S1 = (Q, f1) be
a Γ1-polymatroid and S2 = (Q, f2) a Γ2-polymatroid. Let f1 ∨ f2 and f1 ∧ f2 be the real
functions on Q satisfying that for every A ⊆ P
• (f1 ∨ f2)(A) = f1(A) + f2(A)−min{∆f1(p0 :A),∆f2(p0 :A)}
• (f1 ∨ f2)(A ∪ {p0}) = f1(A ∪ {p0}) + f2(A ∪ {p0})− 1
• (f1 ∧ f2)(A) = f1(A) + f2(A)
• (f1∧f2)(A∪{p0}) = f1(A∪{p0})+f2(A∪{p0})+max{∆f1(p0 :A),∆f2(p0 :A)}−1
Then the pair (Q, f1 ∨ f2) is a Γ1 ∪ Γ2-polymatroid, and (Q, f1 ∧ f2) is a Γ1 ∩ Γ2-
polymatroid. These polymatroids are denoted by S1 ∨ S2 and S1 ∧ S2, respectively.
Proof. First we prove that S1 ∨S2 and S1 ∧S2 are polymatroids using Proposition 5.24.
We show that ∆f1∨f2(p:q|A) ≥ 0 and ∆f1∨f2(p:q|A ∪ {p0}) ≥ 0 for every p, q ∈ Q and
A ⊆ P and then we show the same property for f1 ∧ f2. By p1) in Lemma 5.25, it is
enough to check it for p 6= q, and so we can split the proof into the following 6 different
cases.
Let A ⊆ P and let p, q ∈ P . In order to simplify the notation, we define the set
Ap = A ∪ {p} and, analogously, Ap0, Aq and Apq.
1. ∆f1∨f2(p:q|A) = ∆f1(p:q|A) + ∆f2(p:q|A) + a− b, where
a = min{∆f1(p0 :Apq),∆f2(p0 :Apq)}+ min{∆f1(p0 :A),∆f2(p0 :A)}, and
b = min{∆f1(p0 :Ap),∆f2(p0 :Ap)}+ min{∆f1(p0 :Aq),∆f2(p0 :Aq)}.
Suppose that a < b. If a = 0 then ∆f1(p0 :Apq) = 0 or ∆f2(p0 :Apq) = 0. By
p2) of Lemma 5.25, this implies that b = 0. Hence, we can restrict ourselves to
the case a = 1 and b = 2. In this case, there exists some i ∈ {1, 2} for which
∆fi(p0 :Apq) = ∆fi(p0 :Ap) = ∆fi(p0 :Aq) = 1 and ∆fi(p0 :A) = 0. Using p3) of
Lemma 5.25, we have that
a− b =∆fi(p0 :Apq) + ∆fi(p0 :A)−∆fi(p0 :Ap)−∆fi(p0 :Aq)
=∆fi(p:q|Ap0)−∆fi(p:q|A)
Therefore ∆f1(p:q|A) + ∆f2(p:q|A) + a− b ≥ 0.
2. ∆f1∨f2(p:p0|A) = ∆f1∨f2(p0 :Ap)−∆f1∨f2(p0 :A)
= max{∆f1(p0 :Ap),∆f2(p0 :Ap)} −max{∆f1(p0 :A),∆f2(p0 :A)}.
This is non-negative by property p2) of Lemma 5.25.
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3. ∆f1∨f2(p:q|Ap0) = ∆f1(p:q|Ap0) + ∆f2(p:q|Ap0) ≥ 0.
4. ∆f1∧f2(p:q|A) = ∆f1(p:q|A) + ∆f2(p:q|A) ≥ 0.
5. ∆f1∧f2(p:p0|A) = ∆f1∧f2(p0 :Ap)−∆f1∧f2(p0 :A)
= min{∆f1(p0 :Ap),∆f2(p0 :Ap)} −min{∆f1(p0 :A),∆f2(p0 :A)}.
It is non-negative by property p2) of Lemma 5.25.
6. ∆f1∧f2(p:q|A ∪ {p0}) = ∆f1∨f2(p:q|A) because f1 ∧ f2(Ap0) = f1 ∨ f2(A) + 1.
Hence, it is also non-negative.
Therefore, S1∨S2 and S1∧S2 are polymatroids. Observe that f1∨f2(p0) = f1∧f2(p0) =
1. Since ∆f1∨f2(p0 :A) = max{∆f1(p0 :A),∆f2(p0 :A)}, we have that ∆f1∨f2(p0 :A) = 1
if and only if A ∈ Γ1 or A ∈ Γ2, and so S1 ∨ S2 is a Γ1 ∪ Γ2-polymatroid. Since
∆f1∧f2(p0 :A) = min{∆f1(p0 :A),∆f2(p0 :A)}, we have that ∆f1∧f2(p0 :A) = 1 if and only
if A ∈ Γ1 and A ∈ Γ2, and so S1 ∧ S2 is a Γ1 ∩ Γ2-polymatroid.
Proof of Theorem 5.23. The proof of this theorem is analogous to the proof of Theo-
rem 5.7. Let A ⊆ P . We define the TA-polymatroid STA = (Q, h) as the one satisfying
h(B) = |B ∩ A| for every B ⊆ P , and ∆h(p0 : B) = 1 if and only if A ⊆ B. We define
the FA-polymatroid SFA = (Q, h) as the one satisfying h(B) = 1 if |B ∩ (P \ A)| 6= 0
and h(B) = 0 otherwise, and ∆h(p0 : B) = 1 if and only if |B ∩ (P \A)| > 0.
Let S be a Γ-polymatroid. By Lemma 5.8, the following construction is a Γ′-polymatroid:
S ′ =
(
S ∧
∧
A∈I
SFA
)
∨
∨
A∈J
STA ,
where I = max(Γ \ Γ′) and J = min(Γ′ \ Γ). Then κ(Γ′) ≤ κ(Γ) + |Γ \ Γ′| + |Γ′ \ Γ| =
κ(Γ) + dist(Γ,Γ′).
5.8 Bounds for Linear Secret Sharing Schemes
For any finite field F, every (F, 1)-linear secret sharing scheme Σ is equivalent to a
monotone span program of size σT(Σ) (see [121] for more details). Since the bounds
studied in this section are bounds on the total information ratio of (F, 1)-linear secret
sharing schemes, we have the same results for the size of monotone span programs.
Next, we present a formulation of the Razborov rank measure [147] that is adapted to
the context of secret sharing and access structures.
5.8.1 Razborov Rank Measure
Let Γ be an access structure on P , and let U ⊆ Γ and V ⊆ Γc be two families of subsets.
For any U0 ⊆ U and V0 ⊆ V , we say that the Cartesian product U0 × V0 is a (U, V )-
rectangle. For each i ∈ P , define the (U, V )-rectangle Ri = (U × V ) ∩ (T{i} × F{i}).
Denote the set of all such rectangles by RΓ(U, V ) = {R1, . . . , Rn}.
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Let F be a field and let A be any |U |× |V | matrix over F with rows indexed by elements
of U and columns indexed by elements of V . The restriction of A to the rectangle
R = U0 × V0 is the submatrix A R obtained by setting to 0 all entries not indexed by
elements of R.
Definition 5.27 ([147]). Let Γ ⊆ P(P ) be an access structure, U ⊆ Γ, V ⊆ Γc. Let F
be a field and let A be a |U | × |V | matrix over F. If rank(A) > 0, the rank measure of
Γ with respect to A is given by
µA(Γ) =
rank(A)
maxR∈RΓ(U,V ) rank(A R)
.
If rank(A) = 0, we set µA(Γ) = 0. We accordingly define the rank measure of Γ as
µ(Γ) = max
A
µA(Γ),
where the maximum is taken over all families of subsets U ⊆ Γ, V ⊆ Γc and all matrices
A of the form stated above.
Razborov [147] showed that the rank measure of a monotone Boolean function is a lower
bound on the size of the shortest formula for this function (see Section 5.9). Later,
Ga´l [162] proved that the rank measure is also a lower bound on the size of monotone
span programs. Taking into account the connection between monotone span programs
and linear secret sharing schemes mentioned above, we obtain that the rank measure is
a lower bound on the optimal information ratio for linear secret sharing schemes. More
concretely, we have the following result.
Theorem 5.28. Let Γ ⊆ P(P ) an access structure, U ⊆ Γ, V ⊆ Γc. Let Fq be a field
and let A be a |U | × |V | matrix over Fq. Then,
µA(Γ) ≤ λTq,1(Γ).
In the following theorem, we study the behavior of the rank measure when we add or
delete subsets from an access structure.
Proposition 5.29. Let Γ,Γ′ ⊆ P(P ) be access structures, U ⊆ Γ, V ⊆ Γc. Let F be a
field and let A be a |U | × |V | matrix over F. Then, there exist U ′ ⊆ Γ′, V ′ ⊆ Γ′c and a
|U ′| × |V ′| matrix A′ such that
µA(Γ) ≤ µA′(Γ′) + dist(Γ,Γ′).
Proof. Set U ′ = U ∩ Γ′ and V ′ = V ∩ Γ′c, and let A′ be the restriction of A to U ′ × V ′.
Then, observe that |U\U ′| ≤ |Γ\Γ′|, since U\U ′ = U\Γ′ and U ⊆ Γ. Similarly, we see
that |V \V ′| ≤ |Γ′\Γ| by using Γc\Γ′c = Γ′\Γ. Since A′ is the submatrix obtained by
setting to 0 all rows of A indexed by U\U ′ and all columns indexed by V \V ′, we have
rank(A) ≤ rank(A′) + |U\U ′|+ |V \V ′| ≤ rank(A′) + dist(Γ,Γ′).
LetRΓ(U, V ) = {R1, . . . , Rn} andRΓ′(U ′, V ′) = {R′1, . . . , R′n}. SinceR′i = Ri∩(U ′×V ′),
we have that A′ R′i is a submatrix of A Ri , and thus rank(A Ri) ≥ rank(A′ R′i). Hence,
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max
R∈RΓ(U,V )
rank(A R) ≥ max
R′∈RΓ′ (U ′,V ′)
rank(A′ R′).
Given a rectangle R ∈ RΓ(U, V ), let R′ = R∩ (U ′×V ′). Note that A′ R′ is a submatrix
of A R, and so rank(A R) ≥ rank(A′ R′). Since the map RΓ(U, V ) → RΓ′(U ′, V ′)
given by R 7→ R ∩ (U ′ × V ′) is exhaustive, we get the inequality
max
R∈RΓ(U,V )
rank(A R) ≥ max
R′∈RΓ′ (U ′,V ′)
rank(A′ R′).
By using the previous inequalities, we see that
µA(Γ) =
rank(A)
maxR∈RΓ(U,V ) rank(A R)
≤ rank(A
′) + dist(Γ,Γ′)
maxR′∈R′Γ′ (U ′,V ′) rank(A
′ R′)
≤ µA′(Γ′) + dist(Γ,Γ′).
Theorem 5.30. Let Γ,Γ′ ⊆ P(P ) be access structures. Then
|µ(Γ)− µ(Γ′)| ≤ dist(Γ,Γ′).
Proof. Let A be the |U |×|V |matrix such that µ(Γ) = µA(Γ), and let A′ be the restriction
of A to U ′ × V ′, where U ′ = U ∩ Γ′ and V ′ = V ∩ Γ′c. By Proposition 5.29 we
have µ(Γ) ≤ µA′(Γ′) + dist(Γ,Γ′). Now, by definition µA′(Γ′) ≤ µ(Γ′), so µ(Γ) ≤
µ(Γ′) + dist(Γ,Γ′).
Note that the behavior of the rank measure bound is different from that of λTq,1. If we
extend the bound on Corollary 5.10 to λT we have that |λTq,`(Γ)−λTq,`(Γ′)| ≤ n·dist(Γ,Γ′)
for every two access structures Γ and Γ′.
Recently, in [163], the rank measure bound has been used to prove that for every prime
p there exist access structures Γp for which λTq,1(Γ
p) = 2Ω(n) for every finite field Fq
of characteristic different from p. Let P = P2 ∪ P3, where P2 = {1, . . . , n} and P3 =
{n+1, . . . , 2n}. Let Γ be the access structure P with Γ|P2 = Γ2 and Γ|P3 = Γ3 satisfying
that for every A ∈ min Γ either A ⊆ P2 or A ⊆ P3. This access structure satisfies
λTq,1(Γ) = 2
Ω(n) for every finite field Fq.
5.8.2 Critical Subfamilies
The next technique provides lower bounds on the size of the shares for linear secret
sharing schemes. It was first introduced in [148].
Definition 5.31. Let Γ be an access structure and let H ⊆ min Γ. We say that H is a
critical subfamily for Γ, if every H ∈ H contains a set TH ⊆ H, |TH | ≥ 2, such that the
following two conditions are satisfied
• The set TH uniquely determines H in the subfamily H: No other set in H contains
TH .
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• For any subset Y ⊆ TH , the set SY = ∪A∈H, A∩Y 6=∅A \ Y does not contain any
member of min Γ.
Theorem 5.32 ([148]). Let Fq be a finite field. Let Γ be an access structure and let H
be a critical subfamily for Γ. Then λTq,1(Γ) ≥ |H|.
Given a critical subfamily for an access structure Γ, it is easy to construct a critical
subfamily for an access structure Γ′ obtained by deleting some subsets from Γ or from
min Γ. However, it is not easy to find a critical subfamily for access structures that are
obtained by adding subsets to Γ or to min Γ.
Lemma 5.33. Let H be the critical subfamily for an access structure Γ. Let Γ′ be an
access structure with min Γ′ ⊆ min Γ and |min Γ \min Γ′| = `, and let Γ′′ be an access
structure with Γ′′ ⊆ Γ and |Γ \ Γ′′| = `. Then there exist two critical subfamilies H′ and
H′′ for Γ′ and Γ′′, respectively, with |H′| ≥ |H| − ` and |H′′| ≥ |H| − `.
Proof. The families of subsets H′ = H∩min Γ′ and H′′ = H∩Γ′′ are critical subfamilies
for Γ′ and Γ′′, respectively.
5.9 Formulas for Monotone Boolean Functions
In this section, we apply the approach of Section 5.4 to study the behavior of the
complexity measures associated to monotone Boolean functions. Informally, our results
show that similar monotone Boolean functions have close complexity measures. In the
first subsection, we aim at giving similar bounds as those in Theorems 5.7 and 5.18
and to Proposition 5.20 for the leafsize of monotone Boolean functions. In the second
subsection, we study the family of submodular complexity measures. For an introduction
to Boolean functions, see for instance [164, 165].
5.9.1 Definitions
A Boolean function is a function of the form f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} for some n ≥ 1.
We also see the domain of a Boolean function as the power set of P = {1, . . . , n}
via the bijection {0, 1}n → P(P ) given by (xi)i∈P 7→ {i ∈ P : xi = 1}. Then we
denote by Γf the collection of elements A ∈ P(P ) such that f(A) = 1. A Boolean
function f is called monotone if Γf is an access structure. In this case, we denote
min f = min Γf . If the domain of a Boolean function f is {0, 1}n, we say f is fanin-n.
For two monotone fanin-n Boolean functions f, f ′, we define the distance between f and
f ′ as dist(f, f ′) = dist(Γf ,Γ′f ).
Given a Boolean function f : P(P )→ {0, 1} and a set B ⊆ P , we define the restriction
of f to B as the Boolean function f |B : P(P ) → {0, 1} given by f |B (A) = f(A ∩ B).
We have that Γf |B = Γf |B.
If Φ, g1, . . . , gm are Boolean functions and Φ is fanin-m, we can define a Boolean function
Φ(g1, . . . , gm) by applying all the outputs of g1, . . . , gm to Φ in an orderly manner. For
i ∈ P , we denote the i-th input variable by xi. Note that xi can be seen as the monotone
Boolean function satisfying Γxi = T{i}.
We now define formulas and some related concepts.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC TECHNIQUES FOR SECURING DATA IN THE CLOUD 
Jordi Ribes González 
 
5.9. Formulas for Monotone Boolean Functions 137
Definition 5.34. Let Ω be a set of Boolean functions. A formula S over Ω is a sequence
(g1, . . . , gm) of Boolean functions such that
• the first k Boolean functions g1, . . . , gk are input variables,
• for every gj that is not an input variable, there exists Φ ∈ Ω and `1, . . . , `dj < j
such that gj = Φ(g`1 , . . . , g`dj ), and
• for every gj other than gm, there exists a single function in S that is computed
using gj (i.e., gj is fanout-1).
We say a formula S = (g1, . . . , gm) computes a Boolean function f if f = gm. We say
that a formula over Ω is monotone if Ω = {∧,∨}. Similarly, we say it is deMorgan if
Ω = {∧,∨,¬} and the gate ¬ can only be applied to input variables.
Let Ff and Fg be formulas computing monotone Boolean functions f and g, respectively.
Then, Ff∧Fg denotes the formula computing the Boolean function h = f∧g = max{f, g}
built by appending the AND of the outputs of Ff and Fg. We then have Γh = Γf ∩ Γg.
Similarly, Ff ∨ Fg denotes the formula computing the Boolean function h′ = f ∨ g =
min{f, g} built by appending the OR of the outputs of Ff and Fg, and we have Γh′ =
Γf ∪Γg. For every formula F and B ⊆ P , we define F |B as the formula that is obtained
by replacing xi by 0 for every i /∈ B. If F computes a function f , then F |B computes f |B.
5.9.2 Bounds on the Size of Formulas
We now analyze the minimal leafsize L, which is a complexity measure attached to
monotone Boolean functions. The leafsize of a formula is defined as the number of
input variables in it. We define the deMorgan (resp. monotone) minimal leafsize L(f)
(resp. L+(f)) of a Boolean function f as the smallest leafsize over all deMorgan (resp.
monotone) formulas computing f . We state our results here in terms of L, but they
all hold verbatim for L+. Moreover, our results can be adapted to other complexity
measures, such as the size of Boolean formulas and of circuits.
Before stating our results, we give formulas and complexity measures for particular
families of Boolean functions. We start with the Boolean functions associated to the
access structures TA, FA, SA defined in Section 5.3, and we proceed with the restriction
f |B of a Boolean function f to B ⊆ P .
The functions fTA and fFA admit the formulas
∧
i∈A xi and
∨
i∈P\A xi, which have leaf-
sizes |A| and n − |A|, respectively. Since SA = TA ∩ FA, we have that
(∧
i∈A xi
) ∧
(
∨
i∈P\A xi) is a formula for fSA with leafsize n.
We now consider the restriction f |B : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} of a Boolean function f . By
applying the restriction xi = 0 for all i /∈ B to a minimal monotone or deMorgan
formula for f , and by removing redundant input variables and Boolean functions, we
get a formula for f |B. Therefore L(f |B) ≤ L(f).
Next, we present analogous results to Theorems 5.7 and 5.18 and Proposition 5.20 for
the minimal leafsize of monotone Boolean functions. The following proposition shows
that close monotone Boolean functions have similar minimal leafsizes.
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Proposition 5.35. For every two monotone Boolean functions f and f ′,
|L(f)− L(f ′)| ≤ n · dist(f, f ′).
Proof. Let F be a formula computing f . Let I = max(Γ \ Γ′) and let J = min(Γ′ \ Γ).
Using Lemma 5.8 with Γ = Γf and Γ
′ = Γf ′ we see that
F ′ = (F ∧
∧
A∈I
GA) ∨
∨
A∈J
HA
is a formula computing f ′, where GA and HA are the formulas for FA and TA described
above, respectively. Hence,
L(f ′) ≤ L(f) +
∑
A∈I
|P\A|+
∑
A∈J
|A| ≤ L(f) + n · dist(Γ,Γ′).
The proofs of the next results follow a similar strategy than the proofs of Theorem 5.18
and Proposition 5.20.
Proposition 5.36. Let f, f ′ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be two monotone Boolean functions. If
there exists a (min f \min f ′,min f ′ ∩min f ′)-covering of degree d, then
L(f ′) ≤ dL(f) + nt,
where t = deg(min f ′\min f).
Proof. Let C be a (min f \min f ′,min f ∩min f ′)-covering, and take A ∈ min f . In this
case, A ∈ min f ′ if and only if there exists B ∈ C such that A ⊆ B. Hence min f ∩
min f ′ =
⋃
B∈C(min f ∩ P(B)). Now, since min f ′ = (min f ∩min f ′) ∪ (min f ′\min f),
Γf ′ = cl(min f
′)
= cl(min f ∩min f ′) ∪ cl(min f ′\min f)
=
(⋃
B∈C
cl(min f ∩ P(B))
)
∪
⋃
A∈min f ′\min f
TA
=
(⋃
B∈C
Γf |B
)
∪
⋃
A∈min f ′\min f
TA.
Hence, if HA is the formula for TA described above, the formula
F ′ =
(∨
B∈C
F |B
)
∨
∨
A∈min f ′\min f
HA
computes f ′.
Proposition 5.37. Let f, f ′ be two monotone Boolean functions, and let f˜ be the mono-
tone Boolean function with min f˜ = min f ∩ Γf ′. Then
L(f ′) ≤ L(f˜) + n · dist(f, f ′).
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Proof. Using Lemma 5.19 with Γ = Γf , Γ
′ = Γf ′ and Γ˜ = Γf˜ we have
Γ′ =
Γ˜ ∪ ⋃
A∈Γ′\Γ
cl
(
minSA ∩ Γ′)
) ∪ ⋃
A∈min(Γ\Γ′)
TA.
Now note that cl (minSA ∩ Γ′)) = TA ∩
⋃
i/∈A:A∪{i}∈Γ′ T{i}, hence this access structure
admits the formula (
∧
i∈A xi) ∧
∨
i/∈A:A∪{i}∈Γ′ xi, which has leafsize at most n. The rest
of the proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 5.35.
5.9.3 Submodular Formal Complexity Measures
A non-negative real-valued function µ defined on the set of monotone Boolean functions
in n variables is a submodular formal complexity measure if
• µ(xi) ≤ 1 for i = 1, . . . , n,
• µ(f ∧ g) + µ(f ∨ g) ≤ µ(f) + µ(g) for all monotone Boolean functions f, g.
For every submodular formal complexity measure µ and for every monotone Boolean
function f , it holds that µ(f) ≤ L(f) [166]. See [164, 166] for more details about
submodular formal complexity measures.
Proposition 5.38. Let µ be a submodular formal complexity measure. Then for every
two monotone Boolean functions f and f ′,
|µ(f)− µ(f ′)| ≤ n · dist(f, f ′).
Proof. Let Γ = Γf and Γ
′ = Γf ′ . Let I = max(Γ \ Γ′), let J = min(Γ′ \ Γ), and let g
and h be the monotone Boolean functions associated to the access structures ∩A∈IFA
and ∪A∈JTA, respectively. Since f ′ = (f ∧ g) ∨ h and µ is submodular,
µ(f ′) = µ((f ∧ g) ∨ h)
≤ µ(f ∧ g) + µ(h)− µ((f ∧ g) ∧ h)
≤ µ(f) + µ(g)− µ(f ∨ g) + µ(h)− µ((f ∧ g) ∧ h)
≤ µ(f) + µ(g) + µ(h).
Since µ is submodular, the size of the monotone formulas described above for TA and
FA are upper bounds on µ(fTA) and µ(fFA) (see [166]). Then
µ(g) + µ(h) = µ(
⋂
A∈I
FA) + µ(
⋃
A∈J
TA) ≤
∑
A∈I
(n− |A|) +
∑
A∈J
|A|
≤ n · |I|+ n · |J | ≤ n · dist(f, f ′).
The Razborov rank measure introduced in Section 5.8.1 was originally defined over
Boolean functions, and it is submodular (see [166]). Note that the bound we obtained
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for the Razborov rank measure in Theorem 5.30 is much better than the one in the
previous proposition.
The behavior of µA and L for close monotone Boolean functions is different. Let f and
f ′ be two monotone Boolean functions at distance `. Let A and A′ be matrices over
a finite field F that maximize µA(f) and µA′(f ′), respectively. By Theorem 5.30, the
difference µA(f) − µA′(f ′) is at most `, but the difference L(f) − L(f ′) can be much
bigger than `.
The following examples show that the functions κ, σ, σT, λ, and λT are neither submod-
ular nor supermodular. Let Γ and Γ′ be the access structures on P = {1, 2, 3, 4} with
min Γ = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}, {3, 4}} and min Γ′ = {{1, 2}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}}.
Both Γ and Γ′ admit ideal linear secret sharing schemes, but κ(Γ ∩ Γ′) = 3/2. Hence
none of the functions is submodular. Now let Γ and Γ′ be the access structures on P
with min Γ = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}} and min Γ′ = {{1, 2}, {1, 4}, {3, 4}}. Both Γ∩Γ′ and
Γ ∪ Γ′ admit ideal linear secret sharing schemes, but κ(Γ) = κ(Γ′) = 3/2. Hence none
of the parameters is supermodular.
5.10 Conclusion
The main objective of this work is to discover properties to characterize access structures
that admit efficient secret sharing schemes. We show that access structures that are
close admit secret sharing schemes with similar information ratios. We also bound the
difference between information ratios by the distance between the access structures.
Our results are constructive, and we present a formula which, given a secret sharing
scheme for a particular access structure, provides schemes for nearby access structures.
This formula is simple, but it apparently provides good bounds for both short and large
distances (see Sections 5.4.1 and 5.5).
Since access structures that are close admit secret sharing schemes with similar infor-
mation ratios, in the domain of access structures we have regions in which the access
structures admit secret sharing schemes with low information ratio, for instance around
ideal access structures. An interesting line of research is to study these regions, and to
analyze their distribution and their density in the domain of access structures.
We also provide a combinatorial result that leads to general bounds for the optimal
information ratio for access structures whose minimal access structures are close. We
translate the search of efficient secret sharing schemes to a combinatorial problem. For
graph access structures there exist better constructions [149, 156], but for general access
structures our approach is interesting.
The presented techniques are very general, and we extend them to other models of
computation, bounding the formula leafsize and the monotone span program size for
monotone Boolean functions. Moreover, we believe that our results can also be useful in
information theory and coding theory, in particular in network coding and index coding.
Our problem can be set as an information-theoretic problem as follows. Suppose that
we have a family of random variables, satisfying certain dependence conditions. Then
we can modify those conditions and we can consider the problem of constructing new
random variables which satisfy the new conditions, while minimizing the their entropy.
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We extend our results in order to analyze the techniques for finding lower bounds on
the optimal information ratio, and we study their behavior when we add or delete sub-
sets from an access structure. We study bounds based on the Shannon inequalities,
the Razborov rank measure, the critical subfamilies method, and submodular formal
complexity measures. These bounds are used in other models of computation and infor-
mation theoretic schemes, and so the obtained results can be useful in other areas.
In the information theoretic setting, another interesting problem is to know the effect
of small changes in the dependence conditions. For instance, given an access structure,
it would be interesting to study the change in the optimal information ratio if we allow
some forbidden subsets to have a certain amount of information about the secret. Since
the family of perfect secret sharing schemes cannot capture these situations, we should
consider non-perfect secret sharing schemes. In this work we see that the optimal in-
formation ratio is 1-Lipschitz, but it would be interesting to study the continuity of the
optimal information ratio in this setting. In order to answer this question, we should find
a more general description of the access structure of a scheme. For instance, with the
access function [161]. For now, the continuity of the optimal information ratio remains
an open problem.
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Chapter 6
Data Splitting
In this chapter we show our contributions to privacy-preserving data splitting. Privacy-
preserving data splitting is a technique that aims at protecting data privacy by storing
different fragments of data at different locations.
In our work we give a new combinatorial formulation of the data splitting problem. We
see the data splitting problem as a purely combinatorial problem in which we have to
split data attributes into different fragments in a way that satisfies certain combinatorial
properties derived from processing and privacy constraints. Using this formulation, we
develop new combinatorial and algebraic techniques to obtain solutions to the data split-
ting problem. We present an algebraic method which builds an optimal data splitting
solution by using Gro¨bner bases. Since this method is not efficient in general, we also
develop a greedy algorithm for finding solutions that are not necessarily minimal sized.
6.1 Introduction
The size of the data sets collected by companies and organizations and the amount of
features demanded when handling data have increased over time, and it is nowadays
unfeasible for some data owners to locally store and process data because of the as-
sociated costs (such as hardware, energy and maintenance costs). The cloud offers a
suitable alternative for data storage, by providing large and highly scalable storage and
computational resources at a low cost and with ubiquitous access. However, many data
owners are reluctant to embrace the cloud computing technology because of security and
privacy concerns, which are mainly centered around the cloud service provider (CSP).
The problem is not only that the CSPs may read, use or even sell the data outsourced
by their customers, but also that they may suffer attacks or data breaches that can
compromise data confidentiality.
Privacy-preserving data splitting is a technique that aims at protecting data privacy by
leveraging multi-cloud architectures. Data splitting minimizes the leakage of information
by distributing the data among several CSPs, assuming that they do not communicate
with each other. Similar problems have been studied in other areas such as data mining,
data sanitization, file splitting and data merging.
In general, in data splitting data sets are structured in a tabular format, accord-
ing to a set of attributes (or features) identifiable by attribute names. Data is then
143
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composed by records, where each record holds up to one value per attribute. For
instance, we can consider the attributes ‘Name’,‘Age’,‘Occupation’, and a record
{‘John’,‘21’,‘Student’}, where the record holds values for all attributes.
Data splitting comes in three flavours: horizontal, vertical and mixed. In this work, we
deal with vertical data splitting, where fragments consist of data on all records, but only
contain information on a subset of the attributes. In horizontal data splitting, fragments
contain part of the records, and information on all attributes is specified. In mixed data
splitting, fragments hold partial information on some records.
In most practical cases, horizontal data splitting is not privacy-preserving by itself, be-
cause all the information of an individual register is stored together. Hence, it does not
preserve privacy by decomposition [54]. Horizontal data splitting has been used to ana-
lyze data collected by different entities on a set of patients [167], or in conjunction with
homomorphic encryption [168], to mine horizontally-partitioned data without violating
privacy.
Vertical data splitting can be used for privacy-preserving purposes [54, 55]. In particular,
in a setting where some combinations of attributes constitute the sensitive information,
the data set can be vertically split and distributed among cloud servers so that no CSP
holds any sensitive attribute combination. Assuming that CSPs do not communicate
with each other, this measure enforces privacy. An example of a sensitive pair of at-
tributes in a medical data setting is passport number and disease, whereas blood pressure
and disease constitute a generally safe pair.
The results we present in this work focus on data splitting, but they can be applied to
other related areas such as file splitting, data sanitization, and data merging.
In file splitting, pieces of files owned by the same entity are stored in different sites.
This is done in such a way that pieces from each site, when considered in isolation, are
not sensitive. In [169], the authors spread the data across multiple CSPs and introduce
redundancy in order to tolerate possible failures or outages. Their solution follows
what is done at the level of disks and file systems in the RAID (Redundant Array of
Independent Disks) technology, which strips data across an array of disks and maintains
parity data that can be used to reconstruct the contents of any individual failed disk.
In [170], user files are categorized and split into chunks, and these chunks are provided
to the proper storage servers. The categorization of data is done according to mining
sensitivity. To ensure a greater amount of privacy, the possibility of adding misleading
data in the chunks depending on the demand of clients is given. Wei et al. [171] proposed
a new privacy method that involves bit splitting and bit combination. In their approach,
the original files are broken up through bit splitting and each fragment is uploaded to a
different storage server.
Data sanitization is the process of removing sensitive information from a document so as
to ensure that only the intended information can be accessed. Typically, the result is a
document that is suitable for dissemination to the intended audience. Data sanitization
has been applied along with data splitting in [1], where the terms in the input document
that cause disclosure risk according to the privacy requirements are first detected, and
then those terms are distributed in multiple servers in order to prevent disclosure.
Data merging consists on securely splitting and merging data from potentially many
sources in a single repository. An approach for data merging is to split and compress
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the data into multiple fragments, and to require certain privacy constraints on the
fragments [172].
In data splitting, once the data is split, the main issue is how to securely compute
over distributed data (see [173] for more details). For some computations, the servers
may need to exchange data, but none of them ought to reveal its own private stored
information. Computing over distributed data is also studied in the context of parallel
processing for statistical computations. In this case, the main difficulty lies in combining
partial results obtained from independent processors. Existing related literature reduces
statistical analysis to performing either secure distributed scalar products or secure
distributed matrix products, e.g. see [174–176]. On a similar note, the field of privacy-
preserving data mining deals with the problem of computing over distributed data. It
has as its main objective to mine data owned by different parties, who are willing to
collaborate in order to get better results, but that do not want or cannot share the raw
original data. For instance, see [177–179].
6.1.1 Our Results
In this work we give a new combinatorial formulation to the data splitting problem. In
the considered data splitting problem we force some subsets of attributes to be stored
separately, because the combination of these attributes may reveal sensitive information
to the CSPs. Moreover, we impose some subsets of attributes to be jointly stored in some
cloud server, for instance because we want to query on them efficiently or to compute
statistics on them (such as data mining or selective correlations). Regarding privacy
and security, the CSPs are not trusted and hence they are not given access to the entire
original data set. We thus assume that the access of the CSPs to the original data set
is restricted to a single chosen fragment.
Our treatment of privacy-preserving data splitting assumes the honest-but-curious se-
curity model, where the CSPs honestly fill their role in the protocols and do not share
information with each other, but they may try to infer information on the data made
available to them. In particular, each CSP may be curious to analyze the data it stores
and the message flows received during the protocol in order to acquire additional in-
formation. Therefore, in our model the information leakage is the sensitive information
that can be extracted from single stored data fragments. This model is common in the
cloud computing literature, e.g. see [180].
In this setting, our main objective is to minimize the number of different CSPs that
are needed to store a data set using data splitting, without applying any other privacy-
preserving techniques. To study this problem, we regard the data splitting constraints
as consisting of two families of subsets of attributes: the family of subsets of attributes
that must be stored together by some CSP, and the family of subsets of attributes that
must not be jointly stored by any CSP. These two families respectively define processing
constraints and privacy constraints. We define a data splitting solution as a family of
subsets of attributes which satisfies the processing and privacy constraints. Each set in
this family should be outsourced to a single CSP in order to enforce privacy. Therefore,
we see the data splitting problem as a purely combinatorial problem, in which attributes
must be split into different fragments in a way that satisfies the combinatorial properties
derived from processing and privacy constraints.
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Using this formulation, we develop new combinatorial and algebraic techniques to obtain
solutions to the data splitting problem. We first present an algebraic method which uses
Gro¨bner bases to build a data splitting solution with the minimal number of fragments.
Since this method has performance issues, we also develop an efficient greedy algorithm
for finding solutions that are not generally minimal sized. We compare the efficiency and
the accuracy of the two approaches by showing experimental results. Using results of
graph theory, we are able to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence
of a solution to the data splitting problem, and we give upper and lower bounds on the
number of needed fragments.
6.1.2 Related Work
Recently, the data splitting research has focused on finding the minimal sized decom-
position of a given data set into privacy-preserving fragments. Related works suggest
outsourcing a sensitive data set by vertically splitting it according to some privacy con-
straints [54–58]. In all previously proposed methods, privacy constraints are described
by sensitive pairs of attributes.
In [54], Aggarwal et al. study the problem of finding a decomposition of a given data set
into two privacy-preserving vertical fragments, so as to store them in two CSPs which
have to be completely unaware of each other. Query execution is also optimized, i.e.
they minimize the execution cost of a given query workload while obeying the constraints
imposed by the needs of data privacy. Graph-coloring techniques are used to identify a
decomposition with small query costs. In particular, their data splitting problem can be
reformulated as a hypergraph-coloring instance of a graph G. In case that some sensitive
attribute pairs can not be stored separately without increasing the number of fragments
to more than two, encryption is used to ensure privacy. To improve the query workload,
the storage of the same attribute by both CSPs is allowed.
The optimal decomposition problem described in [54] is hard to solve even if vertex
deletion is not allowed. In fact, Guruswami et al. [181] proved that it is NP-hard to
color a 2-colorable, 4-uniform hypergraph using only c colors for any constant c. This
means that, in the case that all 4-tuples of attributes are sensitive, it is NP-hard to
find a partition of attributes into two sets that satisfies all privacy constraints, even
knowing that it exists. Because of the hardness of this problem, in [54] they present
three different heuristics to solve it.
A later article [55] by Ganapathy et al. studies the same scenario as [54]. Here as well,
they consider vertically splitting data into exactly two fragments, though their results
are easily extendable to more fragments. They also allow encrypting sensitive attributes
and storing the same attribute in both fragments. Three heuristics are introduced to
find a decomposition with small query costs. These heuristic search techniques are based
on the greedy hill climbing approach, and give a nearly optimal solution.
In [55], the authors study the time complexity of the proposed optimal decomposition
problem in terms of the number of attributes. The general problem can theoretically be
solved in polynomial time if the collection contains only few sets of constraints, by solving
the minimum cut problem. It can also be solved in O(log(n)) time when the problem
is equivalent to the hitting set problem. And it can be solved in an approximation
factor of O(
√
n) if each constraint set has size 2, by using directed multicat (i.e., solving
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the minimum edge deletion bipartition problem). The problem becomes intractable if
the sets of constraints have size 3. In fact, in this case the problem is reduced to the
not-all-equal 3-satisfiability problem, which is an NP-complete problem.
Also, Ciriani et al. [56] present a solution for vertically splitting data into two fragments
without requiring the use of encryption, but rather by letting the data owner store a
portion of the data set and perform part of the computations.
Another solution presented by Ciriani et al. in [57] uses both encryption and data split-
ting, but it allows the CSPs to communicate between each other. Because of this as-
sumption, in order to ensure unlinkability between attributes, no attribute must appear
in the clear in more that one fragment. In their solution, data is split into possibly more
than two different fragments. This lowers the complexity of the problem with respect
to [54] and [55]. The optimization problem is then to find a partition that minimizes
the number of fragments and maximizes the number of attributes stored in the clear.
Also, in this case, the problem of finding a partition of the attribute set is NP-complete.
Hence, they present two heuristic methods with time complexity O(n2m) and O(n3m),
where m is the number of privacy constraints and n is the number of attributes. The
first one is based on the definition of vector minimality, and the second one works with
an affinity matrix that expresses the advantage of having pairs of attributes in the same
fragment.
A similar approach to [57] is also illustrated in [58], where they split a data set into an
arbitrary number of non-linkable data fragments and distribute them among an arbitrary
number of non-communicating servers.
The data splitting problem studied in this work is also related to other well known
combinatorial optimization problems. We want to emphasize the connection with the
job shop scheduling problem. The job shop scheduling problem consists on assigning jobs
to resources at particular times. Welsh and Powell [182] described a basic scheduling
problem as follows: let J = {Ji}Ni=1 be a set of N jobs. Suppose that it takes an entire
day to complete each job, and that resources are unbounded. Let M = {mij}Ni,j=1 be
an incompatibility matrix, where mij is zero or one depending on whether or not Ji and
Jj can be carried out on the same day. The problem consists in scheduling the n jobs
using the minimum needed number of days according to the restrictions imposed by M .
An efficient algorithm to solve this problem is presented in [182], and subsequent works
[183, 184] improve on this solution. See [185] for a survey on this and similar scheduling
problems.
By interpreting jobs as attributes, days as data locations and the incompatibility matrix
as a set of privacy constraints, we observe the equivalence between the problem posed
in [182] and the data splitting problem. Through this same analogy, our setting extends
to the following job scheduling problem: let J = {Ji}Ni=1 be a set of N jobs, and suppose
that it takes an entire day to complete each job, and that resources are unbounded. Let
A ⊆ P(J) be a family of sets of jobs that can not be carried out all on the same day.
Similarly, let B ⊆ P(J) be a family of sets of jobs that must be carried out all on the
same day. The problem consists in scheduling the n jobs using the minimum needed
number of days according to the restrictions imposed by A and B.
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6.1.3 Outline of the Work
Section 6.2 states the problem of privacy-preserving data splitting as a purely combina-
torial problem, which consists in splitting sensitive data into several fragments. Section
6.3 presents an algebraic formulation of the combinatorial problem stated in the previous
section. Here, Gro¨bner bases are used to find the optimal (i.e., minimal-sized) solutions.
Section 6.4 proposes a polynomial-time method which solves the combinatorial prob-
lem. This method sacrifices the solution optimality in favor of efficiency. In addition,
an heuristic improvement is also proposed. Section 6.5 presents the experimental results
obtained by implementing the methods presented in Sections 6.3 and 6.4. First, we
depict a comparison between the methods in a practical situation. Then, a performance
analysis of the polynomial-time methods is carried out over random graphs. Finally, we
list some conclusions in Section 6.6.
6.2 A Combinatorial Approach
In this section we state the problem of privacy-preserving data splitting as a purely
combinatorial problem. This problem consists in splitting a given data set in which
some attributes are sensitive. As discussed above, this situation also covers problems of
file splitting, data sanitization and data merging. First we introduce some notation.
Let P be a set and let C ⊆ P(P ). For any i ∈ P , we define degi(C) as the number
of subsets of C containing i, and we define the degree deg(C) of C as the maximum of
degi(C) for every i ∈ P . For any B ⊆ P , we also denote by degB(C) the number of
subsets A ∈ C such that A∩B 6= ∅. For any i ∈ P we define degi(C) = deg{i}(C). Given
a set A ⊆ P , we define its closure cl(A) = {B ⊆ P : A ⊆ B}. We define min C and
max C as follows. A subset A ⊆ P is in min C if and only if A ∈ C and there does not
exist B ∈ C with B ( A. Analogously, a subset A ⊆ P is in max C if and only if A ∈ C
and there does not exist B ∈ C with A ( B. That is, a min C is the family of minimal
subsets in C, and max C is the family of maximal subsets in C. We say that C is an
antichain if A * B for every A,B ∈ C. In this case, C = min C = max C.
In the considered data splitting setting we have a set of attributes P , and some com-
binations of the attributes are not to be stored by any individual server because they
would leak sensitive information. We assume that individual attributes, when consid-
ered in isolation, are not sensitive (otherwise, encryption can be used). Moreover, we
want some other attributes to be stored in the same location, for example to perform
statistical analysis computations such as contingency tables, correlations or principal
component analysis of the attributes. We thus describe a data splitting problem using
two families of attributes: A ⊆ P(P ) is the family of subsets of attributes that cannot be
stored jointly in any single server, and B ⊆ P(P ) is the family of subsets of attributes
that must be stored together in some server. We state the data splitting problem in
terms of (A,B)-coverings, a notion first introduced in [84].
Definition 6.1. Let A,B ⊆ P(P ). An (A,B)-covering C is a family of subsets of P
satisfying that
1. for every A ∈ A and for every C ∈ C, A * C, and
2. for every B ∈ B there exists C ∈ C with B ⊆ C.
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Let A,B be the families of subsets defined by the data splitting restrictions described
above, and let C be an (A,B)-covering. Then C defines a solution for data splitting
by associating each fragment i with a set Ci ∈ C. That is, we solve the data splitting
problem by storing the data corresponding to attributes in Ci at the i-th location.
Observe that, according to this definition, for each B ∈ B there is at least one fragment
containing all attributes in B, and none of the fragments contain all attributes in A for
any A ∈ A. These are exactly the restrictions we have for data splitting. Note that we
distribute data in as many fragments as |C|. Since B ⊆ P(P ) is the family of subsets of
attributes that we want to be stored together, we will always assume that ∪B∈BB = P .
Our work is focused on minimizing the size of the coverings, which corresponds to the
number of fragments in data splitting. Therefore, we say that C is an optimal (A,B)-
covering if |C| is minimal among all (A,B)-coverings. Also, it could be desirable to
minimize
∑
X∈C |X|, which corresponds to the total amount of information that will
be stored, and maxi∈P degi(C), which corresponds to the maximum redundancy in the
storage.
Example 6.1. Let B ⊆ P(P ) be an antichain, and let A ∈ B. Then C = {P \ {i} : i ∈
A} is an ({A},B \ {A})− covering.
Next we present some technical results about coverings. The main results of this section
are Proposition 6.4, which characterizes the existence of coverings, and Proposition 6.6,
which justifies the search for (A,B)-coverings in the case that A and B are antichains.
In addition, we present a theoretical lower bound on the size of (A,B)-coverings in
Proposition 6.7.
Lemma 6.2. Let A,B, C ⊆ P(P ). Then C is an (A,B)-covering if and only if
1. cl(A) ∩ C = ∅ for every A ∈ A, and
2. cl(B) ∩ C 6= ∅ for every B ∈ B.
Proof. Let C be an (A,B)-covering. For every A ∈ A and for every C ∈ C it holds that
A * C, and so for any A′ ∈ cl(A) we have A′ * C. Hence cl(A) ∩ C = ∅. For every
B ∈ B, there exists C ∈ C with B ⊆ C, i.e. C ∈ cl(B). Hence cl(B) ∩ C 6= ∅. This
concludes the proof of one implication.
For any A ⊆ P , if cl(A) ∩ C = ∅ then A * C for every C ∈ C. For any B ⊆ P , if
cl(B) ∩ C 6= ∅ then there exists C ∈ C with B ⊆ C. Hence the converse implication
holds.
As a direct consequence of this lemma, we have the following result.
Lemma 6.3. Let A,A′,B,B′ ⊆ P(P ) with A′ ⊆ A and B′ ⊆ B. Every (A,B)-covering
is also an (A′,B′)-covering.
The next proposition characterizes the pairs of subsets (A,B) admitting (A,B)-coverings.
Proposition 6.4 (Condition 6.1). Let A,B ⊆ P(P ). There exists an (A,B)-covering if
and only if
A * B for every A ∈ A and B ∈ B. (6.1)
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Proof. Let C be an (A,B)-covering. By Lemma 6.2, for every A ∈ A and B ∈ B,
cl(A) ∩ C = ∅ and cl(B) ∩ C 6= ∅, so A * B. Conversely, if A * B for every A ∈ A and
B ∈ B, then B is an (A,B)-covering.
Lemma 6.5. Let A,A′,B,B′ ⊆ P(P ). If
• for every A′ ∈ A′ there exists A ∈ A with A ⊆ A′, and
• for every B′ ∈ B′ there exists B ∈ B with B′ ⊆ B,
then any (A,B)-covering is also an (A′,B′)-covering.
Proof. Let C be an (A,B)-covering. Let A′ ∈ A′ and let A ∈ A with A ⊆ A′. For every
C ∈ C we have A * C, and so A′ * C. Now let B′ ∈ B′ and let B ∈ B with B′ ⊆ B.
Then there exists a subset C ∈ C satisfying B ⊆ C, which also satisfies B′ ⊆ C. Hence
C is an (A′,B′)-covering.
Proposition 6.6. Let A,B, C ⊆ P(P ). Then C is an (A,B)-covering if and only if it is
a (minA,maxB)-covering.
Proof. By Lemma 6.3, every (A,B)-covering is an (minA,maxB)-covering. The con-
verse implication is a direct consequence of Lemma 6.5.
According to the previous proposition, we can always restrict the search for (A,B)-
coverings to the case where A and B are antichains. Further, as a consequence of
Lemma 6.5 we can define a partial hierarchy among the pairs of antichains (A,B). For
example, every ({{1, 2}}, {{3, 4, 5}})-covering is also an ({{1, 2, 3}}, {{3, 4}})-covering.
To conclude this section, we describe a theoretical lower bound on the size of (A,B)-
coverings. Note that, in the case B = (P1) = {{i} : i ∈ P} and A ⊆ (P2), the problem
of finding an (A,B)-covering is equivalent to the graph coloring problem on the graph
G = (P,A). In this case, the size of an optimal (A,B)-covering is just the chromatic
number χ(G).
Existing general lower bounds on the chromatic number include the clique number,
the minimum degree bound, Hoffman’s bound, the vector chromatic number, Lova´sz
number and the fractional chromatic number. Our proposed bound generalizes the
minimum degree bound χ(G) ≥ nn−δ(G) , where n is the number of vertices and δ(G) is
the minimum degree of G, to the case of (A,B)-coverings.
Proposition 6.7. Let A,B ⊆ P(P ) be families of subsets satisfying condition 6.1, and
let C be an (A,B)-covering. Then
|C| ≥ |B||B| −maxA∈Amina∈A dega(B)
.
Proof. Let C be an (A,B)-covering. Given C ∈ C, denote BC = B ∩ P(C).
By the properties of (A,B)-coverings we have that B ⊆ ∪C∈CP(C), and this implies that
B = ∪C∈CBC . Hence |B| ≤
∑
C∈C |BC | ≤ |C| ·maxC∈C |BC |, so |C| ≥ |B|/maxC∈C |BC |.
We now proceed to upper bound maxC∈C |BC |.
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Since for every B ∈ BC we have B ⊆ C, we see that ∪B∈BCB ⊆ C. Therefore, by the
definition of (A,B)-coverings we have that A * ∪B∈BCB for every A ∈ A. Denote by
α(A,B) the size of the largest subfamily of B with this property, i.e.
α(A,B) = max{|B′| : B′ ⊆ B and A * ∪B∈B′B for every A ∈ A}.
By the preceding observation, we get that maxC∈C |BC | ≤ α(A,B). By definition
of α(A,B), given any set A ∈ A we have α(A,B) ≤ α({A},B), and so α(A,B) ≤
minA∈A α({A},B). Now, given a set A ∈ A, a family B′ ⊆ B satisfies A * ∪B∈B′B if
and only if there exists an element a ∈ A such that a /∈ ∪B∈B′B. Therefore α({A},B) =
maxa∈A α({a},B). Finally, by definition we see that α({a},B) = |B|−dega(B). By com-
posing the obtained results, we see that maxC∈C |BC | ≤ minA∈Amaxa∈A(|B|−dega(B)) =
|B| − maxA∈Amina∈A dega(B). The proposition follows by applying the first obtained
inequality.
6.2.1 Multi-Colorings of Hypergraphs
In order to construct (A,B)-coverings, we will use colorings of hypergraphs. Let H =
(P,E) be a hypergraph. A coloring of H with k colors is a mapping µ : P → {1, . . . , k}
such that, for every A ∈ E, there exists u, v ∈ A with µ(u) 6= µ(v).
Next, we describe the connection between colorings and coverings. Let µ be a coloring of
the hypergraphH = (P,A) with k colors. Consider the family of subsets of elements in P
that have the same color under µ. That is, consider a family of subsets C = {C1, . . . , Ck}
that is a partition of P satisfying that µ(j) = i for every j ∈ Ci and for every color i.
Now consider the pair (A,B) with B = (P1). Observe that C satisfies condition 1 in
Definition 6.1 because, if a subset A is in A, then it cannot be monochromatic. Since
each element in P has a color, condition 2 is also satisfied. In order to construct (A,B)-
coverings for other families of subsets B ⊆ P(P ), we can use sequences of colorings. To
appropriately formalize these constructions, we use hypergraph multi-colorings.
For any integer k > 0, we define a multi-coloring of the hypergraph H = (P,E) of k
colors as a mapping µ : P → {0, 1}k with the following property: for every A ∈ E and
for every 1 ≤ j ≤ k, there exists i ∈ A for which the j-th coordinate of µ(i) is 0, namely
µ(i)j = 0. If we associate each 1 ≤ j ≤ k with a different color, a multi-coloring of H
is a mapping that maps each element in P to a set of at most k colors. This mapping
must satisfy that for every subset in A ∈ E and for each color, at least one element in
A does not have this color. A sequence of colorings of a hypergraph defines a multi-
coloring. A multi-coloring defines a family of subsets in a natural way, and vice-versa.
More concretely, a multi-coloring µ induces the family of subsets C = {Ci}1≤i≤k ⊆ P(P ),
where Ci are the subsets of elements of P mapped to the same color i by µ.
Lemma 6.8. Let A,B, C ⊆ P(P ), with |C| = k. Then C is an (A,B)-covering if and
only if C defines a multi-coloring µ of H = (P,A) of k colors with the property that, for
every B ∈ B, there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ k for which the j-coordinate of µ(i) is 1 for every
i ∈ B.
Proof. Let C = {C1, . . . , Ck} be an (A,B)-covering . We define a multi-coloring µ of k
colors as follows. For every i ∈ P and 1 ≤ j ≤ k, set µ(i)j = 1 if and only if i is in Cj .
Let B ∈ B, and let Cj be a subset in C with B ⊆ Cj . Then µ(i)j = 1 for every i ∈ B.
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Taking into account the comments detailed above, it is straightforward to prove that
the converse implication also holds.
We use the connection between coverings and multi-colorings to find general construc-
tions of coverings and upper bounds on their size. Beimel, Farra`s, and Mintz constructed
efficient secret sharing schemes for very dense graphs [149]. One of the techniques devel-
oped in that work is connected to our work. In [84], this result was described in terms
of (A,B)-coverings for B = (Pk) \ A. Due to Lemma 6.3, if A ⊆ (Pk), the biggest family
of subsets B ⊆ (Pk) admitting an (A,B)-covering is B = (Pk) \A. The next lemma states
the results described above in a more general way. A partial proof can be found in [149]
and in Theorem 5.15 of the previous chapter.
Lemma 6.9. Let A,B ⊆ P(P ) be families of subsets satisfying condition 6.1. Let d
denote the degree of A, and suppose that sets in A and B have size at most k. Then
there exists an (A,B)-covering of degree 2(2kd)k−1 lnn and size 2(2kd)k lnn.
6.2.2 Optimal Covers
Both the optimization problem of determining the size of an optimal (A,B)-covering
and the search problem of finding an optimal (A,B)-covering are NP-hard. This is so
because taking B = (P1) and A ⊆ (P2) transforms these problems to the corresponding
graph coloring problems, and so there is a trivial reduction from the known NP-hard
graph coloring problems to the (A,B)-covering problems. Next, we see NP-completeness
of the decisional problem.
Proposition 6.10. The problem of deciding whether an (A,B)-covering of size t exists
is NP-complete.
Proof. Let A,B, t define an instance of the problem where the answer is affirmative.
Given an (A,B)-covering C of size t, a checking algorithm first verifies that C has size t,
that every B ∈ B is contained in some X ∈ C, and that no A ∈ A is contained in any
X ∈ C. The running time of this checking algorithm is at most quadratic in the size of
the problem input, and thus the given problem is in NP.
Now, note that the case B = (P1) and A ⊆ (P2) is equivalent to the graph coloring
problem. Therefore the given problem is NP-complete.
6.3 Algebraic Formulation of the Problem
In this section we present an algebraic formulation of the combinatorial problem pre-
sented in the previous section. The purpose of this formulation is to exploit algebraic
techniques to find solutions to the data splitting problem for a fixed number of fragments.
It is not unusual that graph-coloring problems are encoded in polynomial ideals [186–
189]. In this case, the existence of a coloring is reduced to the solvability of a related
system of polynomial equations over the algebraic closure of the field. Furthermore,
the weak Hilbert’s Nullstellensatz theorem allows to obtain a certificate that a system
of polynomial has no solutions [190], and, consequently, that a graph is not colorable.
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The focus of this section is the use of polynomial ideals and Gro¨bner bases to provide
an optimal multi-coloring µ with the property described in Lemma 6.8. Recall that
obtaining a multi-coloring µ is equivalent to finding an (A,B)-covering.
Let H = (P,A) be a hypergraph and let µ be a multi-coloring of H = (P,A) of k
colors with the property that, for every B ∈ B, there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ k for which the
j-coordinate of µ(i) is 1 for every i ∈ B. The multi-coloring µ can be seen as assignment
of {0, 1} values to a set of kn variables xi,j , where n = |P |, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
xi,j = 1 if and only if µ(i)j = 1. In other words, we assign k variables xi,j to each vertex
i in P in such a way that,
xi,j =
{
1 if vertex i takes color j by applying µ
0 otherwise.
Encoding µ to a polynomial ring allows an algebraic formulation of the multi-coloring
problem. Since we focus on optimal multi-colorings, the number of colors is fixed to
a designated minimal k. Furthermore, each variable xi,j takes values in {0, 1}, which
allows working over F2.
Therefore, given X = (xi,j)1≤j≤k,1≤i≤n, we define the k-coloring ideal Ik(H,B) ⊂ F2[X]
as the ideal generated by:
• G1 = {
∏
i∈A xi,j : 1 ≤ j ≤ k,A ∈ A}
- all vertices belonging to an edge set A ∈ A cannot have the same color,
• G2 = {
∏k
j=1(
∏
i∈B xi,j − 1) : B ∈ B}
- there exists a color j such that all the vertices in B are colored with j.
Theorem 6.11 proves that finding a solution of Ik(H,B) is equivalent to obtaining a
suitable multi-coloring µ.
Theorem 6.11. Let µ : P → {0, 1}k be a multi-coloring of H = (P,A), and assume
that ∪B∈BB = P . Then µ defines an (A,B)-covering (in the sense of Lemma 6.8) if
and only if Ik(H,B) has a common root in F2[X]. In other words, the multi-coloring µ
of H does not define an (A,B)-covering if and only if Ik(H,B) = (1).
Proof. According to the definition above, the map µ is a multi-coloring if:
• for every A ∈ A and for every 1 ≤ j ≤ k, there exists i ∈ A for which µ(i)j is 0,
• for every B ∈ B, there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ k for which the j-coordinate of µ(i) is 1 for
every i ∈ B.
It is known that if a polynomial e1 encodes a property and e2 encodes another property,
then the ideal generated by e1 and e2 encodes the conjunction (i.e., the and) of the
properties. Therefore, if G1 and G2 encode the properties above, respectively, then
Ik(H,B) encodes µ. We see that this is indeed the case:
• G1: for all A ∈ A and for every color j, we have that
∏
i∈A xi,j ∈ Ik(H,B). This
happens if and only if
∏
i∈A xi,j = 0, which means that there exists i ∈ A such
that xi,j = 0. This is equivalent to say that there exists i ∈ A such that µ(i)j = 0.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC TECHNIQUES FOR SECURING DATA IN THE CLOUD 
Jordi Ribes González 
 
154 Data Splitting
• G2: for all B ∈ B, we have
∏k
j=1(
∏
i∈B xi,j − 1) ∈ Ik(H,B). This happens if
and only if
∏k
j=1(
∏
i∈B xi,j − 1) = 0, which means that there exists j such that∏
i∈B xi,j = 1. This amounts to say that there exists j such that xi,j = 1 for all i,
which is equivalent to saying that there exists j such that µ(i)j = 1 for all i ∈ B.
Observe that imposing ∪B∈BB = P is not restrictive. In fact, it is always possible to add
the singletons of any vertices to B in order to guarantee that every vertex is assigned a
color, without changing the request of the problem (see Example 6.2 for more details).
In particular, if ∪B∈BB = P , then for all i ∈ P there exists B ∈ B such that i ∈ B, and
therefore there exists a color j such that xi,j = 1, which amounts to saying that there
exists a color j such that µ(i)j = 1. The hypothesis ∪B∈BB = P has also been stated
in Section 6.2.
Now that the data splitting problem is stated as an algebraic problem, a technique
based on Gro¨bner bases can be used to solve it. A Gro¨bner basis is a generating set of
an ideal I in a polynomial ring, which allows to determine if any polynomial belongs
to I or not [190]. In other words, it allows to determine the variety associated to I,
i.e. the solutions of I. It is proven that it is possible to associate a Gro¨bner basis to
every polynomial ideal [190]. Informally, Gro¨bner basis computation can be viewed as
a generalization of Gaussian elimination for non-linear equations.
In our case, Gro¨bner bases can be used to find the solutions of Ik(H,B). Once the
Gro¨bner basis of the k-coloring ideal is obtained, the associated variety can be easily
computed. The complexity of computing the Gro¨bner basis of a system of polynomial
equations of degree d in n variables has been proven to be dO(n
2) when the number
of solutions is finite [191]. In general, its complexity is 22
O(n)
. Since Ik(H,B) belongs
to F2[X], then it has a finite number of solutions, and so a bound for the worst-case
complexity of computing Gro¨bner basis in this case is (kn)O(n
2). The complexity of
computing Gro¨bner bases is at least that of polynomial-system solving.
As stated before, it is possible to derive a certificate for the unsolvability of a system of
polynomials from the weak Hilbert’s Nullstellensatz. In our case, this allows to prove
that it is not possible to find a multi-coloring µ with a designated number of colors k.
Theorem 6.12 (Weak Hilbert’s Nullstellensatz [190]). Let f1, . . . , fm ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn].
Then there are no solutions to the system {fi = 0}i=1,...,m in the algebraic closure of K
if and only if there exist α1, . . . , αm ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn] such that
α1f1 + · · ·+ αmfm = 1 (6.2)
The set {αi} is called a Nullstellensatz certificate. The complexity of computing such a
certificate depends on the degree of {αi}mi=1, which is defined as the maximum degree
of any αi as polynomials. Fast results have been achieved when the Nullstellensatz
certificate has small constant degree [192].
According to Theorem 6.12, by using methods to compute a Nullstellensatz certificate
it is possible to find out whether or not Ik(H,B) has any solutions. If we start by fixing
a tentative number of colors k, the data splitting problem can be solved by applying
a Nullstellensatz certificate method. When there exists a Nullstellensatz certificate,
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Ik(H,B) does not have common root. The complexity of the Nullstellensatz certificate
and the Gro¨bner basis methods grow with the number of variables which, in our case,
grows with the number of colors. Therefore, it is convenient to start with as few colors
as possible and increase them sequentially until a certificate of feasibility is found or
until a Gro¨bner basis is computed. Notice that finding the optimal k is a NP-complete
problem, because it has complexity equivalent to solving the system of equations.
Example 6.2. Given A = {{1, 2, 3}} and B = {{1, 4}, {2, 4}, {3}}, we want to compute
an (A,B)-covering. As explained above, the problem can be encoded to polynomial ideals.
We assign k variables to each attribute, where k is the number of colors needed to obtain
an optimal covering. For example, we can encode vertex 1 to x1,1 and x1,2 when 2 colors
are considered. The variable xi,j equals 1 if and only if vertex i takes color j, and it
equals 0 otherwise.
The ideal I2(H,B) is generated by the polynomials in G1 and G2, where
• G1 = {x1,1x2,1x3,1, x1,2x2,2x3,2}.
• G2 = {x2,1x4,1x2,2x4,2 +x2,1x4,2 +x2,2x4,1 +1, x1,1x4,1x1,2x4,2 +x1,1x4,1 +x1,2x4,2 +
1, x3,1x3,2 + x3,1 + x3,2 + 1}.
Note that there does not exist an (A,B)-covering of size one, because {1, 2, 3} ⊆ ∪B∈BB.
Since we can compute the Gro¨bner basis of I2(H,B), there exist (A,B)-coverings of size
two, and we obtain the optimal (A,B)-coverings:
{x1,1, x2,1 + 1, x3,1, x4,1 + 1, x1,2 + 1, x2,2, x3,2 + 1, x4,2 + 1},
{x1,1, x2,1 + 1, x3,1 + 1, x4,1 + 1, x1,2 + 1, x2,2, x3,2, x4,2 + 1},
{x1,1, x3,1 + 1, x1,2 + 1, x2,2 + 1, x3,2, x4,2 + 1}.
In the last solution, the variables x2,1 and x4,1 are missing, which means that they can
take both 0 and 1 values. Therefore, the solutions can be re-written as the following
coverings:
{{2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}},
{{2, 3, 4}, {1, 4}},
{{3}, {1, 2, 4}}, {{2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}}, {{3, 4}, {1, 2, 4}}, {{2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 4}}.
To obtain the number of colors k which allows to compute an optimal covering, a small
number of colors k = 2 is fixed. If the Gro¨bner basis method applied to I2(H,B) outputs
the ideal (1), then k is incremented. This process is repeated until an ideal different from
(1) is obtained. The resulting number of colors k is the smallest one for which we have
an (A,B)-covering, and thus it is optimal.
6.4 A Greedy Algorithm
In this section we aim for an efficient method to build (A,B)-coverings and for upper
bounds on the size of an optimal (A,B)-covering.
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As seen above, the problem of finding an optimal (A,B)-covering is NP-hard. Hence, as
expected, the labour involved in finding an optimal (A,B)-covering can render methods
inefficient when solving practical data splitting instances. Our strategy to circumvent
this consists in sacrificing optimality to achieve a polynomial-time algorithm.
The problem of finding upper bounds on the size of an optimal (A,B)-covering C has
been studied in the literature for the following particular cases:
• In the case B = (P1) and A ⊆ (P2), the problem of finding an (A,B)-covering
is easily seen to be equivalent to the graph coloring problem. Then |C| is the
chromatic number of the graph G = (B,A). For instance, the greedy coloring
bound gives |C| ≤ deg(A) + 1.
• The case B ⊆ (P2) ∪ (P1) and A = (P2)\B has been studied as the clique covering
and the clique partition numbers. Hall [193] and Erdo˝s et al. [194] showed that
|C| ≤ b|P |2/4c.
• In the case B = (Pl ) and A ⊆ ∪i>k(Pi ) for 1 ≤ l ≤ k < n, the problem of finding
a k-uniform (A,B)-covering is equivalent to finding an (n, k, l)-covering design. In
this case, Spencer [195] showed that |C| ≤ (nl)/(kl) (1 + ln (kl)) .
In the following, we first describe a general upper bound on the size of an optimal (A,B)-
covering. We then deduce from this bound an algorithm to build (A,B)-coverings, and
we analyze its worst-time complexity. Finally, we introduce an heuristic improvement
and a theoretical bound that improve the prior results for sparse enough B.
6.4.1 Our Construction
The next result generalizes the greedy coloring bound to (A,B)-coverings. It gives a
general bound of the size of an optimal (A,B)-covering in terms of the degrees of A,B.
Theorem 6.13. Let A,B ⊆ P(P ) be families of subsets satisfying condition 6.1, and
suppose that sets in B have size at most k. Then there exists an (A,B)-covering C of
size
|C| ≤ k deg(A) deg(B) + 1
such that degv(C) ≤ degv(B) for every v ∈ P .
Proof. We prove this by induction on |B|. If |B| = 1, then C = B satisfies the lemma.
Now let s > 1 be an integer and assume that the proposition holds for every pair
A,B ⊆ P(P ) of families of subsets satisfying |B| < s and the proposition hypotheses.
Let A,B′ ⊆ P(P ) be a pair of families of subsets satisfying |B′| = s and the proposition
hypotheses, and express B′ = B ∪ {B} for some fixed B ∈ B′ and |B| = s. Then, by
induction hypothesis, there exists an (A,B)-covering C with |C| ≤ k deg(A) deg(B) + 1
and such that every v ∈ P is contained in at most degv(B) elements of C. We now build
an (A,B′)-covering C′ from C, in such a way that |C′| ≤ k deg(A) deg(B′) + 1 and that
every v ∈ P is contained in at most degv(B′) elements of C.
If B is contained in some X ∈ C, then C′ = C satisfies the lemma. Otherwise, let
FB = {X ∈ C : there exists A ∈ A with A ⊆ X ∪B}.
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Note that the condition A ⊆ X ∪ B is equivalent to A ∩ B 6= ∅ and A \ B ⊆ X. Since
there are at most k deg(A) elements A ∈ A with A ∩ B 6= ∅, and since every set of the
form A\B can be contained in at most deg(B) elements of C (because degv(C) ≤ degv(B)
for every v ∈ P by hypothesis), we have that |FB| ≤ k deg(A) deg(B).
Therefore, either there exists an element X ∈ C \ FB, in which case we take
C′ = {X ∪B} ∪ (C \ {X})
or C = FB, in which case |C| ≤ k deg(A) deg(B) and we let C′ = C ∪ {B}.
Algorithm 6 is a greedy algorithm to compute an (A,B)-covering that follows directly
from the constructive proof of the previous lemma. This algorithm simply builds a
ordered (A,B)-covering C by iterating through B. Every set B in B is merged with the
first available element of C, i.e., with the first element X ∈ C such that no A ∈ A is
contained in X ∪B. If no such X exists, then B is added as a singleton in C. Note that
this algorithm is a generalization of the usual greedy coloring algorithm.
Algorithm 6: Construction
Input: A = {A1, . . . , Ar}, B = {B1, . . . , Bs}
1 Initialize C ← ∅
2 for i = 1, . . . , s do
3 if Bi is not contained in any X ∈ C then
4 if there exists X ∈ C such that A 6⊆ X ∪Bi for every A ∈ A then
5 C ← {X ∪Bi} ∪ (C \ {X})
6 else
7 C ← C ∪ {Bi}
8 end
9 end
10 end
Output: The (A,B)-covering C
To see the worst-time complexity of Algorithm 6, note that the first loop (line 2) is
repeated |B| times. At step i, the first if statement (line 3) requires checking at most
i−1 inclusions, and the second if statement (line 4) requires checking at most (i−1)|A|
inclusions. Therefore, Algorithm 6 runs in time O(|A| · |B|2).
6.4.2 An Heuristic Improvement
In order to motivate the heuristic procedure proposed later, we must first note that the
output of Algorithm 6 depends strongly on the particular order in which elements of B
are taken in the first loop. In particular, we see in the following proposition that there
always exists an optimal ordering of the elements of B. Of course, since the problem of
finding an optimal (A,B)-covering is NP-hard and an optimal ordering can be verified
in polynomial time, finding an optimal ordering in our case is NP-complete.
Proposition 6.14. Let A,B ⊆ P(P ) be families of subsets satisfying condition 6.1.
Then there exists an ordering of B such that Algorithm 6 outputs an optimal (A,B)-
covering.
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Proof. Let C = {X1, . . . , Xt} be an optimal (A,B)-covering. For every j ∈ {1, . . . , t},
define Sj as the family of elements of B that are contained in Xj and that are not
contained in any Xl for l < j,
Sj = {B ∈ B : B ⊆ Xj and B 6⊆ Xl for every l < j}.
We first prove that {Sj}tj=1 defines a partition of B.
Indeed, Sj 6= ∅, because otherwise C \ {Xj} would be an (A,B)-covering smaller than C.
Also, Si∩Sj = ∅ for every i, j. Otherwise, if B ∈ Si∩Sj with i < j, then B ∈ Si implies
B ⊆ Xi, and B ∈ Sj implies B 6⊆ Xi, a contradiction.
Finally, since every B ∈ B is contained in some element of C by the definition of (A,B)-
covering, we can take Xj ∈ C with minimal index j among those that contain B. Then
B ∈ Sj by definition, and therefore B = ∪tj=1Si.
Now, define a new ordering of B by taking the sets in Sj sequentially. That is, if
Sj = {Bj,1, . . . , Bj,kj}, define
B′ = {B1,1, . . . , B1,k1 , . . . , Bt,1, . . . , Bt,kt}.
Consider the behavior of Algorithm 6 on input A,B′. It is easy to see that, when
the algorithm finishes processing the sets in Sj , the local variable C holds at most j
elements. Therefore, since the covering C is optimal, Algorithm 6 outputs an optimal
(A,B)-covering.
Following this result, we propose an heuristic procedure to build an ordering of B,
inspired in the Welsh-Powell algorithm [182]. This procedure can be deduced from the
proof of the following proposition, which effectively reduces the upper bound given in
Theorem 6.13 for sparse enough B.
Proposition 6.15. Assume the hypotheses of Theorem 6.13. Then there exists an
(A,B)-covering C of size
|C| ≤ max
i
min{degBi(A) deg(B) + 1, i}
such that degv(C) ≤ degv(B) for every v ∈ P .
Proof. First reorder B so that B = {B1, . . . , Bs} satisfies
degB1(A) ≥ degB2(A) ≥ · · · ≥ degBs(A).
Now, consider the behavior of Algorithm 6 on input A and the reordered B. At step
i, algorithm 6 processes Bi. In this step, there can be at most degBi(A) deg(B) sets
X ∈ C such that Bi does not satisfy the condition in line 4 (that is, such that there
exists A ∈ A with A ⊆ X ∪ Bi). To see this, note that by definition at most degBi(A)
elements A ∈ A intersect Bi, and that each set of the form A\Bi can be contained in at
most min{deg(B), |C|} ≤ deg(B) elements of C.
Now, at step i the number of elements X ∈ C checked in the condition of line 4 is at most
min{degBi(A) deg(B), |C|}. Since at step i the family C has at most i− 1 sets, at most
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min{degBi(A) deg(B), i−1} elements of C are checked until either line 5 or 7 is executed,
and line 7 can add an additional element to C. Hence, by iterating through all elements
of B, the size of the final output can be at most maxi min{degBi(A) deg(B), i−1}+1.
We now state our heuristic improvement of Algorithm 6, which follows directly from the
previous proof.
Algorithm 7: Heuristic Improvement of Algorithm 6
Input: A = {A1, . . . , Ar}, B = {B1, . . . , Bs}
1 for B ∈ B do
2 Compute degB(A) = |{A ∈ A : A ∩B 6= ∅}|
3 end
4 Sort B so that B = {B′1, . . . , B′s} satisfies degB′1(A) ≥ degB′2(A) ≥ · · · ≥ degB′s(A)
Output: The output of Algorithm 6 on input A,B
To see the worst-time complexity of Algorithm 7, note that the computation of each
quantity degB(A) requires O(|A|) time. Adding in the sorting time, we see that our
heuristic takesO(|B|·(|A|+log(|B|))) time. In turn, adding this to the cost of Algorithm 6
does not alter the total O(|A| · |B|2) worst-time complexity.
Remark 6.16. In fact, the previous proof indicates a slightly better bound. For an integer
α define the function fα by
fα(β) =
{
β if α < β
β + 1 otherwise.
Then the bound on the previous proposition can be replaced by
|C| ≤ fdegBs (A) deg(B)(fdegBs−1 (A) deg(B)(· · · (fdegB2 (A) deg(B)(1)) · · · )) + 1.
6.5 Experimental Results
This section details the experimental results obtained by implementing the proposed
methods in the Sage Mathematical Software System [196], version 7.4. First, a compari-
son between Algorithm 7 and the Gro¨bner basis method on a practical setting is shown.
Then, a performance analysis of Algorithms 6 and 7 is carried out over random graphs.
The reported experiments have been conducted on an AMD Ryzen 7 1700X Eight-core
3.4 GHz processor, with 32 GB of RAM, in Sage [196] and under Ubuntu 4.10.0-37. All
experiments have been carried out without parallelization. All CPU running times have
been collected using the function cputime(subprocesses=True) in Sage.
6.5.1 Medical Data Example
Medical data applications tend to be extremely storage and functionality-demanding,
and thus it is often unfeasible for the data holder to locally store and manage the data.
Therefore, medical data provides a good candidate for a privacy-preserving data splitting
use case.
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Table 6.1 depicts several possible features that can be found in medical data. Since the
features patient ID and address completely identify the patient, they need to be stored
in an encrypted form, and therefore they are not taken into account in the associated
data splitting problem. A different numerical identifier is assigned to every other feature
for presentation purposes.
# Hospital Folder features # Hospital Folder features
- patient ID 4 weight
- address 5 diagnosis
0 ZIP code 6 procedure
1 birth date 7 medication
2 gender 8 charges
3 ethnicity 9 hospital ID
Table 6.1: Example of patient Healthcare features.
Observe that other combinations of attributes can also be sensitive. An example of
such combination can be {0, 2, 3} as it is shown in [197], where a 1990 federal census
reports that in Dekalb, Illinois there were only two black women who resided in that
town. We can also consider {0, 1, 3}, {0, 1, 4} and {1, 2, 3} sensitive for obvious reasons.
Moreover, some attributes may need to be stored in the same fragment, for instance to
perform statistical analysis computations. Possible combinations are: {1, 2, 5}, {1, 3, 5}
and {0, 2, 5}.
The Gro¨bner basis method (implemented as buchberger2() in Sage) and Algorithm 7
can be used to find an (A,B)-covering that solves the data splitting problem, where
A = {{0, 2, 3}, {0, 1, 2}, {0, 1, 4}, {1, 2, 3}} and B = {{1, 2, 5}, {1, 3, 5}, {0, 2, 5}, {4}}.
Gro¨bner basis method Algorithm 7
# v. A B # sol. |C| time opt. |C| time
6
{023, 012, 014, {125, 135, 025, 4} 15 3 6.68s Yes 3 3.84ms
123}
6 {023, 012, 014} {125, 135, 025, 4} 3 2 1.12ms Yes 2 1.19ms
8 {045, 123, 89} {124, 458, 09, 238} 1 2 316ms No 3 1.41ms
9
{13, 168, 34, {023, 012, 36,
204 3 16h 45min Yes 3 4.88ms
79, 036} 46, 78, 07, 9}
10
{02, 168, 34, {01, 128, 35, 46,
2 2 1.87s Yes 2 2.19ms
79, 03} 78, 04, 23, 9}
“# v.”: number of vertices of the selected hypergraph,
“# sol.”: number of optimal coverings,
|C|: size of the (A,B)-coverings computed by the respective method,
“time”: the time needed by the related method to compute the solution,
“opt.”: whether or not the solution of Algorithm 7 is optimal,
We use a compact notation for sets, i.e. 023 = {0, 2, 3}.
Table 6.2: Comparison between Gro¨bner basis method and Algorithm 7 on several
hypergraphs.
The first column of Table 6.2 shows the results of applying the Gro¨bner basis method
and Algorithm 7 to the medical data set. Algorithm 7 has been chosen for the tests
above instead of Algorithm 6 due to efficiency reasons. Both the Gro¨bner basis method
and Algorithm 7 provide optimal solutions in the considered case but with a considerable
time difference. Two of the optimal solutions computed by the Gro¨bner basis method
are depicted in Figure 6.1.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC TECHNIQUES FOR SECURING DATA IN THE CLOUD 
Jordi Ribes González 
 
6.5. Experimental Results 161
Table 6.2 also depicts the results of the Gro¨bner basis method and Algorithm 7 to
several other splitting problems, all referred to the medical data set of Table 6.1. The
time needed to obtain a solution is strictly related to the degree of A and B. Other
parameters which affect the running time are the number of vertices and the size of the
optimal covering (see Section 6.3 for more details). However, while having the same
number of vertices, the needed time may vary greatly. Observe that Algorithm 7 does
not always compute an optimal solution.
0 1
5
2
3
4
0 1
5
2
3
4
Figure 6.1: Two of the optimal solutions computed by Gro¨bner basis method of the
medical data problem. The solution found by Algorithm 7 is depicted in the right chart.
Vertices in the same set belong to the same fragment.
6.5.2 Performance Analysis over Random Graphs
We now give some performance measures to analyze the results presented in Section 6.4.
In this performance analysis we restrict to the graph case, and thus we take A ⊆ (P2)
and B ⊆ (P2)∪ (P1) to be disjoint families of subsets. We classify the test cases according
to two parameters: the number n of vertices and the sum of densities ρ = ρA + ρB of A
and B. For each test case, we randomly generate graphs by choosing every single edge
of the complete graph Kn with probability ρ, and we then throw a uniform random coin
for each chosen edge to determine if it belongs either to A or to B. Next, we add the
necessary singletons to B so that ∪B∈BB = P . Finally, we randomly shuﬄe A and B
and we apply the algorithm to test. Hence, in the considered experiments both A and
B are generated with density ρA = ρB = ρ/2.
In Table 6.3 we analyze the time performance of Algorithm 6 and Algorithm 7. For each
of the considered n and ρ, the reported CPU running times have been averaged over 103
independent random experiments.
Algorithm 6 Algorithm 7
n ρ = 0.1 ρ = 0.4 ρ = 0.7 ρ = 1.0 ρ = 0.1 ρ = 0.4 ρ = 0.7 ρ = 1.0
10 0.003 0.010 0.029 0.066 0.005 0.020 0.057 0.125
20 0.018 0.181 0.740 1.989 0.036 0.347 1.255 3.021
30 0.065 1.150 5.134 14.80 0.136 2.023 7.769 19.88
40 0.186 4.415 21.10 61.85 0.384 7.116 29.03 78.39
50 0.442 12.69 63.28 190.6 0.891 19.29 81.76 227.8
60 0.941 30.45 155.8 478.7 1.864 43.95 193.2 552.9
70 1.803 63.69 338.6 1054 3.452 88.57 403.8 1177
Table 6.3: Time performance analysis (in seconds).
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Observe that average running times increase both in the number of attributes and the
density, and range between milliseconds and 20 minutes for the considered parameters.
Next, in Table 6.4 we compile evidence on the size of the result output by Algorithm 7
over the size of the result output by Algorithm 6. For every considered n and ρ, we
randomly instantiate 105 different A and B as stated above, and for each of them we
compute the sizes salg and sheur of the (A,B)-coverings given by Algorithm 6 and by
Algorithm 7, respectively. Then, we compute the decrease as the percentage (100(salg−
sheur)/salg)% in size offered by the heuristic. The reported percentage decreases have
been averaged over at least 105 independent random experiments.
n ρ = 0.1 ρ = 0.3 ρ = 0.5 ρ = 0.7 ρ = 0.9 ρ = 1.0
5 0.01233 0.2569 0.5101 0.3551 0.09567 0
6 0.07317 1.006 1.234 0.7517 0.3193 0.08730
7 0.2227 1.991 1.876 1.193 0.6438 0.3433
8 0.5131 3.000 2.486 1.709 1.075 0.7280
9 0.9214 3.675 3.007 2.269 1.600 1.184
10 1.609 4.275 3.563 2.799 2.087 1.634
Table 6.4: Average percent size reduction given by Algorithm 7 from the size given
by Algorithm 6.
Following the same procedure, in Table 6.5 we compile evidence on the size increase of
the covering given by Algorithm 7 in relation to the size of an optimal covering. The
reported percentage decreases have been averaged over at least 104 independent random
experiments.
n ρ = 0.1 ρ = 0.3 ρ = 0.5 ρ = 0.7 ρ = 0.9 ρ = 1.0
5 0.00003333 0.0002666 0.003666 0.001333 0.00001333 0
6 0.001333 0.0250 0.1045 0.07500 0.03203 0.02680
7 0.009333 0.3333 0.3250 0.1683 0.1602 0.1548
8 0.06667 0.5167 0.4083 0.4844 0.3111 0.1940
9 0.1333 0.8417 1.041 0.8906 0.8411 0.3667
10 0.3333 1.493 1.601 1.396 1.210 0.9015
Table 6.5: Average percent size increase given by Algorithm 7 with respect to the
optimal size.
In Table 6.4, we observe that our heuristic algorithm 7 generally improves the greedy
algorithm 6 for a small number of attributes, and that this improvement grows in the
number of attributes and is larger for medium densities. In addition, in Table 6.5 we
confirm that our heuristic algorithm generally provides near-to-optimal sized decompo-
sitions for a small number of attributes, and that much better results are achieved for
small densities. In the case n = 5 and ρ = 1, our algorithms always provide optimal
coverings.
6.6 Conclusion
Recent data splitting research focuses in preserving the privacy of a sensitive data set
by decomposing it into a small number of fragments. In this context, data is split into a
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small number of fragments, frequently two or three. Since this does not usually suffice to
ensure privacy, existing solutions build cryptographic techniques on top of data splitting.
However, up to this point no research has engaged with the data splitting problem in a
setting where no other privacy-preserving techniques are to be used.
In our work, we tackle the problem of addressing privacy concerns by finding a de-
composition into fragments of a given data set. We also take into account processing
constraints, which may impose some sets of data attributes to be stored together in the
same fragment. We first consider the problem of finding the optimal number of frag-
ments needed to satisfy privacy and processing constraints, and we further remove the
optimality condition to provide better efficiency.
Firstly, we present a formulation of the stated problem and a concrete approach to
solve it. The data splitting problem is presented as a purely combinatorial problem,
by specifying two families of subsets A and B. The first family A represents privacy
constraints, and specifies sets of attributes that must not be stored together for privacy
reasons. The second family B represents processing constraints, and specifies sets of
attributes that must be stored together in the same fragment in order to speed up
processing. In this setting, we introduce the notion of (A,B)-covering, and we show that
(A,B)-coverings directly translate to solutions of the privacy-preserving data splitting
problem.
Once the combinatorial problem of finding (A,B)-covering is stated, we show that it can
be solved by using purely algebraic techniques through its equivalence to a hypergraph-
coloring problem. We exhibit an algebraic formulation of the data splitting problem,
which translates privacy and processing constraints to a system of simultaneous equa-
tions. Through the use of Gro¨bner bases, this formulation allows the computation of
optimally-sized data decompositions.
Since finding an optimal covering is an NP-hard problem, obtaining optimal solutions
is often unfeasible in practice. We hence present a greedy algorithm that sacrifices
optimality for efficiency, achieving a polynomial running time in the size of the considered
problem. We further present an heuristic improvement of this greedy algorithm, that
provides smaller decompositions when the family of constraints is sparse enough.
A performance analysis is carried out to evaluate all of the presented solutions. First,
we analyze the execution time of our first algebraic approach in the context of a medical
data set. Next, we report the execution times of our greedy and heuristic algorithms
over random graphs, and we estimate the size overhead incurred by both algorithms
with respect to the optimal size for a small number of attributes. The experimental
results show that our greedy algorithm requires milliseconds to find a solution, whereas
computing an optimal solution may require hours depending on the problem at hand.
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